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ABSTRACT
Feeling as Knowing: Trans Phenomenology and Epistemic Justice
by
B Lee Aultman
Advisor: Paisley Currah
This dissertation is a critical intervention into the literatures on epistemic and
phenomenological claims about trans experiences, and embodied knowledge more generally. It
also addresses the conception of ordinary affects, or feelings of self-adjustment in everyday life,
and their political implications for trans people. Traditional literatures on the political tend to
avoid questions of embodiment and the experiences of everyday life in favor of institutional
interpretations of courts, elections, and protest movements. This has become particularly true of
scholarship on trans politics and theories of ordinary life. These literatures often reduce political
movements to their presumed universal intentions for constitutional equality and legal parity.
Theories of life, for example, biopolitics and recent attention to neoliberalism, more often
describes trans people as effects of power relations. Bodies are disciplined bodies otherwise
evacuated of any sense of agency and being. In the most generalized instances, trans people are
represented in two ways. On the one hand, they possess a liberal desire toward a normative life
of assimilation. On the other hand, they are rebellious, possessing an anti-normative desire to
abolish sex/gender binaries altogether.
Each of these representations of trans people severely impairs understanding their how
gender nonnormative forms of life actually live in under ordinary circumstances. These
representations also reduce the richness of trans knowledge claims. Such commitments create the
conditions for misunderstanding, and misreading, the complexities of trans histories, narratives,
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and even what it means to possess an embodied sense of selfhood. These misunderstandings
create the conditions for many continued forms of epistemic injustice, a form of injustice that is
characterized by the reduction of a person’s, or a group’s, capacity to engage in claiming
knowledge about the world as well as the production of knowledge itself. Descending into what
this dissertation calls the “trans ordinary” is a means for arguing that feeling, that is to say the
live sensations during scenes of ordinary moments, serves as a co-present condition for knowing
and thus making claims about the world. This work is a theory of feeling as knowing.
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Preface
The Latina philosopher and phenomenologist Mariana Ortega, whose work I found
exceptionally incisive and inviting, write about “hometactics” in her book In-Between: Latina
Feminist Phenomenology, Multiplicity, and the Self. Really, the term is articulated at the very
end of her erudite discussion of marginally gendered and racialized selfhood. She argues that
writing that book was an exercise in finding herself, in locating a home in a series of academic
worlds that might feel uninviting. I didn’t know it yet, but I too wanted to write an extended
dialogue about our attachments to gender and what this dissertation (intentionally or not) might
do to complicate movements toward or away from those attachments. I had felt an uneasy but
durable sense that political science in particular and theories of the political in general lacked a
sustained conversation with the plurality of gendered existence. It was at first a stinging
realization that transgender and gender nonconforming (trans) political life had (and has) been
given very little attention other than what investigators find as reactions to institutional action
against trans communities, a study of their social movements, or the backlash when their
constitutional rights were asserted. So, what are we thinking about when we think about gender?
Bodies, sex, experiences, identity, subjectivity, theories, living moments, and/or psychic states?
Are they common and shared by all or simply personal and isolating in nature only to us? To get
at some answers to these broad questions, this work is situated within the larger literatures of
queer theory, political theory, and transgender studies.
My visit to the Transgender Archives in Victoria, British Columbia, in 2015 proved to be
one of the most transformative events in my graduate career. The archive, in general, has a
peculiar kind of affective economy. It is often cold and silent. Few people are there. Books don’t
speak. The experience of the daily walk to the archive (I was on campus as a visiting scholar and
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the Archive was only a few building away), the routine of requesting the cart of boxes that I had
requested the day before and interacting with the pleasant staff gave it a more relational feel.
Sifting through pages of books and newspapers, adult magazines and stickers, pins and other
ephemera, I was often up and out of my seat scanning material into my online cloud storage. I
read closely any word that might indicate something political in the ordinary lives these files
contained. It could simply be the description of a scene at a pageant or an eruption of violence in
a protest. Often I would find headlines concerning the death of trans people. It struck me that
each folder contained not only words—but life. There were texts that merely represented facts,
such as newspapers and academically oriented books. But there were personal effects, diaries,
poems, stream-of-consciousness notes, and other miscellanea. These words were typed by human
hands. Most were typed by trans people long since passed away. It was history in the present,
what Walter Benjamin might have called human knowledge in the nucleus of time.
But I was affected, particularly, by a typewritten page, stuck between two old newspaper
clippings, so out of place. A single line on a blank page. I scanned it (see image below):

Image 1.0 Scanned Fragment from the Archives
The mystery of this note, its affective attachment of this short typed piece I still carry with me,
haunts this dissertation in a way. I find these perennial words of Thomas Paine’s “American
Crisis” moving anyway. But, I wonder if not all times, in the sense of our ordinary coming
undone, isn’t somehow always already trying our souls. Through the many literatures I started
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searching in order to find meaning in the process of what this dissertation will be frequently
referring to as “meaning-making,” Lauren Berlant’s work stuck out the most. She argues that
everyday life is filled to some extent with a broad array of attachments and that these
attachments, however banal, create the conditions for our own unhappiness. This is particularly
heightened when the ordinary comes under siege. As I will repeatedly explain throughout the
following chapters (perhaps to a fault), the ordinary is how everyday life (from pain to joy) is
folded and otherwise justified so as to make do. When these concerns of making do are
jeopardized, when “The fantasies that are fraying include, particularly, upward mobility, job
security, political and social equality, and lively, durable intimacy...the ordinary becomes a
landfill for overwhelming and impending crises of life-building and expectation whose sheer
volume so threatens what it has meant to ‘have a life’ that adjustment seems like
accomplishment” (Berlant 2011, 3). If being trans these days means putting up with open
political hostility, denied access to health coverage, bathroom access, and continued sustained
everyday violence—then, indeed, these are trying times.
Affect theory could be described as observing how things affect, and are affected by,
other things. It’s a nebulous term—affect—that describes an array of unthought and taken-forgranted forces that shape our orientations to the world around us. To be affected by ordinary
circumstances offers insight into where everyday life emerges as more than variables in a
complex discourse. To feel at home, to be at home, to rest in bed, to feel upset, the feelings of
anxiety or sadness, the amorphous feelings that circulate in our ordinary day on a commute, all
compose our attunement to the world. Indeed, to be in the world is human being—to belong in a
world, to act in a world, to associate in a world. So to invite affect from ordinary life into our
thinking about gender would be critical to thinking gender, full stop. (As an exercise: begin to
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sense your body’s shape and position in which is currently situated; notice how it relates to the
space and objects within it, the feeling of the elastic bands from your clothing, the tightness or
looseness of your pants or dress, the way a shirt falls over your chest, or the tingle of hair over
your eyes or neck. These are feelings, illegible at first, but are shaped by some of the very
assumptions we have about the gendered body itself. Weight, height, hair length, the presence of
hair on the body at all, our (non)reproductive organs—these are all conditioned by a litany of
discourses, memories, stories, and objects that shape your relation to your body and the world it
moves within.) The ordinary is, in fact, gendered.
But suppose that I don’t read philosophy or social theory in a manner, as scholars would
like presumably, from a purely academic angle in this dissertation. Thus, I wouldn’t read Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s (1958) monumental Philosophical Investigations (PI) as a philosopher, or a social
theorist, but as a human, in what Heidegger called my everydayness, endeavoring in what
humans do: make a life. The book was supposed to be about, as I’ve learned over the course of
writing this dissertation, ordinary language and forms of life. I think this becomes a more
illuminating ground for how one might approach Wittgenstein’s theories of games and language.
It was for me. In other words, it isn’t for the philosopher to determine what constitutes language
as such. It isn’t for the social theorist to let the people know what is social and cultural. It is,
rather, people who do it. The contextual arrangements among collectives of human “we’s” that
crystalize in order for (personal, social, cultural) meaning to happen. That, as for language,
speaking and action is a “form of life” (11). That language games should be understood as
metonymic with a kind of (sociological, anthropological, philosophical) life, or life-making. That
as we move through the world, or our various worlds in the production of that life, we find
“family resemblances” amongst and between common structures, places, and things (32).
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Imagining, then, the whole of PI becomes less a task of dismantling the complexities of what
constitutes a “game” as such. It is rather an exercise leading to a powerful conclusion: That the
ordinary in life-making consists of contexts and micrological meanings, not macrological
propositions and “ideals.” There is something non-replicable about the human experience. There
is a kind of being of monumental importance that is involved in our attunements to one another
as we fasten meaning to places and things, other people and other times—life in the making.
This, I think, is the beginning of a venture into the ordinary that Veena Das (2007)
ascribes as the crucial task of understanding subjectivity. It is not enough to understand the large
structure that “we” all “know” explains this or that. Capitalism and work. Neoliberalism and
market-logics of exclusion. Heteronormativity and sexual desire. Rather, delving into those
forms of life, that “way of speaking,” requires of us investigators a special kind of attention. That
even the banalities of a simple existence become a site of plastic and innumerable meanings.
This simple existence may find attachments to all sorts of structural or unanticipated aspects of
our culture, or society, or their local socialities and life-worlds. This simple existence, this form
of life, is a generative concept that heaves upon the investigator the onus of more than
framework-development. It is only through descending into the ordinary, to borrow language
from Das, that one might begin to understand how this form of life takes its shape in comparison
to, but also complete unto its own self, others. Because, importantly, to live a life is to learn
(when did we learn) the meaning of our language games within a “family of meanings” as they
are led within (the ongoing question of) the “bounds of the incidental” (37). There, between the
lines of scoring the commonplace definitions of things, a kind of life exists. He is complicating
how one might compartmentalize meanings, look at data, and render forms of life intelligible. He
seems to reach out from the text and suggest that our ontologies need excavating, that our
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understanding is buried too deeply normative assumptions. That he is not entirely invested in
language, per se. He is invested in life as living forms of interaction, meaning-making, emotion,
affect, contradiction, affinity, and difference.
I have no doubt, and I would be foolish to think otherwise, that Wittgenstein had in mind
the special place of rules in meaning. Being invested in everyday language rather than “ideal”
forms of linguistic syntax, he affirmed the basis of understanding and knowledge—of finding
some common ground for truths. But, again, this is qualified by a particular insistence on the
rules of a game as they are carried out in life. As so many signs along the path of living. His
philosophy, the way I read it, is less a suspicion of abstraction and more an assertion on the
commingling of abstraction and concreteness within everyday life. Learning and playing,
discovering and naming—that is to say, living—avoids the “ahistorical” methods of some
philosophies. Rules of a game, like words (like life!) occur within history like so many parts of
human constructions. Again, with qualification. Things are not constructed “all the way down.”
Rather, things are held within meaningful constellations, family resemblances, and human
relations. The descent into how these play out, how these make sense, of how human beings
make do in their ordinary lives: I think this marks the philosophy in PI.
These are among the many methodological problematics in PI. For instance, I find certain
phenomenological insights crucial to understanding ordinary life. First, that there isn’t the
penetration of phenomena, but rather the “possibilities of phenomena” (42). That is to say, what
grounds our shared world of understanding isn’t so much firmly planted beings, but shifting
forms of meaning about them. Second, when he writes that “our investigation is therefore a
grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing
misunderstandings away” (44). The importance is found in understanding the various ways a
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proposition (or forms of life) comes to mean something, somewhere, to someone or some people.
Again, I find this to be a philosophy of life, not mere words. To me, as to Das, life and words are
inextricably bound, nucleated by cultural, social, and everyday affinities. To understand
propositions we must first learn to understand the forms of life from which they flow. Thus, what
we take as linguistic must be understood as emanating from some affective “signposts” for
everyday practice. Kathleen Stewart’s (1996) work in A Space on the Side of the Road has read
these signs with exceptional clarity.
Parts of life-making vary. Parts of which—being made and remade in processes that
cannot unfold simply for the critic—only the human (however it is so defined) can perceive
them, make them “move together,” or not. There are parts completely opaque to the critic (an
affective attachment to a particular chair). There are parts uniquely understood by the critic (an
affective attachment to a market of “free” labor). There are others that must remain open and
fluid (the feelings, the felt sense of being gendered, racialized, and sexed). This list can, and
should, be exhausting in its scope. The endlessness of meanings that socialities and members of
groups and social individuals attach to places and things, others and “home,” are grist for
excitement—a certain philosophical zeal that should be tempered only by an ethos not of
(feminist) care, but “reparative nurture.” One can nurture a story, a narrative, or history of a
place/people, without “caring” for it in some particular way. I could still get it wrong, though I
“took great care” not to. Or, I could care and nurture, where the latter is most important. I care
about trans communities, and desire to nurture their narratives and history. I care about them in
ways singular to my own personal attachments (my own identity, my own felt sense of
embodiment). Thus, I seek to nurture, in a way, a form of life with which I find a family
resemblance, a kinship, a close relation to—and take care not to fuck up.
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This kind of confession isn’t an empty piety. It speaks to a certain kind of theorizing that
I feel must go into talking, thinking, and investigating certain ways of being in the world. It
speaks to a personal history cross-cut by other histories that seemed only to have meaning upon
embarking on this research. The snapping into place of all those moments (of meaning) that had
been, until a specific time of reading in an archive or the pages of a book, like frozen crystals
hanging from the walls of my memory. And they suddenly came to life. Given words, these
memories were exposed to meaning and significance. I suddenly found that I, too, was within a
constellation of forms of life—a part of something in another world (still this one, but not quite).
I had been (economically and racially) privileged and spirited away from that other world,
however. I had been tamed by something I would learn were called “norms.” I had learned to
temper myself through the reproduction of these norms. And in this “tempering” I realized that
making do isn’t something one just learns from living in poverty, or the mere words of a parentlike figure. Making do meant toughing it out even when you knew those conditions were wrong,
problematic, unjust—but you lacked the grammar to make sense of it (Wittgenstein was right
that such investigations are grammatical). So, going deeper into history, I realized more
meanings, more constellations, more life needed excavating and nurture. Not just subjugated, this
knowledge was sedimented, ossified, absent the meaningful experience that words provide—
only meaningful to that form of life hidden within the texts of poetry and autobiography. How to
give them life again, to redeem them as Walter Benjamin sought in his critique of history, is a
part of my aim in this dissertation.
Thus, the ordinary as a part of the meaning of making a life becomes clearer as the
dissertation progresses. However unique or singular it is to one life or another, the ordinary
doesn’t deny a cultural “snapping” into place of meaning. That words, language even, is imbued
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with a kind of power that gives expression to those things we call memory and memory,
likewise, imbues language with the power of experience and the past. That history and time, if
only the concatenation of momentary “now’s,” become the keepsakes of thought horizons of
being in the world. That, as Martin Heidegger envisioned, memory becomes the gathering of all
thought—calls us to thinking. To pay homage to those socialities and forms of life that seem to
defy the imaginaries of scientists, critics, and theologians; to pay homage, in a certain sense, to
life-making in spite of all the critical bullshit, is another way of imagining this dissertation’s
trajectory.
Consider, for a moment, the following story. A young child, no older than six, was
visiting family in North Carolina back in the 80s after spending time in England (the father was a
military man). The living room is filled with aunts and uncles, cousins, brothers, and sisters,
telling stories in the living room of a special woman—mother to some, grandmother to others.
Some laughter was punctuated: “Ann was a meaner ‘an Hell when she was younger.” Ann
looked up from painting her nails. “And what the hell is that supposed to mean, Bob?” The sixyear old danced and watched and listened. Aunt Ann gently grabbed the child’s waist, pulling
them in for big, all embracing hug. “Let’s paint your nails, too.” The living room fills with
laughter as this little creature proudly gallops around the room, showing off a freshly minted
pink. Little fingers were delicately outstretched, touching the arms and foreheads of aunts and
uncles and teenage cousins. A quiet consternation nestled between growingly nervous laughter.
The laughter stops when an uncle says it’s time to take off the polish—the charm has worn off.
The child stiffly refuses. And not without a fight, without some embarrassed tears and
frustration, the polish was removed. The little boy who loved his pink nails ran to a TV room and
wondered what was wrong. It’s “effeminate,” someone had said. What does that mean?
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The boy would grow up in several states. The schools and people changed as quickly as
they would appear, forming sinuous memories of friendships and relationships—faces and names
often melded together. The banal and the fantastic seemed to sit side-by-side in his mind. Like
when he was thrown into a garbage can for being a “faggot.” Never knew what that meant either.
He told no one this: But when he discovered that touching certain parts of his body felt good, he
thought of that bully. In high school he joined a church that preached a unique gospel. That
effeminate men (there it was again) were abominations. “Fairies will burn in Hell.” Fairies? He
pleaded with the congregation to pray for him—and as they laid their hands on his head and
shoulders, he cried as he had done at in a North Carolina living room—another layer taken away.
His mother was not so amused upon learning of this. Baffled at her son’s odd behavior—his
isolating and moody affects, his righteous accusations about identity. She firmly stated that he
needed to stop attending this church. “God is not hate. God makes no mistakes.” She said this
with a delicate southern drawl, disarming, loving. She reached for him—and he wept again
because he didn’t know where he belonged. “Here,” she whispered.
As a sophomore, he met a lesbian! She took him to the places that had all the “gay stuff.”
He secretly accumulated adult magazines for “gay” men. He began to pilfer his mother’s nail
polish, eyeliner, blush, and mascara. But he only put it on in the bathrooms at school. Never at
home. Never to be caught! One year, he was given his father’s pickup truck. He was now
independent. So he exploited that independence. He would paint his nails in the truck when he
got to the school’s parking lot. He would gel his hair with a glitter-like product. His lesbian
friend had given him butterfly berets to style his hair. He had skirts, dresses, and lipstick. He had
boy clothes and girl clothes but couldn’t quite tell why they were entirely separate in the first
place. Though he would outwardly play at being coy when girls wanted him to put on the skirts.
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That all ended, of course, when his father discovered the polish, the glitter, the makeup. His
mother told him that he needed to stop. His father was upset. Where do I belong?
This story is a part of a litany of others that this dissertation treats narratives of
transgender and gender nonconforming (trans) life. No narrative is universal in character. But
this narrative is mine to share. But it is already shared by others: my mother, my cousins, family,
and friends—now you. But what makes it political, or where was politics expressed at all? The
school’s bathroom, of recent importance for transgender rights, was a site where I, by necessity,
applied make-up? The privacy of my new truck that afforded me the opportunity to get ready on
the way to school or in the school’s parking lot? Even the exchanges between a young queer and
their lesbian friend? These all have political importance for queer life. These spaces and
moments in time, however ordinary and trivial they might first appear, are the foundation of an
embodied politics that comprises the very grounds forming a life. As I created myself from
within the complications of ordinary events, I found my own agency, voice, and way of being in
the world. I want to explore what this journey has meant for others.

B Lee Aultman
The Graduate Center, CUNY
New York, NY
2018
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Foreword: Notes on Sex, Gender, and Identity
Studying sex/gender systems and the outgrowth of human identities has undergone
extensive crises of interpretation in the last two millennia. The body has been a kind of map or
project of these interpretations. Philosopher Michel Foucault traced this scientific development
of the human, noting that as both object of study and subject of philosophical inquiry the human
had become a “empirico-transcendental” doublet (1994 [1970], 303-343). The human (or more to
the point the “man” of mankind) is constructed and can only be understood through this
constructed historicity responsible for shaping culture’s expanding and contracting theories of
knowledge (or epistemology). Since Foucault’s genre-creating (and shattering) observations,
scientists and social theorists alike have been preoccupied with the “constructedness” of most
facets of the human being, most especially that of sex and gender. As queer theorist Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick put it, “the charting of a space between something called ‘sex’ and
something called ‘gender’ has been one of the most influential and successful undertakings of
feminist thought” (2008 [1990], 27). I would like to briefly examine these in relation to trans in
order to set a baseline of working assumptions for the rest of this dissertation.
Queer and Feminist Criticisms of Sex/Gender
Discussing trans histories is to implicate feminist debates over normalizing sex and
gender within history. Since at least Simone de Beauvoir’s now canonical claim in The Second
Sex that one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman, “sex has had the meaning of a certain
group of irreducible, biological differentiations between members of the species Homo sapiens
Gender, then, is the far more elaborated, more fully and rigidly dichotomized social production
and reproduction of male and female of identities and behaviors” (Sedgwick 2008 [1990], 27).
What is less well known, despite their use in both popular and academic cultures, is that the
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terms “gender” and “gender identity” did not emerge as qualifying the human condition until
somewhere in the late 1950s with psychologist John Money and his peers (Jordan-Young 2010).
Gender was a social manifestation of sex, but gender identity was a deeply sensed psychological
connection between the body and mind. Bracketing “gender identity” momentarily, the analyses
restricting sex and gender to different spheres of the human condition with lasting implications
for both gender and sexual minorities.

Sex (Associated Biology)

Gender (Associated Social Roles)

Male
Penis and Scrotum (External)
Prostate and Testes (Internal)
Production of Spermatozoa (Sperm) and
Semen
XY Chromosomes, Testosterone

Man
Masculine-defined
Assertive towards sexual partner(s)
Worker or laborer (Public)
Subject of heterosexual desire

Female
Vaginal Opening, Labia, Clitoris (External)
Uterus and Ovaries (Internal)
Production of Ova (Eggs)
XX Chromosome, Estrogen

Woman
Feminine-defined
Passive and welcoming toward sexual partner
Caretaker and domestic laborer (Private)
Object of heterosexual desire

Table 1.0: Sex and Gender
In Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud, historian Thomas Laqueur
(1999) argued that as far back to second century, the body, though sexually classified into two
complementary visions, were primordially the same. Males were, from Greek anatomist Galen’s
point of view, the central and defining embodiment from which women, as “inverts” of male
bodies, grew. It is often the case that gender roles have always been conceived out of the sexual
differences of human bodies. One of Laqueur’s crucial yet missed points, however, was that
“there [was] no effort [at that time] to ground social roles in nature; social categories themselves
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are natural and on the same explanatory level as what we would take to be physical or biological
facts. Nature is not therefore to culture what sex is to gender, as in modern discussions” (29). A
definitive point in the re-telling of that history, borrowing from and yet transforming the
meaning of theological accounts on “good sexual politics” along the way, was the Enlightenment
phenomena of modern science and rationalism from the 17th century onward. There, it was
possible for two sexes to emerge and to anchor two parallel social categories with normative
assignments for both. And yet the problematic remained, “social and political changes are not, in
themselves, explanations for the reinterpretation of bodies the remaking of the body is itself
intrinsic to each of these developments” (11). The features of each cultural development, and the
theories of knowledge (or epistemologies) they produce, have a tendency to harden into
normative practices or commonsense.
As feminist philosopher Charlotte Witt argues, from the moment of the Enlightenment
onward, regardless of etymology and interpretive shifts, gender had an important cultural
component that divvies up social positions in which the complexities of everyday human life are
carried out (2011, 29-30). Gender determines a social function “in terms of the different socially
mediated reproductive functions of men and women” (29). In other words, gender difference
became a popular, not a purely intellectual, reflection of sexual difference, and the two
maintained each other in a kind of perpetual dualism. The resulting social functions carried out
over time, becoming fixed, erased the complex and intersecting histories of sexual differences
and established new practices. This fixity led feminist historian Gayle Rubin (1975) to argue that
sexual norms and gender norms are mutually reproductive, creating what she called the
“sex/gender system.” The effects of this system are manifold: reaffirming the sexualized roles of
men and women meant reaffirming the bodily requirements for being a male or female (that is,
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genitalia capable of sexual reproduction); this naturalized hetero-sexed couples and reaffirmed
heteronormative sexual desires and prohibited homo-sexed desires, laying the cultural
groundwork for homophobia; insofar as roles were developed, so too were the norms of
masculinity and femininity, ascribed as “natural” behaviors to the sexes; by naturalizing
heteronormativity, the sex/gender system coded men’s bodies as stronger and women’s bodies as
weaker, or to recapitulate Witt, gender roles could be fashioned around sexual virility and desire.
In short, masculinity and femininity became part of a symbolic and yet manifestly “real”
network of social forces that separated men from women, males from females, normal from
abnormal behaviors and practices. With these conceptions of gender on one side and sex on the
other, history had been written in mostly normative tones. How this history would deal with trans
communities who, in some form that did not yet have a name until the 20th century, is fraught
with empirical and theoretical consequences.
Trans-ing Sex/Gender Trouble
Making distinctions about sex and gender are part and parcel of both queer and trans
studies. Indeed, they are the root of contemporary theories about nonbinary gender identities. But
these terms (sex and gender) continue to have vexed relationships. “Sex is not the same as
gender,” remarks historian Susan Stryker (2008, 7). Her landmark Transgender History was one
of the first attempts (following her co-edited volume of The Transgender Studies Reader) at
collating the critical histories and terms underscoring the debates in queer and feminist theories.
The fact that Stryker appears so adamant is not a simple reflection of past scholarship, where
biology (sex) and social function (gender) are kept related but distinct. Other foundational
thinkers in the field of gender and sexuality studies, since the 1990s, propped this position of
hers up by a sustained attack on the validity of the sex/gender distinction. Sedgwick, for
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example, calls into question the usefulness of this division altogether. She had argued that the
sexed body, beyond the dubious distinctions relying by chromosomes or hormones, called into
question how sex is precisely a physical phenomenon where gender is not. Rather, “usages
involving the ‘sex/gender system’ within feminist theory are able to use ‘sex/gender’ only to
delineate a problematical space rather than a crisp distinction” (2008 [1990], 29). She was not
alone.
A decade before, French philosopher Monique Wittig had stated, at a conference of
professional linguists and theorists, that “lesbians are not women” (quoted in Hale 1996, 94). She
argued, in part, that because “lesbian” as a category can never fulfill the status as both an object
desired by heterosexual men and object desiring heterosexed affection, lesbians can never fully
inhabit the social position of “woman.” This might seem fanciful if not eccentric. But other queer
theorists used this as a means of rethinking the sex/gender system tout court. Queer theorist
Judith Butler (2008 [1990]) has been one of the most influential thinkers in this area. In
developing her “performative theory” of gender, Butler also criticized the distinctiveness of sex
and gender for its occlusion of certain political powers. For her, “the identification of women
with ‘sex,’ is a conflation of the category of women with the ostensibly sexualized features of
their bodies and, hence, a refusal to grant freedom and autonomy to women as it is purportedly
enjoyed by men. Thus, the destruction of the category of sex would be the destruction of an
attribute, sex, that has, through a misogynist gesture come to take the place of the person” (27,
emphasis in text). In short, what has been understood as gender has been sex all along. Even
Thomas Laqueur, almost a decade after Sedgwick and Butler’s respective texts had
revolutionized queer studies, wrote that his book “show[s] the basis of historical evidence that
almost everything one wants to say about sex—however sex is understood—already has in it a
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claim about gender. Sex, in both the one-sex and the two-sex worlds, is situational; it is
explicable only within the context of battles over gender and power” (1999, 11). If sex and
gender referred to the same thing, then what of those whose sex did not, in a sense, coincide with
the gender that had been ostensibly destroyed?
It was at this point of the debate, where feminists and other theorists were determining
just how “constructed” gender and sex were, that trans activists and scholars were reintroduced
into the mixture. But their voices, as Sandy Stone (1987) has argued, were already spoken for.
Some radical feminists like Janice Raymond, Stone argued, made trans women and
nonnormativity seem like conscious efforts by biological men to encroach on women’s spaces.
Raymond refused to call trans women real women or to unsettle gender norms except in
politically salutary ways. But the most prolific in the field of radical queer feminism was Judith
Butler. For Butler, the sex/gender collapse was not just a call to political intervention on behalf
of women. She was convinced that gender (indeed sex) was a part of a representational system,
an illusion and not a material form. Gender, she argued, was nothing if only the reenactment of
cultural norms over time that, following Foucault’s observations about the human, performed
and generated truths. “Discrete genders,” she argued, “are part of what ‘humanizes’ individuals
within contemporary culture; indeed, we regularly punish those who fail to do their gender right”
(190). The norms governing gender possess “truth” only in the context of the performances and
the repetition of those performances. Her work speculated that gender has no original, no first
man or woman who could provide an adequate or original truthful account of what gender was.
“Because there is neither an ‘essence’ that gender expresses or externalizes nor an objective ideal
to which gender aspires, and because gender is not a fact, the various acts of gender create the
idea of gender, and without those acts, there would be no gender at all. Gender is, thus, a
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construction that regularly conceals its genders” (ibid.). Butler’s points are radically progressive
and yet prohibitive for gender nonnormative identities for a few reasons.
The progressive implication is that the linkage between birth-assigned sex and gender
must be broken. Sociologist Lori Girshick might sum this perspective best: “the presumption that
two genders correspond to two sexes is doomed to be false when we realize that there are more
than two sexes and, therefore, more than two genders” (2008, 24). If there is no true gender, or
sex for that matter, then the body is not a naturalized given but an ongoing constructed thing.
Politically, the gender subversive person could wield this knowledge and “parody” gender, just
as those who perform drag do in the subcultural scenes of gay and queer bars. But the prohibitive
possibilities of this theory suggested a lack of materiality to both the body and the gender: no
real gender means no real body. If that is the case, are trans people merely reproducing fictitious
gender norms that, when one comes right down to it, mean that the trans identity itself is
fictitious? Can the trans body exist as materially situated, possessing a gender and identity,
without its being considered merely an effect of something else (for Butler, that “something else”
is the regulatory effect of power)? In another text, Bodies that Matter, Butler (1993) slightly
revises her argument to argue that the body is the material remainder of gender’s relational
power. But limitations of this argument are still captured by other trans phenomenologists like
Jay Prosser (1998), who argued that trans bodies were very much “here,” not in some distant
elsewhere of discourse and fantasy, possessing a phenomenality unique to the person.
Materiality is an important component of the debate concerning gender nonnormative
life. Although the radical critique of gender as a performative, and thus constructed, aspect of
everyday human life opened the possibility that the rigidity of the binary must become more
flexible, it did little to establish “realness” or “reality” to a trans phenomenology of the body. If
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anything, it took energy from it. Somewhere between this debate of construction and its polar
opposite of essentialism, considers biology as an important part of the sex/gender equation, but
not a deterministic one. Biologist and feminist Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000) has written
extensively on the existence of the five sexes, inclusive of intersex communities. Fausto-Sterling
has offered readers more than a brilliant account of the diversity of the human sexes. She also
demonstrated that the study of gender and sex can be empirical as much as it is theoretical. For
Rebecca Jordan-Young (2010), a “three-ply yarn” theory works best for interpreting the
complexities of material and symbolic forces that affect the identities of a person. She writes that
the realms of sex, gender, and sexuality all work in biologically diverse and socially distinctive
ways. Each are co-productive, or relational, terms that cannot be taken in complete isolation of
one another: “I find the [three-ply yarn] metaphor appealing because it suggests three strands that
are simultaneously distinct, interrelated, and somewhat fuzzy around the boundaries” (15). For
feminist philosopher Charlotte Witt (2011), some gender essentialisms are not themselves a bad
thing. Rather, gender essentialism is a way of forming one’s identity around a singular (and
personal) understanding of a given norm experienced in everyday life. In this way, Witt argues,
gender’s essence is less about violently limiting a human being through normative sanctions
(although that can happen). Rather, gender essentialism exists on a number of levels that give a
social actor the opportunity to experiment with the generic practices of gender and the
conventional standards that circulate in a culture about the sexed body.
This is the intersection from which my own assumptions about sex/gender emerge.
Namely, that there is materiality to the body. We need not focus on pre-discursive or purely
discursive practices to make claims about human life in terms of sex and gender. The task of this
dissertation will be to examine how interactions of material, linguistic, extra-linguistic (such as
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gestures and performances), affective, and life-making practices co-construct one’s sense of
gender. And finally, that even these are linked with heterogeneous social, economic, and political
relations of power that engage with subjectivity that create an affective condition for the
possibility of knowledge.
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Introduction: Thinking about the Trans Ordinary
Feeling as knowing does not conflate affect, or sensation, and knowledge-claims that
posit “facts” about the structure of the world. Rather, feeling beside knowing, as a supplement
and update to knowledge, is suggestive. It is a commitment to the theory that everyday life is
filled with fits and starts of singularly lived and culturally shared energy that is felt, lived, and
embedded in situational contexts. These feelings surge from moment to moment or can stabilize
into patterns indistinguishable the face of the everyday. These moments and temporal
punctuations, shocks to our nervous system and feelings of being-at-ease, all tend to settle in the
ordinary—a space of living out the complexities of the world in terms of feeling and being
present to change, stasis, crisis, or wellbeing. That is to say, the contemporary “present” of our
lived experience is felt intensely, experienced in a kind of existential thickness. Time can stop
and the experience of a moment can become terrorizing, pulsating, and subject to as much
painful clarity as anxiety-inducing confusion. In one example of these extremes, poet Claudia
Rankine captures the intensity of this temporality in a vivid poetics from Citizen. “Then flashes,
a siren, a stretched-out roar—and you are not the guy and still you fit the description because
there is only one guy who is always the guy fitting the description” (Rankine 2014, 106). She is
writing from the narrative-life of marginalized Black bodies in American culture. In an age
marked by economic inequalities compounded by social divisions on the basis of race, ethnicity,
gender, sex, sexuality, class, and ability, the marginalized feel this thick present in particular
emphasis. Even the most routine of day-to-day things, like driving, might become a situation
waiting to become an event. “Get on the ground. Get on the ground now. I must have been
speeding. No, you weren’t speeding. I wasn't speeding. You didn't’ do anything wrong. Then
why are you pulling me over? Why am I pulled over? Put your hands where they can be seen.
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Put your hands in the air. Put your hands up. Then you are stretched out on the hood. Then
cuffed. Get on the ground” (ibid.). This scene of ordinary life, where driving to and from a store
(or a parent’s house, a lover’s apartment, the homeless shelter) becomes a site of something
Gloria Anzaldúa called “intimate terrorism” (Ortega 2016, 20). Because it is a scene taken right
out of everyday life that, for most is mere background noise, it makes getting past the trauma that
much more difficult. Because it happens in the ordinary, this kind of violence disrupts the
familiar and transforms it into an uncanny object of state terror. These moments might be
singularly lived but no less culturally shared. Kathleen Stewart (2007) describes these scenes of
ordinary life where “everyone knows something” whether its “not quite right” or just there. The
scene sticks to local and cultural imaginaries.
The following dissertation is an exploration of this cultural and singularly lived space.
But through the lens of trans experiences, I am calling it the “trans ordinary.” It is a study in
phenomenology of the body alongside affective experiences in gender nonnormative forms of
life. By intertwining these sometimes disparate methods of theory and philosophy, I hope to
establish the presence of a felt sense of knowledge for trans communities. But first, there is some
necessary ground-clearing. I am not making a metaphysical claim that the ordinary is similarly
situated across worlds. Rather, I am arguing throughout that the ordinary is, in the present, being
felt as something both stable and discontinuous. The ordinary is not the forgettable banalities of
existence nor is it a space defined by purely repetitive habit. It is, rather, a site of meaningmaking, forming and carving out a life, interpretation, interpellation, variation, and
improvisation. Where the “everyday” in “everyday life” consists of the ideological guarantees
that things will go according to plan, the ordinary consists of precisely how forms of life engage
in practices that come to define those plans. Imagine the narrator in Rankine’s poem cited above.
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What practices does she/he use to turn this site of intimate terrorism into something thinkable,
workable, livable? How do forms of life adjust to these environments that seem so hostile to
them? I use “forms of life” to designate how the construction of “living” a singular iteration of a
larger picture of life has a form and content (although neither can be precisely detailed) without
neat classification. And therein lies the frustration for scholarship. As a site of improvisational
life-making, ordinary life is messy (Stewart 2007; Das 2007; Berlant 2011). All one can hope to
do is gain a descriptive insight into what kinds of practices and improvisational work goes on in
making sense of life in the sometimes personal, sometimes impersonal zones that suggest to
onlookers that “something more” is there. That is why the ordinary is both a cultural (that there is
something more) and lived (that there is room for improvisation) space.
In this introduction, I hope to elaborate how the ordinary will be a part of the intellectual
architecture of each subsequent chapter. Namely, I want to point out how the ordinary, and more
specifically the trans ordinary, is site of rich experience as much enmeshed in history as it is in
feelings of the “thick present.” I want to flesh out how “the political” and “politics” attend to
future projects of self-making that engage with this felt sense of temporal thickness. Insofar as
being-a-self, or being-in-worlds more generally, is multiplicitous and ongoing, attention to
improvisation and adaptation is crucial to this study. But I also want to illustrate how the trans
ordinary is a space of affective arrangements, structures, and orientations. It is a site where the
everyday has to make sense. It is a space where one’s affective “furniture,” so to speak, is in a
constant state of arrangement, or sometimes not. The differences matter. The ordinary might be
thought of as a “poetics of space,” where subjects feel their way through in particular ways that
potentially share an aesthetic.
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I often use the term affect as means of tracking historical feelings and moods into the
ordinary spaces of present trans life-making and world-building. One familiar with
phenomenology and continental philosophy might find these terms familiar, and others uncanny.
My sense is that affective experience can be brought into play, so to speak, so as to argue for a
thing like “affective intelligence,” for feeling as knowing. This is my take on the “streetwise
theorizing” that feminist philosopher Mariana Ortega (2016) illustrates as critical experience in
her book on Latina phenomenologies. There is an epistemic component in the trans ordinary that
is rich in narrative and emotional content. It has feeling. Not only is it a living thing, the ordinary
is also a deposit box of shared histories, narratives, and culture. I believe that the trans ordinary
captures a particular kind of bodily knowledge as experienced in living time. At least, that is my
ultimate goal for this dissertation.
Politics and the Political: A Distinction
As a political project, this dissertation makes certain claims about what constitutes “the
political” and “politics.” There is already a long history behind these terms and their insistent
dichotomy. For example, the canonical view holds that the political is an existential space of
contest generated by the conflict between governance and rights. This conception, borne out by
the liberal conception of the public, suggests that the political is a terrain inhabited by citizens
and would-be citizens who vie over their share of recognition, equality, and relative power over
the narrative of the good life under the aegis of the nation-state (Geuss 2001). According to
theorists like Chantal Mouffe, traditional liberal concepts like equality and liberty are political
precisely because they make distinctions amongst imagined communities who delineate “us” and
“them,” “public” and “private” (2001, 40). Politics is then defined by the various ordinary and
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exemplary practices coordinated by the masses and elites in articulating these distinctions and
rendering them more concrete over time.
As other thinkers such as Sheldon Wolin have argued, such a system becomes
mechanistic and bulky, unable to attend to the everyday needs and improvisational nature of
everyday life. This typical view of the political and politics has saturated contemporary
American culture. It is also the subject of a longstanding feminist critique for its tendency toward
exclusion based on arbitrary, albeit historically ramified, conditions that privilege masculinity.
(More recent feminisms have taken up claims of intersectionality, whereby identity is based on
mutually constitutive and relational social positions of race as well as gender.) The public and
private distinctions amplify feelings of mutual antagonisms (along racial, ethnic, class, and
gender lines) by privileging certain voices that all seem to share a common (fantasmatic)
conception of the good life. The feminist movement behind “the personal is political,” the mantra
of certain 20th century feminisms, sought to break down this public/private divide by
politicizing, or de-naturalizing, the intimate oppressions of private life that women, and
particularly women of color, routinely experience. This adds a sense of urgency, intensity, and
importance to matters often relegated to the margins. But these claims, from whatever strand of
feminism, are often attached to the state as the mediating agent as well as space in which rights
are meted out. Most radical coalition movements couch their demands in terms of preserving
even the minimal welfare state.
My view on these matters changes this feminist critique only slightly. My sense of the
political pays less attention to the state as legimating force and imaginary terrain that citizens and
would-be citizens negotiate to assert and participate in the good life. I think the state has served,
and probably will continue to serve, a purpose in guaranteeing the protection of persons from
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certain kinds of harm. But I do not think that this is the only form that such a socio-political
service or cultural norm may take. I think of the political, and the practices of politics, as a
reflection of the affective worlds of people who fantasize about their place in the larger good life
narrative. It is a space of attachment and a question of what that attachment does. This means, at
least in part, that the political is a desire for and attachment to reliable or even experimental
methods of feeling as though one were a part of that narrative.
Following Lauren Berlant’s work on “intimate publics” I also argue that what constitutes
the political desire is a longing to feel a sense of security in an insecure world. This does not
mean that everyone experiences this desire equally. Of course, the problems of political
participation, of “political depression” as Berlant would put it, persist (2011, 227). But I tend to
think, along with Berlant, that contemporary reflections on the political are about the need to
satisfy feeling even at the expense of a material outcome. That is, political depressive does not
abstain from politics or voting simply because they think their vote does not count or their voice
will not be heard. They abstain because they get the sensation generated by desire from
elsewhere. The political and politics should be thought along these lateral lines, where ordinary
life and the political event might be one and the same—shaped by the same forces and animated
by the same desires. Perhaps my view on the political and the practices of politics can be
summed as “sometimes you just have to forget the state and go for the immediacy of feeling
together, of being-at-ease in explicit publicness.”
The Trans Ordinary and Phenomenology
It might be useful to give a few examples from the phenomenological perspective to
illustrate why this area of philosophy is so critical to the present study. I understand
phenomenology to be the study, and attendant methodological urgency, of experience. Although
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first-person narratives have often been faulted in theoretical studies for overly subjective,
epistemically confusing, or obscurely lived components, they have played a pivotal role in
feminist and transfeminist studies of selfhood. One can use these narratives as a means of
collecting ways that the self is constructed in worlds, across times, and within specific lived
contexts of what Martin Heidegger called “everydayness.” To capture this mode of everyday
being is to be attentive to mood, to what existential phenomenology calls “attunement.” As will
be discussed under the title of affect, mood and attunement is a kind of preconscious form of
knowing things. Moods are the staging ground for the affective furniture that orients us in the
world. Furthermore, feminist phenomenologists in particular treat the historicity of lived and
living experiences into their investigations. The benefits of this move are numerous. History is an
important component of how we, as living beings, are raised to encounter the worlds we inhabit.
Cultural theory has all but settled on the contingency of historical experiences and self-making.
In other words, forms of life are context-specific and inquiries into them must be contextsensitive. Histories play an important role in how we can proceed investigating, say, a trans
person’s testimonies in the early 20th versus the beginning of the 21st centuries. It means that
one must track moods and shared attunements across time retracing affective entanglements in
ordinary scenes of life.
Thus, personal narratives are not meaningless subjectivisms. Latina phenomenologist
Mariana Ortega, for example, writes that her own experiences as a woman from Nicaragua have
had profound effects on how she perceived her own sense of “otherness” in mundane
circumstances. “I got looks of surprise or even uncomfortable and unfriendly looks when I
approached people to kiss their cheek, and as I was looked at with mocking or confused glances
while I stood up to greet teachers, I stopped relating to the world in terms of practical
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orientation” (2016, 60). She uses these experiences to examine how anxiety, from a
phenomenological point of view, affects one’s orientations to the world as being in worlds. It is
disorientating to have one’s habits or customs mocked or treated with open derision. As
embodied forms of life, the subjects of Ortega’s philosophical inquiry possess intersectional
identities. That is, identities that are coextensive and relational. A marginalized person’s sense of
self-hood is constantly jarred, experienced in different temporalities than others in nondominated social positions. “My point,” Ortega explains, “is to note that the experiences of the
selves described by Anzaldúa, Lugones, and other Latina theorists include a lived experience of
constantly not being-at-ease due to the numerous ruptures or tears of everyday norms and
practices, the numerous deeper existential moments that they experience, the confusions and
contradictions about their selves [sic], and the unwelcoming, threatening nature of their
experiences given their race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ability, ethnicity, and other social
identities” (2016, 61). Ortega is arguing for an application of “multiplicious” self-making.
Further, Ortega insists that this multiplicitous self has a continuity with the worlds it is in, despite
the changing nature of those worldly contexts and however thick those feelings are.
I think Ortega is right on both counts. But the intersectional essence of self-making is
complicated by trans narratives for a number of reasons. The first reason might be the complex
biopolitical histories that can be tracked in trans narratives. Pathologizing language, feelings that
are said to stem from dysphoria, psychiatric and therapeutic modes of care, all paint a picture of
everyday trans life that is often overstating the medical. The other reason for complication is the
privileged role of “continuity” in the stream of conscious (and unconscious) self-making that
often attend cisgender accounts of the body. These narratives seem to flow from birth to present
to future, changing from “world to world” as the embodied subject travels (Braidotti 2011, 137-
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140; Ortega 2016, 89-90) whereas trans accounts have a story punctuated, often abruptly, by
experiences of sexed/gendered otherness unique or distinct from others. This reason, too, might
be attributed to the tightly knit structures of medicine and embodied cognitive dissonance, that is,
an unstated or smuggled in subject of dysphoria. In any case, author Juliet Jacques writes that her
own feelings of anxiety, ones that were rooted in commonplace spaces, were often interpreted
through the lens of a “split personality” (2015, 117). Even reading Jacques’ words of spending “a
whole day as Juliet for the first time” can be understood as existing “between” sexed and
gendered worlds (97); the reactions to intimate terrorisms during gay pride celebrations,
“someone in a passing car yelled ‘faggot’ at me. This is my day, you shit-stack, I thought, but I
said nothing” (99, emphasis in text); or of being with others who are at ease with her appearance
while she is still urged to take note of the experience itself, “I almost forgot that I’d ever been
made to feel that was an issue” (99); or the self-presencing needed during a postal delivery,
“Incredulous, [the postman] looked at me, unshaven in my dressing gown. Do I have to do my
makeup and everything else even at home? I wondered, signing for the parcel” (185, emphasis in
text). My point is that reading these experiences, that is to say from a phenomenological
perspective, has to respect the urgency of those moments of self-making and self-articulation.
They are taken as they stand for themselves as experience in spite of tendencies toward quick
historicisms. This is a reading practice of “bracketing,” one advocated by Edmund Husserl, a
founding member of the phenomenology movement in the late 19th century.
The Trans Ordinary: Affect and Genre
I follow much of the structural arguments about affect and affectivity from critical
theorists Lauren Berlant, Kathleen Stewart, and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. In particular, my
sustained engagement with Berlant’s work is an attempt to replicate her own subtle and probing

18

attention to history, phenomenology, and affect as she illustrates contemporary life for the
economically marginalized under regimes of a globalizing capitalism and neoliberalism.
Although these latter “catchphrases” can often do more work than that of the investigator,
phenomena like capitalism, globalization, and neoliberalism do have particularized effects on
forms of life. As Alyson Cole and Estelle Ferrarese (2018) have argued, capitalism itself can be
understood as its own form of life, as an ethical arrangement, or as a project modulating senses
of the self. Kathleen Stewart has also provided a collection of works that examine how people in
the most banal circumstances make do under systems of economic despair. Rather than define
them by that despair, Stewart understand these forms of life as signs embedded in everyday
meaning. Her critical ethnography of Appalachian coal mine culture in West Virginia is
particularly compelling for its attention to meaning-making, symbolic interactionism, and the
power of narrative to convey feeling. Eve Sedgwick’s later work on affect has made a particular
impression on my own affective theories. She finds affect to be “irreducibly phenomenological,”
and bound up with ordinary ways of bodily sense, touching, feeling, and grasping for meaning in
a growingly chaotic world. In such an ongoing scene in ordinary life, Sedgwick’s inclination was
toward reparative criticism where the thinker conceives of what is singularly or culturally broken
as well as what might motivate beings to maintain their attachments to its broken-ness.
Berlant’s take on everyday forms of this kind of self-management is that certain affective
“structures” emerge under neoliberalism. These structures situate people in proximity to objects
that reinforce generic fantasies of the good life. This is central argument in Cruel Optimism.
Cruel optimism is an affective arrangement whereby the promises of the good life attached to an
object (a thing, a someone, a habit, or a lifestyle) overshadow that object’s potentially
devastating and self-dissipating effects. Berlant’s investigation wonders “why people stay
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attached to conventional good-life fantasies—say, of enduring reciprocity in couples, families,
political systems, institutions, markets, and at work—when the evidence of their instability,
fragility, and dear cost bounds” (2011, 2). Plunging into the depths of the ordinary is an attempt
to understand, if not to repair, the sensorium in which these attachments become fixed over time
for trans communities. I am likewise convinced that such “good life” narratives not only abound
in the trans ordinary. They have a coordinative effect on trans peoples’ attachments to capitalist
forms of living. If the good life, for instance, means getting work, and maintaining that job, then
the politics of “passing” is as imbricated with the need for productivity as it is for everyday
recognition and growth as a self. It is in this sense that one might ask what it means to be
attached to normative fantasies of success and work as they relate to everyday bodily
comportments to the sex/gender system.
In this sense the trans ordinary is a collection of bits and pieces of normative and
nonnormative forms of life in a particular sex/gender system. It is a space that requires a certain
skill at making a self intelligible, or not, in one’s own publicness. The trans ordinary serves as a
bulwark against what the fraying genres of reliable living that Berlant (2011) concludes are no
longer capable of making sense of intimate worlds. In such a life of crisis, living a life is more a
series of practices of self-management, acts and performances that enable a human being to bear
the weight of systemic forces like sexism, racism, transphobia, homophobia, violence,
discrimination, and the day-to-day concerns of the bare reproduction of life under capitalism.
Since the neoliberal worlds we inhabit are saturated by the desire-constructing fantasies that
market forces will “work themselves out,” and hard work will eventually “pay off,” all forms of
life learn to cope and make do when these generic attitudes fail. But that is not all. Making do is
not merely a means of survival or tactics of living. Making do consists of an entanglement of
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conventionalities, a play on affective and material resources that are at hand, and a means for
(trans) people to manage feelings of normalcy, to ensure that the cliché “tomorrow is another
day” has the substance of a promise, or that they are at least proximally close to something like
it.
The trans ordinary is a narrative space, “a site of an opening or reopening into [a
culture’s] story” (Stewart 1996, 3). This space contains a variety of scenes and situations, events
and happenings that can fall within a “trans genre” in my re-telling of our culture’s story. This
genre is a collection of stories that share conflicting and similar, shared and contradictory,
visions of the past and future. They run the gamut of social location in terms of class, race,
ethnicity, and even the very definition of trans itself. But as in any genre, it contains a multitude
of practices that push the very limits that individually and discursively define it. Genres are able
to contain contradictions and contradictory conventionalities by allowing room for narrative
change. Following Berlant’s trilogy on national sentimentality, I am also inclined to certain
identities as genres of being, “as something repeated, detailed, and stretched while retaining its
intelligibility, its capacity to remain readable or audible across the field of all its variations”
(2008, 4). This decidedly aesthetic moves provides a framework that is both historical and formal
by reading and viewing genre-making events and life-sustaining conventionalities as they are
lived, reiterated, and improvised in ordinary life.
The archive that constitutes this genre is sufficiently large. Although I have personally
travelled to the largest physical archive of trans history at The University of Victoria, British
Columbia, for my present investigation, the trans archive is also one feeling, as critic Ann
Cvetkovich (2003) might say. Developing a political aesthetics of trans culture (e.g., one that
establishes a viable socio-economic complaint or political critique) means that questions of what
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forms of recognition, what at-hand affective and material resources, as well as what actually
narrated feelings of belonging (what Ortega would call the existential state of “being-at-ease”)
should have reparative, Sedgwick-like attention. In the sense that I am deploying here, my genre
tracks affects across the last 60 years of autobiography, poetry, and personal testimony. In
addition to personal narrative, I look at culturally mediated representations of trans life and
documentation of trans legal complaints as a means of understanding the when, where, and what
of this emergent aesthetics that capture trans forms of life.
The Ordinary as Epistemic
As a site of narration, practice, and symbolic interaction, the ordinary is also a site
knowledge production. The epistemic qualities of the ordinary is the last but coequal movements
of this dissertation. In making both phenomenological and affective claims, my aim is to
contribute to the ongoing debates in feminist thought and political theory concerning
marginalized knowledge in general but trans knowledge in particular. In this sense, my project
frames the ordinary in ways that can track singular and cultural experiences in (hopefully)
intelligible and longitudinal ways. Importantly, the knowledges produced in the ordinary may be
durable or transient, germaine one day but forgettable the next, but always interwoven with the
rhythms of life-making. To think of the trans ordinary as a space of knowledge-making does not
resuscitate an old philosophical debate about the agency of the epistemic subject. My
philosophical commitments here are similar to Ortega’s work as well as the works of Miranda
Fricker (2007) and Linda Martín Alcoff (2006). The critique of this so-called sovereign subject
has a long history in feminist texts and continental philosophy as well as postcolonial critiques. I
am deeply committed to this lineage.
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I argue, as I have up to now, that knowledge is deeply rooted in the fleshiness of the
body. It is situated in sociality as well as singular and lived. My intervention is, simply, that
ordinary knowledge might not always have the look of knowledge. A hand gesture in one instant
might not provoke a desired effect in another. A situation might arise where a transmasculine
person adopts a more normative or conventional masculine action. A gender nonconforming
person might leave the apartment on a given day at a given time in a certain outfit and not
another. Although there are reasons to hazard this generalization, the reasons for such disparate
practices are rooted in the anxieties that gender nonnormative people have about ordinary scenes
of recognition and living. Knowledge of sex/gender norms means practicing them, performing
them, and improvising them in public and private spaces, surely. However, as a means of
managing feelings of belonging, recognition, and well-being, certain affective intelligences is
required. Since the ordinary is the folding-in, the making-do, the messy and otherwise sensemaking of a life’s project, the aesthetic forms I draw from within the trans genre illustrates how
the existential qualities of affect, of living a life of feeling, structures the means by which people
navigate their everyday epistemologies. In sum, these affects help guide and determine what
claims can and are made by trans communities. But these claims are more subtle than those
often posited under the rubric of identity (with its political ends).
I do not aim to invest the genre of trans life with a particular political outlook, or scan the
archive for convenient “facts” that comport to the identitarian claims made to support some, and
not other, trans communities. Such claims often delegitimize marginalized knowledge before
they reach the political table (Ortega 2016, 176). I am, rather, aiming to approximate how
affective orientations in trans life, as they are experienced in living time, constitute a kind of
epistemic claim to the structure of our shared world. Let us consider a few illustrations. Berlant,
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for example, has argued that such affective intelligences grow out of the urgent needs of ordinary
life in the contemporary present. Marginalized groups must register the constant flows and
disruptions of the ordinary while “structural antagonisms [play themselves] out….Affective
crisis wears out individuals and spreads across days and myriad lives until publics see
themselves constituted in their precarity and in whatever enclaves and pleasures they can
produce amid threat” (Berlant 2011, 73). This knowledge of the precarious is at once of an
intentional-conscious and intuitive-unconscious kind. It is a conscious in that people make
claims to the structures of the world(s) around them. But it is unconscious because “people
follow their intuitions about what they don’t know and so change the shape of the present, which
is not fleeting at all, but a zone of action in a space marked by its experiments and transitioning”
(Berlant 2011, 77). These are as much epistemic as they are affective attachments.
I will end this account of the epistemic by illustrating a sustained sense of “something
there” that is tracked throughout Claudia Rankine’s work in Citizen. Rankine describes a scene, a
potential situation, where “standing outside the conference room, unseen by the two men waiting
for the others to arrive, you hear one say to the other that being around black people is like
watching a foreign film without translation. Because you will spend the next two hours around
the round table that makes conversing easier, you consider waiting a few minutes before entering
the room” (2014, 50). Why is this a scene, or rather a moment, and not a situation in which
Rankine’s narrator confronts the two men? Rankine suggests the narrator waits it out in order to
avoid that situation. But the affective furniture, so to speak, toward an aleatory encounter was
already set. Rankine’s narrator, living amid structural antagonisms of racism and sexism already
playing out (the two men talking about black people), considers waiting only to ease the
inevitable professional exchange. She avoid the additional energy drain of even saddling the

24

knowledge that they, the two men, fear that she heard them and knows. She would only confirm
a suspicion. She is attached to the self-dissipating moment not only of necessity but a desire to
keep things stable, however awkward and unjust that stability is. She waits, considers, listens,
and hesitates. Much of Rankine’s previous entries in Citizen reiterate this kind of vigilance, a
constant mode of scanning and being present, the anxiety of not being-at-ease. I consider
Rankine’s poetics to be the illustration of a certain kind of claim upon the world, one informed
by the affective attachments of experiences that occur in the most ordinary scenes of life that are
worthy of epistemic merit.
Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter One is my attempt to trace the history of shared affects in trans narratives.
Although there is a wide span of time in which gender nonnormative practices existed, the bulk
of this chapter reads the archive of feelings decades after the invention of the terms transsexual
and transgender. I deal with the issues raised in biopolitical accounts of trans self-making.
However, my intent is to conduct a “redemptive critique,” a move coined by Marxist cultural
critic Walter Benjamin, that seeks to dislodge narratives from certain discursive emplotments. In
other words, it is an attempt not only to reclaim narrative power for trans communities. It is also
developing a sketch of the historical sensorium of gender nonnormative life, or an aesthetic
grounding for what constitutes the contemporary trans genre. There, I develop a re-telling of
trans narrative histories, illustrating the divergent social, economic, and political claims made by
trans communities in affective terms that construct the present trans ordinary.
Chapter Two delves into the existential and felt realities of the trans ordinary. In that
chapter, I develop a phenomenology of the present in terms of affect. By tracking shared and
divergent senses of history, my aim in that chapter is to dispense with notions of trans
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embodiment that focuses on a disparate or inchoate self that projects to a better, more perfect and
truer trans identity. I try to distance myself from a liberal and assimilationist mode of politics as
well as a purely anti-normative mode. Instead, I illustrate how the trans body is simply there, felt
and articulated in and through encountered worlds. Adopting a few tenets of Latina
phenomenology and existential phenomenology (especially Ortega’s notions of being-betweenworlds and being-at-ease with Heidegger’s phenomenology of moods), I look at how trans
people deal with the benign and the traumatic, the banal as well as event-making, of life. As a
special case study, I look at self-harm as self-interruption, a form of self-management that is not
reducible to mental illness—just as all anxiety in trans people is not reducible to dysphoria.
Rather, it is symptomatic of the kinds of systemic and everyday antagonisms that dissipate the
creative life energies of trans being-in-worlds.
Chapter Three updates certain claims within feminist epistemologies by engaging with
Rachel McKinnon’s work on the subject of trans epistemology. My aim in this chapter is to
provide more robust phenomenological and affective setting for the analytic claims McKinnon
and others make about everyday knowledge. Although McKinnon’s epistemic claims about the
world reflect a range of trans embodiments, the project of epistemology can benefit from
outlining the intensities of living a nonnormative life entails. This does not detract from the
central critiques of the epistemic justice literature. My intent is to supplement its ontology with a
renewed interest in forms of attachment that shape the life projects of the multiplicitous selves
that inhabit the trans ordinary.
Chapter Four explores the juridical and institutional representations of trans life. There, I
make the claim that politics and justice can only be realized when the sensorium of trans
experiences is taken seriously. This chapter explores the role of the trans genre in making
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political and cultural critique. Taking intersectionality as my central method, I explore how
precedent and contemporary modes of judicial justice fail to adequately deal with the “intimate
terrorisms” and affective orientations composing gender nonnormative forms of life. Although
this is neither a new claim nor one unique to trans communities, my argument extends into new
fields of everyday forms of justice that engage with coalitional work across issue-platforms. The
cultural politics of justice must reflect really existing emotional, affective, and material
circumstances for trans people if it is to “get it right.”
Chapter Five seeks to complicate notions that affective and epistemic claims are
divergent phenomena. In that chapter, I explain how the affective intelligences formed under
ordinary expressions of self-management discussed in Chapter Two actually shape the epistemic
claims of trans people. Being-at-ease and being-between-worlds explain the kinds of existential
experiences trans people have. Yet, these phenomenological categories can also be used to
describe a phenomenology of moods that construct ordinary knowledge of being-in-worlds. I use
this as a means of crafting a preliminary statement about ordinary feelings as forms of knowing
the world.
My Afterword is a reflection on the political potential of the trans genre to be read as the
“trans complaint.” Borrowing from Berlant’s work on the unfinished business of sentimentality
in American culture, I consider the implications of developing a trans complaint as a response to
everyday and political projects of gender change. This entails a re-consideration of the liberal
and anti-normative traditions. There, I wish to think about the trans complaint as embodying and
distancing itself from a larger cultural critique of the gender binary. I want to meditate on what it
means to lead a life within the binary, within the conventionalities of gender normativity, where
the attachments to that life can be said to spring from heterogeneous interactions among diverse
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gender identities and expressions. The trans complaint is then a genre of self-containment, a way
of making sense of a singular life within a larger heteronormative and homonormative
affectsphere (a public space of shared sensation), and as a means of gender critique that can cut
both ways.
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Interlude: Reading a Story from the Trans Genre
The following is a brief meditation on ways of reading stories and narratives of the trans
genre. The purpose here is track the narrative emplotment, shifts, and affective arrangements in
this this entry so as to establish some grounds for a practice of reading deployed throughout this
dissertation. Although this particular piece has no date, and is a stated work of fiction on the part
of the author (whose name is, perhaps, Dickie), we can infer a few things about its timeline and a
bit about the author. First, it must have been typewritten sometime in the 20th century. Given its
location in the physical archives at the University of Victoria, I surmise that it was written by a
member identifying as gender nonnormative (if not trans). It was buried amongst other papers in
the Rikki Swin Collection, an authorless piece called the “The Danish Training School” in a
document called “Dickie’s Diary.” We are invited into a scene (perhaps what can actually be
called a situation) where Leslie, the narrator, is subjected to what on the surface amounts to
torture. This is definitely a literal reading. But this piece might also grant access to a shared
affective sense of things that many gender nonnormative forms of life experience. Leslie’s story
is an albeit disturbing example of being-between-worlds, Mariana Ortega’s existential
phenomenology of multiplicitous self-hood. Selves navigate multiple borderlands where norms
and conventions (the very genre of one’s being) are challenged. Whether they are preserved or
potentially undone is a question of resources. Although I have interwoven my own comments
throughout the piece, and provided direct quotes for clarification, my aim is to clarify the kinds
of affective comportments Leslie (and potentially others like her) embody so as to adjust,
manage, and construct a self to make a life in light of structural antagonisms and everyday
oppressions.
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Leslie awoke to find that she had been taken during the night from her hotel. In terror,
she searched her clothing. She had artfully concealed her “true sex”—but her concealments had
been taken. Leslie’s aversion to her “organ/person” is captured in a supplemental diary entry,
also without a date, under the name Dickie. “What mistake did Nature make when she made me
a boy? I wonder? And what mistake did Nature when she made that big, broad-shouldered
woman. She glares contemptuously at me and my dress when we chance to encounter” (Dickie’s
Diary, 1-2). Leslie discovered that her “organ,” or rather “person” (she never described it as a
penis directly), was covered in dried red paint. She knew this “Scarlet Letter,” as she called it,
branded her. “They had known all along my true sex. They had penetrated my disguise quite
easily. I was a prisoner” (Danish Training, 1). Her tormentor is named Madame, a person Leslie
perceives as female bodied and describes as a perfect enactment of the female from her waist,
her bust, and her silky gown. Madame addresses Leslie as “Mr.” She decides, as punishment, to
discipline Leslie. If that is what Mr. wants, then Mr. will become a woman. “You think because I
have an elegant slender waist and wear the most delicate of bottines, that I am weak. Well you
are going to see, just for your benefit I will call no assistance, but will deal with you myself” (2).
Leslie’s normalization as a woman proceeds as a combination of psychological, emotional, and
physical acts of humiliation. It was only after several beatings and simulated penetration that
Madame addressed Leslie as “Miss.” Even after this act of “recognition,” Leslie is subjected to
continued abuse. Frequent physical examinations, psychological torment, and electroshock
treatment are used in conjunction with the medieval use the rack. “You think the Danes are fools,
eh. They are easily fooled, eh. And you, a fool of an Englishman dressed up to kill, can bewitch a
young Danish boy who happens to be a friend of mine? You have been playing with fire” (4).
Leslie’s “training” is that of trauma.
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From a certain angle, one elaborated by Ann Cvetkovich (2003) and Lauren Berlant
(2011), trauma is its own cultural genre for story-telling. Trauma in this sense is often used as a
means of making sense of life after the traumatic event, as a way of re-orienting oneself toward
what is now perceived as shattered worlds. Trauma is a way of re-thinking the construction of
the self on multiple fronts. Although Leslie’s torment is a constant reminder of her sexual
difference, the allegorical account (of disciplinary gender practice, of her own feelings of
incongruity) is an exercise in satire of the major biopolitical narrative of the day for trans
identities: on the one hand, Leslie is a prisoner of her own (wrong) body. Madame serves as
three roles: cultural interlocutor, disciplinarian, and an extension of Leslie’s psyche. Madame is
the ideal of being woman. Leslie’s narrative torment is represents in shocking ways the mostly
ordinary ways that femininity is mapped onto bodies. She is forcibly dressed in overly tight and
revealing clothing and underwear. She is the object of of make-up rituals such that Madame
“made up [Leslie’s] boyish face to look exactly like that of a fashionable woman. I could not
recognize myself” (8). Even the instruments of incarceration were made of gold and embellished
with lavish jewelry. Further, Leslie was forbidden from feeding herself. She had no agency. On
the other hand, Leslie’s time at the Danish training school was one author’s vision of feminine
socialization. Fellow girls participated in Leslie’s training under the supervision of the Madame.
Protestations meant lacerations with a whip or electric shocks. It can be said to track not only a
trans person’s own situatedness in such normative forms of policing. It is also a larger story
about the nature of sexism itself.
This brings me to a few concluding remarks. First, Leslie’s story illustrates how a person
embodying a gender nonnormative form of life reflects feelings in the world of normativity. It is
a product of a certain sensorium of a certain time. Leslie’s self-reflexive prose is an engagement
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with the wrong body narrative as well as a parody of it. Even a story such as this can represent
the conflicting affective comportments that people configure in face of their being-in-worlds.
Second, as a source reflecting one author’s narrative experience of culture, Leslie’s story tracks
the effects of biopolitical as well as intersubjective forms of becoming a self. Throughout this
kind of becoming, anxiety is maximized. This mood, so critical to a number of phenomenologies
of marginalized selfhood, is personified in Madame, the school, other girls, Leslie’s training,
even Leslie’s inability to recognize herself in the mirror as a woman. Her being-a-self is attuned
through an everyday routine of seemingly abusive rituals. And finally, Leslie’s story outlines the
ways that trans people have been viewed historically. Narrated as a trickster and fraud, as a
foreigner on a “temporary” journey to another world, Leslie’s experience captured a particular
kind of self-knowledge and historical commentary about the sex/gender systems that comprise
our normative worlds. Chapter One, “Reading the Signs,” is an attempt to ground stories like
Leslie’s in a shared and overlapping sense of historical continuity called the sensorium. By doing
so, I aim to write about how feelings and affects of belonging (or not), of being out of place or
not being-at-ease, have changed given the course of intersecting relations of power like markets,
technology, and practices to make do.
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Chapter One: Reading the Signs
This chapter situates memory and affect as indispensable to the production of the trans
ordinary. Its descent into the historical construction of gender nonnormative identities, as a
history of the trans ordinary, is animated by what is taken granted in cultural stories of gender
nonnormative forms of life. In other words, historical and cultural (impersonal) and singularly
lived and mediated (personal) forces are in living tension throughout the practices of making do.
This suggests that over the course of the last century upon which much of the archive of this
dissertation is drawing, there is a series of changes in the conditions for how people understood
themselves in the genres of sex/gender that have profound effects on modes of experiencing the
world. Forms of life took shape under innumerable tensions that have grown out of processes
that are socio-economic. These have likewise ineradicably altered meaning-making in nearly all
ordinary spaces of life (Thrift 2008, 101-103). Dramatic shifts at the turn of the 20th century
occurred in the relations of production, the spatial arrangements induced by urbanization, and the
growth of new information and media technology all did their job at reshaping human
experience, that is to say produced a series of new sensorium for human life, as we know it.
Meanings related to these historical moments or events will snap into place as a result of
these emerging sensoria. Take, for example, what Kathleen Stewart (1996) refers to as “the space
of the sign.” The sign, as I understand it, is an embedded or situated object that, given its local
contexts, might run against the grain of accepted cultural narratives of the good life. Somewhere
between this contextual and affectively charged sign and the cultural narratives it mediates are
the experiences that, drawn together, constitute how forms of life feel themselves out into
changing worlds. The aim of this chapter is to determine how we might read the signs of trans
narratives and track affective orientations across the time of just under one hundred years. By
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considering history as an ongoing construction, a presently felt and lived structure, and narrative
as the critical object that grants access to human life, I use an archive of testimony through prose,
poetry, autobiography, and culturally mediated popular representations of gender nonnormative
cultural practices. Understood in this way, the “redemptive critique” that Walter Benjamin
argued could salvage the past from the grips of the enemy traces an omnidirectional trajectory to
illustrate gaps and lacunae in trans histories. I aim to provide the historical grounds for a trans
genre, to gather together (much like I did in the preceding interlude) narrative power for
advancement of social, political, and activist knowledge.
This assemblage of meanings and connections bundle together in ways that cull histories,
places, affects, and human lives. Kathleen Stewart argued that signs “can suggest association but
they can also deflect the [researcher’s] dream of certainty” (Stewart 1996, 146). Her study was of
those spaces on the side of the road, ruptures and openings that serve as unread but open
challenges to grand narratives of the good life. For Stewart, as for me, reading these signs as a
means of pushing back against the construction of otherness is part and parcel of the redemptive
critique. Otherness licenses an asymmetrical symbolic relationship between those who embody
the master narrative and those who, by no fault of their own, do not. Stewart’s was the “southern
other” to American dreams of upward mobility: the simple life against the advanced industrial
age, the slow and quiet against the hustle of urbanization (1996, 7). The signs that forms of life
construct to make sense of things provide details that highlight how life adjusts.
Signs also indicate the presence of a story in the archive. They act as the connective
tissue between global and local meanings. It is a kind of shorthand to maintain the rhythmic
flows of the ordinary. One powerful example could the sign of a traumatic event like a memorial
remembering a murdered trans woman. It serves as a sign to members and allies of those
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communities that a certain space, at a certain time, is unsafe. This memorial, and others like it,
transmits meaning through its aesthetic presence by breaking up the continuity of a scene. It
could be along the Christopher Street Piers in New York or on the streets of the nation’s capital.
Such signs have the power to associate meanings among the people who are most affected by
such violence. It connects the realities of a gender nonnormative life with the everyday activities
of making do. It acts as a kind of allegory or reminder for what counts, or whose lives matter, or
what dangers lurk in the folds of the ordinary.
Signs are more than “just talk.” They hold a place in cultural memory because they
possess an extralinguistic meaning. Images and aesthetic forms are a part of the basis of
redemptive critique. As critic Walter Benjamin notes, “the past carries with it a temporal index
by which it is referred to redemption” (1968, 254). In other words, the past possesses the index
that describes the present with material force. Redeeming that past requires special attention to
the affective attunements of the narratives and stories we intend to unearth, so to speak, and treat
them as potentially resistant counternarratives. This means locating the force of the narrative as a
site of knowledge of places, affects, culture, conventions, and genres. The force of that sign, as a
dialectical image that can seemingly stop the free flow of unilinear time. It shocks the scene of
the present by enlisting the voices of the past. Second, it would privilege the power of image and
context as means of discovering how “the events of history shrivel up and become absorbed in
the setting” (Benjamin quoted in Stewart 1996, 90). The image, as I understand it, is not solely
visual. It is an aesthetic form that establishes a grounding for certain kinds of meaning.
As a means of grounding trans history so as to trace affective registers within it, I turn to
the time I spent at the Transgender Archives at the University of Victoria, British Columbia
during the summer of 2015. My aim is to illustrate how these critical objects (whether through

35

pictures or written texts) can provide a history of unfolding and intelligible feelings that compose
the present trans ordinary. Trans narratives actively make connections that are not reducible to a
single point of recognition, moment of resistance, or insistence on a certain kind of gendered
practice. There is no one way of being trans. There is no single trans community that captures the
singularities of making do in life. Rather, there are gender nonnormative forms of life that might
enforce or destabilize life’s forms. Although the term “trans” is contested, I use it here to refer to
a large swath of gender nonnormative embodiments. And at every step along this historical
process I hope to point out periodic shifts in the ways of making sense of feeling and realizing
one’s own nonnormativity.
Affective Visions of History: The Historical Trans Sensorium
Arguing that we are all actors in the historical construction of the present is to assert less
an image of agency. Since history also constructs what it means to experience being human,
being an actor or participant, I mean that affects run throughout the unfolding of any historical
sense. Karl Marx had famously argued that “men make their own history, but they do not make it
just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under
circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead
generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living” (1978, 595). And yet one of the
most powerful criticisms to date has been that human beings disappear from this history. Entire
forms of life and practices fall away, if not permanently then transforming into other forms and
practices (Thrift 2008). History hurts. But if trans people have engaged in constructing their own
historical narratives, then crafting an historical genre of trans life would account for how feeling
trans, as trans being-in-worlds, has been recorded. History as an ongoing process of events and
untold happenings can also be read in fits and starts, like so many tableaux that capture some of
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the aesthetic economies of gender nonnormativity. At any rate, even if such scenes might depict
the defeated it is my intention to illustrate how those defeated still managed to carry on and made
do.
Thus, the historical record could be read as if “transsexuality” emerged as a being
through medical discourses only in the 20th century. It would be tempting, from a biopolitical
angle of history, to situate all remaining forms of gender nonnormative life in that narrative. And
yet, if medicalization created the conditions for certain forms of gender nonnormative life, it left
out the conditions for numerous others. “First, let me state that ‘gender dysphoria’ has never
meant confusion of who I was or am” (The Quest, Undated). Perhaps, to reconstruct Marx’s
idiom, it is “our modern understanding of gender that is haunted by dead generations like a
nightmare.” The trans historical genre is likewise a refusal of this nightmarish hauntology. The
trans genre pushes against pathology as well as ordinary conventions of gender.
Normatively defined sex/gender in Western cultures is marked by as many discontinuities
as there are rational explanations for sexual difference (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Laqueur 1990). As
for any “unifying” narrative, I identify at least two centripetal forces/discourses that have pulled
trans histories together (however violently, as I will argue) in significant ways. These include
Western norms governing sexual difference (sex/gender as organizing principles of sociality) and
the institution of scientific explanations of both (biology, medicine, psychiatry). Thus, by telling
these stories, I could suggest that these rationalizations of bodily difference would eventually
form tightly bound knots of what Michel Foucault would term discourse, or knowledge-domains
(Foucault 1974). That sex was considered, historically, to be an issue of genital differences
(Laqueur 1999). That trans was nameless, anomalous, an outlier until it was brought into focus
by these knowledge-domains. Trans would eventually become legible, sayable, a kind of being
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amongst others. But what I will attempt to highlight at regular intervals is the changinst historical
sensorium, the historical structures of feeling that made certain affects sensible and livable.
I could continue in this vein and argue that trans people were part of a scientific
“fascination” at the beginning of the 20th century that gave them that being. I could argue that as
a part of this emerging medical discourse, trans forms of life (“transsexual” at that historical
moment) were diagnosed rather than discovered. I could argue that as scientific research on sex
and sexuality advanced, trans became part of the grammar of pathology, not practice. Diagnoses
like “eonism,” and “Sexo-Aesthetic Inversion” marked this itinerary (Stryker 2008, 38). I could
also argue that as early as 1887, Magnus Hirschfeld, had founded the Scientific-Humanitarian
Committee whose mission was to spearhead scientific reforms in the treatment of sexual
minorities (39). That Hirschfeld was the first to use, in fact coin, the term “transvestite” and
would continue to focus efforts on edifying the scientific and medical communities on gender
variance (ibid.). That, despite such advocacy, the role of biology and medicine (e.g., the
discovery of “sex hormones”) would alter the way sexed life in the American imaginary would
settle (Meyerowitz 2002, 2). And that by the end of the 1960s, the term “gender” would be
coined and would work alongside the constellation of descriptive medical terms like “biological
sex” (ibid., 3). As Reid Vanderburgh (2014) intimates, “The model that was out there was that
trans people feel that they are trapped in the wrong body and have always known they were
actually a different gender. I didn’t fit that model and I didn’t know anyone who identified as
neither man nor woman, both butch and femme” (105).
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Gender Identity: Psychic
manifestations of an embodied
sense of self.
Gender: Social expectations or
roles that are assigned to the
embodied self-projections a
person maintains.

Sex: Physical markers of the
body indicating biological or
anatomical reproductive organs,

Figure 1.0: Gender, Gender Identity, and Sex
The body, in this sense, is a site of cultural accumulation as well as singular mediation. And yet
it can easily be overstated when trans people express their perspectives on embodiment.
Consider the following poem, undated and entitled “The Agony of the Transsexual,” as a
text that confounds quick readings of the trans experience. It expresses more than dysphoria as
the oppressive condition of life. Considering its take on the dysphoric mind/body, the poem also
expresses an ambivalence toward the power that the conventions gender possesses. In other
words, regardless of gender, there is an anxiety of continuous misrecognition. It can be read
literally, as much as “The Danish Training School” can be read in the First Interlude, but that
would only encourage the flawed view that trans identities are nothing if only a reflection of
medically defined complications of the mind/body continuity. The point I am trying to make is
that the poem reflects a certain kind of sensorium, impositions on what feelings in everyday life
can look like even if they are not all represented. Here is “Agony” in what is probably its first
reprinted form:
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If I told the world my one desire
Their laughter could not quench the fire
That burns this man’s soul, torn apart
For in it beats a woman’s heart

I don’t know why, I can’t explain
How this great sickness to me came
Effeminate magic cast its spell
And normal wishes did dispell [sic]

I am a new person, I’m in a new world
I’ve left my past for the life of a girl
I am no masculine
I have become so feminine

To be a girl has been my goal
A transsexual down in my soul
To be a woman has been my quest
In ecstasy I wear a dress

I wear a skirt bordered with flowers
In make-up I spend happy hours
The mind of a girl, my sex has changed
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To others what I want seems strange

I want the body of a woman that’s real
For all her emotions to feel
A lady who loves lace and clothes so fancy
From this day on my name is Nancy

And when I bathe with joy I’ve found
My skin is soft, my breasts are round
A bra holds my firm bust in place
While I stare at my pretty face

Church disapproves but still I wear
Jewelry, nylons, and long hair
My Catholic faith calls it a sin
For me to dress like Carolyn

I fell [sic] ashamed, I feel the scorn
An outcast I am so forlorn
Pious men can’t understand
Why I’m a woman and not a man

Is there anyone willing to give
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Hope to me so I can live
I search for help, someone that’s kind
But sympathy I never find

I am a man of intelligence
Dressed like a lady of elegance
The desires of a woman are my weakness
Possessing me like a drunkeness [sic]

Deliver me from my sadness
I would not dare to generalize that all transsexual people felt, feel, or will feel any of
these emotions. My point here is that the narrator indexes a larger cultural attitude about what
having a sexed identity ought to look like, and the feelings that nonnormative people ought to
have in light of being nonnormative. She refers to her feelings as a “sickness,” the knowledge
and origin of which she cannot “explain.” The melodrama of Nancy’s poem underscores the
pervasive and traumatic limits imposed by diagnosis. But it also clarifies and recognizes, through
her melodramatic poetics, what is legitimate about her complaint to the reader (see Berlant
1988). Nancy conveys her frustrations and self-dissipation. She must carry these feelings into the
larger public world and yet bear the weight of realizing that her self-knowledge is, and can only
be understood as, pathological. Rather than reading a “trapped” psychic self in a body, a wrong
body, I read a person embedded in a cultural context that cannot help but to reach out of that
absorptive environment and into the social as the ballast, a sign, for others. Not so that other can
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feel the drama or be interpellated by it. But so she can register her part of this genre-inducing
complaint.
This is a powerful effect and promise of poetics. As Claudia Rankine (2014) notes, “the
body hauls more than it can bear” (12). Writing can be a form of “catching” this large haul in
order to bear it. Mariana Ortega called it a kind of hometactic, where the not-at-home can feel
“comfortable and safe, where I can be who I am” (2016, 193). The world would, to Nancy’s
estimation, only dismiss these hauled feelings as nonsense or abomination. At every step
throughout the poem, she is anxiously aware of her own body and its public perception (“a man
of intelligence/ Dressed like lady of elegance”). Again, I read the term “man” as less about a
biological reality (a birth-assigned sex) and more of Nancy’s assertion toward a universal
qualification of her selfhood. Consider the fact that she has already declared “I am a woman and
not a man.” And although her place in the public dialogue of femininity and womanhood is
constantly put in question by her own doubts, she must make a life in private. As a plea for help
or as an examination of feeling trapped in the wrong culture (not body), “Agony” is an
opportunity to understand affective experience within the limits of this history and culture shot
through with pathological language. We do not need the language of pathology as the only way
to understand her pain.
Activism and Social Change
Gender nonnormative people were (and in many instances still are) viewed with
skepticism and ridicule that is explicitly expressed in the poem “Agony.” Even historically
progressive actors in the fight for so-called gender equality played their part in reinforcing antitrans sentiment. Trans exclusive radical feminists (TERFs), such as Janice Raymond, were
among a growing number of writers and activists declaring that trans women were nothing than
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men invading “real” women’s space. That trans men were simply trying to “escape” the
patriarchy. Raymond and others of her kind of transphobic ilk were participating in what other
feminists would later call the female complaint, a means of bringing together women’s
experiences for the purposes of creating shared subject of femininity. Their so-called radical
reactions to patriarchy only served to reinforce some of the most insidious forms of patriarchal
power. As Lauren Berlant argues, “the fantasy that all women are, more or less, alike produces a
meta-symbolic order in which the female sex is defined as that element which needs to be
explicated or contextualized in one or another patriarchal narrative. Indeed, feminism’s crucial
fusing of the personal and the political comes from turning women’s individual gynogenealogical scars into diacritical marks in different kinds of oppositional narrative and social
practices” (1988, 238). In other words, these radical feminist discourses produced the very
exclusions they hoped to overcome through their own attachment to a generic “women’s”
movement.
Caught within the interlocking networks of conventional norms of sex/gender, medical
diagnoses of “gender identity disorder,” and trans-antagonistic feminisms (what was then
“queer” social criticism tout court) would create a kind of historical gravity well around which
trans narratives became distorted. We can interrupt this kind of pathologized and victimized
narrative by remarking on social upheaval and agentic self-creation also taking place. In the
1960s, the birth of gay liberation movement was forged, owing to the preceding two decades as a
network of connected by bars and dives, secret meetings and public “queer” spaces of queer
sexual practices, pushed back against state induced violence (Warner 2000, 1-40). The trans
communities of the early 20th century could find respite in these spaces. But many queer bars,
for example, would often disallow gender variant patrons, so called “trannies,” and tricksters.
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But trans communities would, ironically, have founding members at the riots at the Stonewall
Inn in 1969 (namely, Sylvia Rivera and Marsha P. Johnson).

Image 1.1: Political History of Rebellion
Behind this history are many trans women and men making things work in their lives for
communities to be built. They made a life that made worlds possible. Transwomen of color,
Sylvia Rivera and Marsha P. Johnson, founded the Street Transvestite Action Revolutionaries
(STAR). Survival and critical attention to space, place, and local memory were crucial. As their
sixty-page manifesto/zine intimated, the founding members were “not respectable queers”
(STAR No Date, 6). That is, they are signs of that “other” of history that stood against the
notions of assimilation, who carried on their very bodies the pain and re-memory of the
liberation movement. As the zine’s introduction stresses, “STAR was just one historical note in a
legacy of queer insurgency” (10). STAR can be read a sign of social and economic activism of
those times. It arose against the backdrop of rivaling socialities, diagnoses, police raids, and local
representation who questioned the very legitimacy for trans being-in-worlds. Yet, this group (and
other like it) worked alongside revolutionary movements for progress and yet failed to have their
affective orientations of anger, rage, and betrayal registered.
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Image 1.2: Front Image of the STAR Zine
Many white trans activists like Virginia Prince, Ariadne Kane, and Reed Erickson
engaged in a number of (well-resourced) efforts. Others, remaining silent, wrote op-eds and
letters to the editor or shared with national pamphlets and magazines. Virginia Prince’s
Transvestia was the first magazine (published with Prince’s own money) to become an inclusive
text for trans communities. Ari Kane established transgenderist conferences such as Fantasia
Fairs where a mixture of crossdressers and trans women were instructed in areas that ranged
from voice, comportment, and what looked right for a feminine appearance. It was the vanilla
version of Leslie’s training in The Danish Training School (see my preceding Interlude on
“Reading”).
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Image 1.3: Within the Fair
Academically (and socially) the 90s marked advances in the study of gender that would invite
the perspectives of trans scholars and activists to speak and write about their experiences (“I am
not sick!”). Their voices were being recounted in a newly developed discipline of transgender
studies—and would work as a bulwark against misleading notions of trans communities.
Interruption: Narratives in the Space of Signs. The following considers the way that language
might be used to locate that historical sign-as-bridge to life. I bolded those terms I thought
might provide such a way of thinking—asking what hides beneath the meaning of these words
and phrases. I owe a great methodological hat-tip to Kathleen Stewart’s style here, especially
her use of such bolded terms when she reproduces spoken words so as to indicate local
mediation of cultural meaning in A Space on the Side of the Road. Consider the following
narrations of life-making in various scenes of life, of affectively absorptive environments:
Before you decide to go public you must consider the risks you are taking. When a
man goes in public dressed as a woman, it is possible for one of three things to happen:
a) to be discovered, b) to be assulted [sic], c) to be arrested. It is the extreme of
foolishness to pretend that ‘it can’t happen to me’ (Lind Undated, 1).
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It can happen to anyone. But it seems that, above, to be discovered at all is violent and leads to
the assault and arrest. Violence becomes an ordinary thing. “The transvestite, transgenderist
and transsexual will go to great effort to hide their way of living. Obviously because of fear of
being ‘read’ found out. Fear of being found out means someone telling friends, wives,
children, employers about them. Setting off a chain of events that could destroy a human
life” (Lind Undated, 3).
Here, the body is something that is read, a sign—and trans communities learn to speak
a language to make sense of their own bodies. Not for the sake of others rather for their own
purposes of self-making. “As trans people,” Willy Wilkinson (2014) argues, “we have
experienced the world in different shoes, different realities, different bathrooms. We speak
a different language” (30). “Along with all that [of being trans] comes the extreme frustration
with language. Theres [sic] only so many words to use for pronouns and genders and
sometimes I feel that none of them fit me” (Trans Youth Survey 2001, 18). As Farmer (1993)
remarked, “the process of throwing off the shackles of masculinity to become a woman, I call
‘Transition’. ‘Transformation’ has been a revolution in my awareness of myself and of my
life” (v). How and when did bathrooms become a site of politics for trans people. Always. The
language of the self changes to meet the contingencies of a time—how words harbor meanings
that carry content across time and space/place. How images/memories of these places matter to
affects of anxiety versus safety, readiness versus quietude. And insofar that trans communities
made a language to narrate their being (within or outside of medical models) some life-making
and life-building was no “revolution.”
B. Fortune wrote in 1985, as an expression of a life between her female and male self:
“I have a wife who knows, a daughter and family who don’t know at this point. Why
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upset those about you unnecessarily? Life is a compromise and I have managed to
find a comprised middle ground where I can be who I am and still give those about
me the person they need and want” (1985, 8-9).
This is, indeed, a kind of hypervisibility—the bringing of the self into the fore of everyday life.
Max, a transgender stone-butch identified participant in Girshick’s (2008) study as well, argues
that “Passing must be done sometimes, in order to be safe. But I can’t imagine living a stealth
life where no one knows I’m trans. I think it’s important for there to be people who are visibly
challenging the gender binary. But I don’t think it’s every transperson’s responsibility to be a
gender crusader” (112). As Shannon, a genderqueer identified participant in Lori B. Girshick’s
(2008) study of trans voices, says: “If I don’t say something, they’re just going to see me as a
‘regular old dyke,’ which I don’t want—about as much as dykes don’t want to be seen as
straight. I don’t want my gender identity to be invisible” (100). What does it mean to have
one’s body made visible? How is one “seen” as straight—as this or that sexuality? Embedded
in this, somehow, is that haunting presence of those not-so-respectable queers who had to fight
and put up with those invisibilizing qualities that, however, paradoxically, made hypervisibility
so much a part of everyday life.
We always felt that the police were the real enemy. We expected nothing better than
to be treated like we were animals-and we were. We were stuck in the bullpen like a
bunch of freaks. We were disrespected. A lot of us were beaten up and raped. When I
ended up going to jail, to do 90 days, they tried to rape me. I very nicely bit the shit
out of a man. I’ve been through it all (STAR, 12).
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Adjustments of Genre in the Neoliberal Sensorium
Numerous socio-political and economic shifts occurred from the 1960s to the present.
But the Americanized form of neoliberalism has had a particularly powerful effect on forming
new barriers to accessing the good life. This model of market rationality has imposed methods of
making do that are particularly traumatic for marginalized groups. I want to briefly focus on
these shifts as a means of understanding how, in an age of “inclusion” in the workplace and the
amplification of post-racial and post-gender societies, expressions of self-dissipation are as
pronounced as ever. I want to illustrate how trans narratives in neoliberal contexts expressions
have less to do with dysphoria than with a kind of hypervigilant affect that saturates the ordinary
and makes feelings of nonnormative embodiment even more powerful and inescapable.
According to political theorist Wendy Brown (2015), neoliberalism can be thought as a
“distinctive mode of reason, of the production of subjects, a ‘conduct of conduct,’ and a scheme
of valuation” (17) that privatizes experiences, selfhood, and feelings within the field of “reason.”
The American iteration of it began sometime in the early 1970s. It forms, to borrow from Michel
Foucault, a correctional world and a redirection of politics. It entails a dramatic shift away from
democratic and social living through a narrative preoccupation with market inequalities as
naturally occurring systemic elements. A neoliberal culture, in effect, quiets politics by diverting
ordinary affects into the apolitical realm of employment (for example, the market). Losing one’s
job may not be the hallmark of phobia or racism anymore. It may be that the neoliberal subject is
not performing. Or the market is taking a dive. Feeling bad about this state of affairs is more
likely to be voiced in therapy, not town halls. Feelings about this kind of routinized, genrewaning form of existence are, if expressed at all, are seen as being out of touch with how things
really are. The town hall has, if anything, become a space of political battles over already
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overrepresented groups. As Lauren Berlant (2008; 2011) argues, neoliberalism creates a social
and cultural norm of silencing marginal voices (or pushing them further into smaller, intimate
publics). These conservative discourses marked the emergence of a new kind of sensorium, one
that pushed private feeling even further into the aegis of the domestic.
Consider, for example, Sylvia Rivera’s speech to a Pride celebration commemorating
Stonewall in 1973. She was being shouted down. Rivera, an open “transvestite” was neither
counted among gay men nor women liberationists who were present. She was in many ways
considered another “freak” who sidelined the political unity of those movements. She yelled
agitatedly into the mic (and I quote at length):
Y’all better quiet down. [Someone can be heard yelling back, ‘shut the fuck up!’] I’ve
been trying to get up here all day—with your gay brothers and your gay sisters in jail and
write me every motherfuckin’ week and ask for your help. And you all don’t do a
goddamn thing for them. Have you ever been beaten up, and raped, in jail? [Someone can
be heard yelling, ‘shut up!’] Now think about it—they have been beaten up and raped
after having spent much of their money in jail to get their [unintelligible] and try to get
their sex change. The women have tried to fight for their sex changes—to become
women of the women’s liberation and they write STAR, not the women’s group; they do
not write men. They write STAR because we’re trying to do something for them. I have
been to jail. I have been to jail. I have been raped, and beaten many times by men,
heterosexual men, men who do not belong in the homosexual shelter. But, do you do
anything for them? You all tell me “no,” to go hide my tail between my legs. I will no
longer put up with this shit. I have been beaten; I have had my nose broken; I have been
thrown in jail; I have lost my job; I have lost my apartment for gay liberation—and you
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all treat me this way? What the fuck’s wrong with you all? Think about that. [Applause].
I do not believe in “the revolution” that you all do. I believe in the [sic] gay power. I
believe in us getting our rights or else I would not be out there fighting for our rights.
That’s all I wanted to say to y’all people. If you all want to know about the people in jail,
and to not forget [Kendry Lamore, and Dora Box, Kenny Messner] and other gay people
in jail, come and see the people at STAR House…. (Violeta 2014, My Transcription)
Rivera’s feelings of betrayal and the accompanying anger toward the gay liberation front were
meant to highlight the other side of queer emancipatory projects. Transvestites like Rivera were
disproportionately targeted by police violence during the regular NYPD raids on gay bars. And
yet this community was rarely on the agenda of the gay revolution. Her reaction was enmeshed
in a combination of frustration with an American culture that invisibilized her and her
community as well as the gay community who ironically perpetuated that invisibilization (recall
what the fuck’s wrong with you all?). She’s struggling throughout her speech to assert, and
reassert, her legitimate presence on stage as a representative of the movement. And the affective
dimensions of trauma (of being raped, being thrown in jail, losing both job and apartment) are
made public through anger and militancy. She shares in the real material dispossession that often
left gay and queer communities of that time in abject poverty and homelessness. But her efforts
are often shouted down.
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Image 1.4: “What the Fuck’s Wrong with You All?” Sylvia Rivera in 1973. Digital screenshot of
online video. Public domain.
Rivera is using speech as a vehicle for the expression of her felt experiences of rage, of complete
isolation from both society and others in the gay community. And the gay community wanted to
distance themselves from her. Her being in jail, her open assaults on the police, her very
appearance in public life, is taken as a sign of something that would hinder, not advance, the gay
the mainstream agenda of gay liberal rights. She makes reference to the literal incarceration of
trans people, which is critical for two reasons. First, trans people could not, literally, participate
in public acts because they were locked up. Second, as criminals, one might argue that they have
no “legitimate” feelings of anger. Why attack the police? Why push against the conventionality
of gender assignment? Why be angry if you’re bringing it on yourself? Her speech does its own
damage to the pristine fantasy inclusivity and individuality. As I will explore in Chapter Two,
Rivera’s speech appears alongside the emergence of new affective experiences, for example,
rage, public expression of self-dissipation, and the pushback of pathological language.
The Legacies of Isolation and Rage
Whether Rivera’s speech is an instance of emancipatory agency and an expression of real
trans politics is a dicey decision to make. However, I think that the trans ordinary can repossess
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this kind of activist memory. That the sign of a counternarrative is in need of reading. Claudia
Rankine (2014) describes such memories inscribed on the body such that “the body is the
threshold across which each objectionable call passes into consciousness—all the unintimidated,
unblinking, and unflappable resilience does not erase the moments lived through, even as we are
eternally stupid or everlastingly optimistic, so ready to be inside, among, a part of the games
(2014, 28). And yet, when and where are these bodily memories recalled in the body of culture
or politics? Whose history gets to speak and on what register? To what political ends? It was
only the violent death of Brandon Teena that seemed to raise a national interest about gender
variant people and their lives (Cvetkovich 2003, 274-275). Movies, documentaries, and constant
“talk” pervaded the national spotlight in the 90s. Academy awards were given for the cinematic
version of Brandon’s life Boys Don’t Cry. Brandon’s name, like many others whose lives were
(and are) brutally taken, “cull themselves into traumatic images and then disperse again in the
anecdotal flow of just talk” (Stewart 1996, 108). Others, like the memory of Tyra Hunter’s tragic
death (ever rarely her life), are only ever brought up during moments of silence and days of
remembrance.
Recent murders of trans women reproduce this compounded silence. India Monroe was a
twenty-nine year old trans woman. She had been shot multiple times. India, a Virginia resident,
was both misgendered and identified using her birth name in initial reports. India’s funeral, held
just this January, also had facts that were, on her friend’s accounts, contrary India’s living
wishes. Her friends say that not only had she been buried with her birth name prominent at
services, but that her hair had been cut, her body was dressed in man’s suit, and that her hands
had been covered so that her feminine features were concealed. One close school friend said
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“[India would] want to have her nails done, hair done, look amazing, because that’s what she
liked.”

Image 1.5: India Monroe. Image Source:
http://www.advocate.com/sites/advocate.com/files/2017/01/06/india-monroe-750x563.jpg.
Public Domain.
India’s life, and death, had lost meaning. She was pulled into the violent undertow in which she
still lingers locally in Virginia—but haunts the imaginary and imposes itself upon the present of
our collective trans (queer) imaginary. India was left to “an ordinary environment” or simply
“episodes, that is, occasions that frame experience while not changing much of anything”
(Berlant 2011, 101, my emphasis). Just talk. Episodes not changing much. How does this past
intrude upon the present in such a way that it becomes entangled with or enflesh the setting? The
memory of a death, of a body, might haunt a particular place—a time, a day, a moment
reminding us not to go “there,” not to wear “that.” Remember what happened to…? India’s
memory, perhaps linked with Tyra’s, can more than simply a call to action on “days of
remembrance.” Surely their memories, that is to say of their lives and the circumstances of their
deaths signify a cultural amnesia of certain traumatic events for marginalized people. The
question is how any memory might intrude upon a public’s memory and thought.
Stories of life and death are more than simply tales. They are rather access points in a
network of knowing/feeling—a remembering that is itself social knowledge, a felt sense of
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what’s going on. Remembering these histories inform how we might speak ourselves into
existence, narrate our being in (or out of) the world. How does one unconceal this density of
historical narrative—to un-conceal their bundled truths? The shock of trans history imposes itself
as so many traumas on the memory/mind in the phenomenological world through a shared
knowing/feeling of pain. In light of this intrusion, we may speak of places, names, memories,
events, and everyday banalities that build upon a “local epistemology of re-membering impacts
by re-tracing them in graphic images that stand at once as refuse and refuge” (Stewart 1996, 91).
In this local epistemology, a cultural and social trans epistemology, how might the graphic
imagery of violent death be read in the archive of everyday news? One can trace these
epistemological repertoires by reading reports that deal with trans death as a sign of otherness.
The absence of care here or the swift remark about national policy there make their deaths seem
like the forgettable kind of ordinary. The historical tableaux against which the contemporary
trans ordinary is propped offers a critique of such cultural erasures. I want to track those erasures
as products of our culture’s historical relegation of gender nonnormative selves. But I also want
to retain the sadness and felt sense of loss without the melodramatic sentimentality that C. Riley
Snorton and Jin Haritaworn (2013) call “trans necropolitics.”

Image 1.6: Tweeting in the Archive of Life and Death
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Out Magazine did not detail the life of Alphonza Watson. Only that, according to her
mother, "She was a very caring, passionate, fun person to be around, always in a talkative and
playful mood." Their report placed her name alongside those other deaths taking place in 2017
alone. “Alphonza's death follows the reported murders of seven transgender women of color in
2017. The names of other women killed this year are Jaquarrius Holland, Chyna Gibson, Ciara
McElveen, Mesha Caldwell, Jamie Lee Wounded Arrow, Keke Collier and Jojo Striker” (Rulli
2017). As a reader, I’m most affected by the abstracted nature of these kinds of reports. That
“one among many” kind of gesture, a name that should be followed by others, constitutes one of
a few signs for Alphonza. But they are always connecting with others’ deaths. That her
benediction should read “Rest in Power” in the tweet—reflecting a prayer that such an afterlife
possesses power. That these stories build upon one another like an impersonal coastal shelf. That
each name constitutes a line across points of reference. These names stand like so many signs
that seem to have more to say, yet say nothing as they sit on a screen, or a page of a newspaper.
Activists did speak out. Director of the New York City Anti-Violence Project, Beverly Tillery,
stated: “As a society we can stop this epidemic by hiring trans women of color, making sure
they have safe places to live and standing up when we see or hear them being demeaned and
attacked and simply by valuing their lives. The moment to act is now” (ibid.)
Society. Epidemic. Safe places. Life. Moment. Now. These are words that add an ethical
and normative dimension to our present, of the “now” being intruded upon not just by the
senselessness of previous murders. Rather, these are words that, pregnant with social and cultural
history of things, haunt the present and intrude upon the common sense of activism. It is “now,”
in a long string of “nows,” in an endlessness of “nows” that stand as opportunities to act as the
archive of trauma fills with signs not read.
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In another featured story, violent death meets the ethos of individualism. We know what
Mercedes Williamson’s last moments were. Newsweek reports:
Joshua Vallum murdered his former partner 17-year-old Mercedes Williamson in 2015
after a friend told him the Alabama-born teenager was a transgender woman. He was
found to have planned her murder, luring her into his car. He tasered her in the chest
and stabbed her multiple times with a pocket knife. As she tried to run away, he
chased her and struck her with a hammer (Rodriguez 2017).
Here, readers are asked to member the ways that certain non-normative lives are devalued. This
kind of intimate terrorism is not entirely new to trans communities. But the Newsweek article
chalks kind of violence to a national epidemic of hate crimes. In the late 90s, the federal
government was prompted to enact hate crimes legislation that enhanced the sentences of people
found guilty of hate-motivated crime. Such legislation was brought about as a result to the
violent deaths of Matthew Shepard (a gay man) and James Byrd, Jr. (a black straight man). I
might recall here that Brandon Teena or Tyra Hunter, having met their end during that same
stretch of time (‘96-’98), were not given such federal heft. Tyra’s memory were left to days of
remembrance. Brandon’s memory was sensationalized in a critically-acclaimed movie. The U.S.
General Attorney reflected on the culture of bias in a provocative way:
‘Today's sentencing reflects the importance of holding individuals accountable when
they commit violent acts against transgender individuals,’ U.S. General Attorney Jeff
Sessions said in the DOJ statement. ‘The Justice Department will continue its efforts to
vindicate the rights of those individuals who are affected by bias motivated crimes.’
(Rodriguez 2017)
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What is the meaning behind fashioning the narrative of redemption, the excavation of voices, the
“unforgetting” of life, out of that cultural debris called normative history? It should be the
realization that these crimes (physical, emotional, affective, epistemic, historical) aren’t about
individuals against individuals. It is, rather, about the cultural against the lived and actual—about
socialities forgotten, or lost, or never having the chance of being vindicated because the cultural
script has always been about the “abstract individual.” Thus far, it has not been about
communities who have not mattered as a result of this kind of cultural investment. Changing
culture cannot be done based upon a constant attention to what I would call the “presentist
political” of neoliberal individualism. Marginalized forms of life need vindicating from this
hurtful history.
As theorist Ann Cvetkovich argues:
Not only does performance [as an archive] act as a repository for ephemeral moments, it
can also make an emotion public without narrative or storytelling; the performance might
just be a scream, a noise, a gesture without a sound. It also displaces the dyadic and
hierarchical relationship between doctor and patient that governs clinical approaches to
trauma, opening that relationship out into the public sphere and expanding the repertoire
for the expression of emotion. When culture takes over from the clinic, though, it
continues to perform therapeutic functions, but these functions are embedded within
collective and public practices (2003, 286).

Performance, here, can be understood as the combination of both objects and humans in a given
space, a combination that has an emotional effect. I wonder, then, what kinds of objects or what
kinds of human gestures help shape and signal the continued dialectic between clinical venues of
expression and cultural ones of trans experience?
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Perhaps the act of redemption found in a memorial-creche placed at the location of a
transwoman’s murder. Such a creche can be understood in numerous ways. As the assemblage of
affects associated with life, this memorial “speaks” to some by associating memories with a
painful history of discrimination, violence, and erasure. As such, it is a reminder of both
vigilance and the need for activism. Yet, for many others the memorial is a reminder of the
vibrancy of community life and of a personal relationship with that community’s histories and
narratives. And even if it has the common effect to onlookers of reminding them of the
everydayness to violence, it has affected the trajectories for navigating what happens after that
encounter, and thus their day, and their life.

Image 1.7: A Makeshift Memorial of Empty Alcohol Bottles for Marsha P. Johnson in
1992. Digital Screenshot. Public Domain.
Perhaps redemption is found in the act of remembrance itself, remembering the
materiality of the past struggle. These are often forgotten in contemporary narratives of activism.
They might muddy the message in an age of mass-mediated infotainment. Perhaps on its own, or
to facilitate such remembrances, national campaigns like the #SayHerName project bring local
tragedies (like the death of India Monroe) into a public dialogue that doesn’t dispense with the
affective dimensions of trans lives. It revels in them. These avoid the “necropolitical” extraction
of value from the emotional existence of trans people.
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Perhaps redemption can be located in the everyday movement of bodies where “they do
not belong,” so to speak. There is a recent trend in the physical occupation of private/public
space is a necessary strategy of forcing the issue of visibility. Consider the history of the
Christopher Street Piers, for example. The Piers was a site in which the contest over capitalism,
rights to belonging, and feelings/expressions of outrage over structural and historical
dispossession take place in non-intuitive. Queer and trans expressions of life can merge in this
space. “The Pier has therefore served as a hangout for queer and questioning youth for years,
providing a venue for socializing, after-bar parties, the dance and performance culture that
influenced New York’s drag balls” (Walker 2011, 95). In “Pier Kids: The Life,” the space is still
used as a ground for gathering together, enacting ballroom scenes (like voguing and catwalks),
and a site to find some respite within an otherwise heteronormative policing of their activities
deeper in the City. This occupation of that site recalls a scene from life in history, recapitulated
in David France’s documentary “The Death and Life of Marsha P. Johnson.” Collecting and
recasting the work of Victoria Cruz’s activism to uncover Marsha P. Johnson’s death, the
documentary has a chilling moment when Sylvia Rivera, then homeless and struggling with
alcoholism after Johnson’s death in 1992, looks over the squalor of the Piers and says, “we tried,
Marsha.”
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Image 1.8: “We tried, Marsha.” Sylvia Rivera, homeless, residing in a still dilapidated Pier (c.
1992). Digital screenshot from “The Death and Life of Marsha P. Johnson.” Public Domain.

Summary
The animating thrust of this chapter has continued to be the affirmation of Stewart’s
urgency of reconstituting nonnormative histories against the grain of larger narratives. These
narratives downplay the affective squeeze most marginalized communities experience in their
life projects toward the fantasies of the good life. Sara Ahmed’s admonition that “forgetting
would be a repetition of the violence or injury” is of particular importance (2014, 33). Ahmed
argued, and I agree, that it is how the past intrudes on our present and interrupts the smooth
surface of our continuity that provides a chance for redemptive shock. And yet I want to make
clear that this is not an invitation to reopen wounds in order to politicize life already subject to
political whim. Rather, I am arguing that these are wounds not because they represent old forms
of violence, death, and isolation. They are wounds because the very premises of their being
forgotten is wounding. Unforgetting is, in a certain sense, the necessary step toward
understanding the shared affects of unbelonging, of not being-at-ease, as Mariana Ortega might

62

argue. This historical grounding of the trans genre explores why bias-motivated violence hurts so
much in the first place. It compounds the problem.
This chapter has argued that such violence is not just the practice of the living now. It is
conducted within the shadows of the present made possible by the overgrowth of shielded
history. That kind of historical overgrowth must be cleared. The recovered signs understood,
nurtured, and given an appropriate place as potentially resistant but always indicative of how
people manage. That is, in so many ways, the final redemptive power for trans narratives. Their
voices, not merely decoupled from medicine or social norms of gender, are also divorced from
the sentimentality of progress that has, as of yet, to manifest in fully emancipatory ways through
acts and performance. Chapter Two will deal with these intensities and performances, offering a
phenomenological account of the trans ordinary and its affective politics. It will also explore how
affects, shared and mapped across history in this chapter, shape the ordinary in gender
nonnormative life.
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Chapter 2: The Trans Ordinary and its Affective Politics
Whereas the last chapter dealt with the historical conditions for feeling, and the absence
of trans histories from many normative accounts of gender nonnormativity, this chapter focuses
on the present experience that is impacted by such histories. This chapter is an attempt to clarify
what the felt sense of the body is, mapping the affective and phenomenological terrain in terms
of the everyday. This chapter explores the lived aspects of feeling. In particular, I take up the
affective conditions of being “happy” or feeling “normal” within the rhythms of day-to-day
gender nonnormative life, or what I have been calling the trans ordinary. I use shudder quotes
here to point toward the normative perils of assuming that happiness extends from accepted
healthy attachments to things, life-activities, and people. My aim is not to argue that normalcy is
impossible to achieve or that the things we enjoy will always disappoint us. I do, however, have
questions about happiness’ solidity across forms of life. What is it to be happy/normal when
attachments to unhealthy habits (whether to fast foods or so-called unsafe sexual practices) may
produce feelings of emotional contentment but reproduce conditions for social ostracism or poor
health, or both? Is this sense of happiness most crucial to a person when life is patterned around
a constant state of exhausting vigilance whether about one’s own sense of belonging in the world
or of local safety or ordinary mutual recognition and reciprocation? Might happiness be
understood as phenomenological, that is to say as irreducible experiences of the bodily type? Or
as affective attachments that do not fit neatly within liberal commitments to self-sovereignty or
radical left critiques of power and of revolutionary empowerment? These questions are just some
of the ways that this chapter will re-frame affect as it is lived in the fragile grooves of the trans
ordinary.
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For me, affects of all types are relationships obtaining amongst people, things,
institutions, social forms, or worlds—object-desires that might provide a sense of longevity and
stability in the face of insecurity. It is not an emotion, per se. Happiness often reflects an
adjustment of everyday practices, and their relational attachments, to the sometimes fantasmatic
genres of living a good life, being a member of a good society, and so on. Happiness is often
more an assemblage of feelings that can be described as attempts at “getting there” rather than
some existential mood of “being there,” where the “there” is the projected space, the finish line
of, happiness. By “getting there,” and the affective structures attending practices associated with
that phrase, I mean that nonnormative life adjusts itself in ways that fit as best it can to the
fantasy of a normative “good life” because this so-called good life is perceived as the only real
road to happiness. Of course, nonnormative life faces all sorts of impasses along that road.
Although, I will explore how structural violence manifests in disproportionately higher ways for
trans communities (Valentine 2007; Girshick 2008; Fogg Davis 2018), I am more concerned that
happiness can arise through various practices that best approximate happy livability. In the
ordinary, such “affective attachments” to familiar phenomena are part of efforts to manage
feelings of wellbeing in justifiably unhappy circumstances. Tracking the affects of anger, pain, or
happy attachments in everyday nonnormative expressions of life means adjusting our own
theoretical conception of the normal, the (im)personal, and the political. This means shaking
loose some already settled questions in queer and trans theory that include, but are not limited to,
the trans body as philosophical sites of becoming (Baldino 2015), the trans body as revolutionary
(Spade 2011) or as effects of normativity and normative desire (Butler 1990; Warner 2000).
The first section of this chapter sketches the political stakes that phenomenology and
affective intuitions create. Between these two political scenes of activism is the experience and
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ordinary life in which gender nonnormative people dwell. I will then sketch the
phenomenological and affective terrain onto which rest of the chapter will map experiences of
the trans ordinary. Here I rely most heavily on Mariana Ortega’s In-Between (2016), Lauren
Berlant’s Cruel Optimism (2011), Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Touching Feeling (2003), and
Andrea Long Chu’s (2017) brilliant critique of trans phenomenology as much intellectual
architecture. The second section explores the meaning of the ordinary when it is attached to
potentially unhealthy, or “ugly,” affective practices. My archive consists of various stories from
trans women across the 20th century. “On Rage” and “On Isolation” illustrate how happiness is
affectively structured by the need to find continuity in unstable emotional and economic
conditions by engaging the improvisational zones of everyday life. Within this improvisational
zone one discovers that feelings associated with the fantasy of the good life often replace the
object of the good life altogether through misrecognized power the harmful object posseses. In
that way, I argue that forms of self-management during day-to-day life also include practices of
self-injury. As Adler and Adler (2011) have argued, “[cutting] is, at its essence, about feelings
[and] about the pain that drive people and the feelings of relief they get from it” (66). But as a
cutter with a non-binary identity, I find that most discussions about self-injury render our
communities pathetic, overly-emotional, or pathological depressives. That narrative must
change. I argue that the project of making a life that feels good means dealing with, carrying on,
and making do in the complex attachments to all sorts of tentative social, political, and emotional
worlds (what Mariana Ortega would describe as being-in-between-worlds). For the trans
ordinary, normative fantasies of the good life are lived orthogonally, forcing readjustments and
pursuing happiness even when it is perceived as injurious.
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The Politics of Feeling “Trans Enough”: Liberal Inclusion and Anti-Normativity
The politics of this chapter is an engagement with two related imaginaries concerning the
trans body. The first projects (and justifies) the necessity for liberal rights, autonomy, and
recognition (Steinmetz 2017; National Geographic 2017). Or as I discussed in Chapter One, as a
sign of a revolt against the hegemonic and otherwise violent cissexist and restrictive gender
binary. I find the consequences of such clashing perspectives (their very existence and whichever
one finds a stronger foothold paradigmatically) of political and personal importance. As a nonbinary activist and junior scholar, I still find myself attached in various ways to the political,
affective, and embodied qualities of the binary. And as we are witnessing important academic,
political, and institutional contributions that provide grounding for the diversity of trans voices
that act as critiques of trans-antagonism and transphobia, there is a necessary reflexive
awareness. Namely, for every political victory or positive discursive shift, there is a strong
tendency to homogenize, and thus erase, many ordinary forms of being in the everyday of trans
life. Testimonials, autobiographies, and academic studies used in this chapter complicate the
sweeping views of what the binary enacts on the trans ordinary. An analysis of the affective
practices in the trans ordinary reveals that trans lives, as they are lived, are in fact not rebellious
by default. Their experiences, as they are lived, are not indicative of a revolutionary aesthetic. It
is exactly an everydayness about trans life that gets lost in all the pageantry that marks our
culture of mass mediated culture, the political maneuvers of neoliberal inclusion, and the
powerful critiques of normormativity.
My political argument operates against what I identify as two broadly defined
imaginaries in trans politics. The first is what might be generally referred to as the
transnormative. It consists of the tendency of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer
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(LGBTQ+) liberal politics advancing progress in the name of recognition and equality, touting
achievements in areas like employment nondiscrimination as signals of change, all the while
overlooking areas of everyday violence in trans life (Valentine 2007, 173-177). This imaginary
holds fast to a constitutional argument that trans citizens are (rightly or wrongly) just like anyone
else. Although important for any number of reasons, this way of thinking often ignores the very
conditions and practices that have made that trans life livable in its singularity. Trans life is
sandwiched between the political rhetoric of equality and the promises of the liberal rights ethos
of citizenship (Girshick 2008). It often politicizes spaces that were already considered to be a
part of a political tapestry of the trans ordinary (take bathrooms, for example). The second
imaginary consists of an anti-normative politics that takes the everyday violence of the
conventional gender binary to be reasons, prima facie, for undoing gender categories and
politicizing non-normative identities to seek those ends. Trans becomes the revolutionary
subjectivity. Dean Spade (2011), for example, has made compelling and accurate arguments
about the violence of the gender binary in American law and policy. His work, however, seems
to argue that “revolution” should impinge on every gender-variant person’s consciousness.
More recent politics for gender nonnormative communities reflect some of its queer
political affinities. But the strategies receiving the most attention often rely on overdetermined
conventions like sentimentality/various attachments, the affects of rage, or a combination of the
two. Rocko Bulldagger outlined a foundational way of looking at nonbinary politics through the
vicarious lens of sentimentality in “The End of Genderqueer” (2006). For Bulldagger, a
genderqueer person (and thus a general politics) is one who “[is] painfully deliberate and
consciously political in their gender expression; identifies with efforts to subvert oppressive
power dynamic by undermining gender expectations; [has a] gender presentation is
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overdetermined by traditionally gendered signs—somebody who displays excessive femininity
or masculinity” (139). The first of these three intersecting guidelines forces an affective point,
namely that someone has experienced a certain kind of pain owing to their gender
expression/identity that would lead to being consciously political. Although the second and third
guidelines serve as declarations of solidarity and the (albeit hyper-generalized) aesthetic
conventions to do it, there is a kind of underdescribed attribution of experience to political
consciousness. These notions borrow from the other movements, such as Queer Nation and
STAR before it, whose aim was to subvert cisgender heterosexual patriarchy at any cost. But
many would consider this to be precisely the problem with explicitly defining nonbinary politics
as a stance against gender conformism. Ally or trans identifying, it is easy to conflate desiring
political intervention with an ethical obligation to act—forgetting that to act is a privilege based
on a number of intersecting factors.
Trans Phenomenology and the Political Spaces of Ordinary Practice
Given the breadth and scope of identities and practices falling under the trans umbrella,
so diverse that Gordene O. MacKenzie once observed that the term contains a veritable “gender
galaxy” (quoted in Currah 2006, 5), where does one situate a phenomenology of trans? The
answer involves the complexities of social and self-perceptions, affective practices and feelings
of self-worth, and self/public acts of recognition. In other words, studying the diversity of gender
nonnormative identities is often a phenomenological undertaking (Prosser 1999; Salamon 2010;
Chu 2017). A phenomenology of gender identity entails, at least in part, describing what it means
to experience gender and sex. It leads to identifying gender nonnormativity as one among many
of these modes of experience (Ahmed 2006). The question of identity, no matter how one poses
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it, is as deeply a philosophical as it is deeply a personal (and thus political) one. These range
from empirical questions of what a body is and its relation to what the body does.
I like to think that phenomenology and affect theory can be utilized along the lines of
what Sedgwick (2003) called reparative—as opposed to paranoid—forms of criticism. Focusing
on the day-to-day practices of life within structural oppressions, reparative theorists think in
terms of “what is naive, sincere, uncomplicated, unironic, uncritical, unstrategic, or just plain
ordinary about everyday being in the world’” (Chu 2017, 150; my emphasis). Such readings aim
to sidestep the claim that humans are simply duped by power and given identity (and desires).
This is why Chu’s choice of “naive” is telling and important. “Naive” can be defined as the state
of not having been subjected to experimentation. Phenomenology, likewise, argues that things,
bodies, and everyday moods are experienced as experience. Phenomenality is literally being
here. The body may be ordinary, average, sexy, or sometimes unappealing. But it is already here
for us as experience. Experience and activity are then phenomena that invite creativity and, more
specifically, “improvisation,” in what closely approximates what Heidegger (2010) called the
nexus of life’s available possibilities (see also Harney and Moten 2013, 48-49).
Despite recent inroads made in developing trans phenomenology within this vein—from
Jay Prosser’s Second Skins (1998) to Gayle Salamon’s Assuming a Body (2010)—there is still be
a failure to take seriously this everyday improvisation. Often following Judith Butler’s (2008
[1990]) take on strong (social) constructionism, these studies misapprehend the day-to-day
expressions of bodily experience, of actually experiencing being-in-a-body. Constructionist
theories situate the body as reflecting norms (or being “inscribed” by them) through bodily
iterations and performances. These modes of being habituate the subject, creating a sense of
regularity of being-in-worlds. Repetitions instantiate the norm, making it real. But overemphasis
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by such trans phenomenologies elide what it is to experience the singularity of having a body,
and particularly a trans body, in spite of themselves. For example, Chu’s (2017) review of these
phenomenologies argues that Prosser, while discussing the “wrong body” narrative of
transsexual experience, suspends the body in a “literal-to-come, linked to an imagined, idealized,
or phantasmatic future where the ‘imaginary or phantomized signifieds’ of the transsexual body
image will be—one day, some day—reunited with their ‘corporeal referents’” (149). In other
words, trans bodies are not-here-yet.
Chu goes on to argue that “to defend a theory of social construction, Salamon must insist
that this ‘simple givenness,’ this unproblematic availability of the phenomenological body, ‘is a
fiction, albeit a necessary one’—even though she assures readers that ‘to claim that our
experiences of sexed and gendered bodies are socially constructed is not to claim that our
experiences are fictive’” (146). Can the trans body ever simply exist? Chu thinks so. There is a
taken for granted appeal that leaves “[life’s] unremarkableness” in peril. Focusing on what the
future trans body ought to look and feel like, theorists retroactively assemble emotions that
haphazardly privilege sexual reassignment surgery (SRS) and other forms of transition. As Chu
would have it, trans phenomenologies should “[succeed] in making transition boring” (142).
Being trans just is. Delving into that “is” constitutes the phenomenological intent of this chapter.
If phenomenology seeks to understand things as they are in the everyday, then affect
theory is a complementary method of prying open the not-quite-definable sensations that are a
part of ordinary bodily existence (Massumi 2003; Stewart 2007; Berlant 2011). Unlike emotions,
affects are not immediately intelligible. But they are experienced and thus “known” to exist in
scenes of life. We will see this in Susan Stryker’s (1994) account of feeling unsettled by the trip
to the hospital during the birth of her partner’s child. Affect theory is concerned with how a
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person’s sensations are brought to the surface of perception, e.g., comfort or discomfort,
calmness or anxiety, belonging or standing out like a sore thumb. It is all about intensity
(Massumi 2003, 34-35). As something felt, “affects can be, and are, attached to things, people,
ideas, sensations, relations, activities, ambitions, institutions, and any number of other things,
including other affects. Thus, one can be excited by anger, disgusted by shame, or surprised by
joy” (Sedgwick 2003, 19). If happiness is understood as affect then it is easier to see how its
production can be attached to things not intuitively “good.” My affective argument centers on
practices of making do that dominant (social and intellectual) norms would define as problematic
and thus chalk up to pathology or power.
Throughout my following meditations on affect, I depend heavily on Lauren Berlant’s
vision of how affective structures in crisis deepen a subject’s commitments to feeling something,
anything, akin to happiness. She argues that within widespread contemporary precariousness
“happiness exists [for some] in their commitment to bring life in line with the affect they want to
continue experiencing” (2011, 166). When the pursuit of happiness becomes a strategy for
feeling something at the expense of getting something, the fragmentary and elusive
characteristics of being happy begin associating in unanticipated ways with unanticipated lived
consequences. Affective structures in crisis time and cultural trauma, where the frequent
suspensions of everyday continuity require subjects to find whatever they can to feel solidity,
constitutes my theoretical commitment to examine how the trans ordinary is made into an
intersectional zone of livability. I am also of the mind that affects are, themselves, “irreducibly
phenomenological” (Sedgwick 2003).
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Intersectional Concerns of Trans Affective Experiences
As I elaborated in Chapter One, gender nonnormative identities carry a disproportionate
weight of the overall historical erasure of “trans” from mainstream LGBTQ+ movements. Even
terms like “nonbinary,” was, and still is, associated with a handful of practices and gender
expressions such as “genderqueer,” “genderfuck,” and “genderfluid.” Recently, pangender and
androgynous have been included within a gender spectrum illustrated below.

Male-Identified

Gender Identity
Nonbinary/Nonnormative

Female-Identified

Gender (Expression)
Masculine | Transmasculine | Masculine of Center | Nonbinary | Feminine of Center | Transfeminine Feminine

Male

Sex (Assigned at Birth)
Intersex
Asexual/Agender/Neutrois/Nonbinary

Female

Figure 2.0: The Body
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Where subjects identify along these spectrums vary. Importantly, locating oneself within the
normative lines does not indicate an arbitrary attachment. As will be discussed in this section, the
intersections of age, race, class, sexuality, etc., all position people in the world. This
“thrownness,” as Heidegger might say, produces adjustments at the lived level. I wish to explore
some of these adjustments in order to illustrate how attachments spring outward from the affects
developed within those intersectional experiences.
Youth
Realizing that one is different is a common thread of any LGBTQ+ narrative. In a Trans
Youth Survey (2001), frequent responses to the question of when respondents knew they were
trans or gender nonnormative elicited responses that seemed to share the same affective
orientation. Of knowing or, at least, of knowing through learning. “When I was six, I remember
thinking that when I grew up, I wanted to be a boy. Then I found out that wouldn’t happen and I
couldn’t wait to die and go to heaven ‘cause I could be a boy then. Before then I was masculine,
but gender wasn’t that structured” (5). Another student argued, “since I could remember” (ibid.).
Some remember specific moments that might relate to a conversation. “At about age 7 a friend
and I discussed ‘sex-change operations’ after seeing a talk show on TV” (6). Religion, too, can
make a powerful scission in someone’s realization. “I remember standing in front of a mirror and
reciting ‘God made you a woman, you’ll die a woman’ over and over as punishment for sinfull
[sic] thoughts. :-\ I was a fucked up little kid. (7). As far as terms go, one respondent argued that
“I came into being genderqueer in the last year I think, but I still identify as trans too because of
the umbrella term thing. Trans is the umbrella and genderqueer is the specific piece of it I
identify with” (9).
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These stories share similar forms forms. One respondent captured a key insight about
perceived gender difference: “…once I started to learn the difference [about gender], I knew I
was different…” (8). Their stories tell of a similar narrative, one popular in general and speaks to
a certain unique knowledge. “At about age 7 a friend and I discussed ‘sex-change operations’
after seeing a talk show on TV” (6). The unfortunate circumstances that surround nonbinary
identities is that what constitutes the limits of visibility are powerful narratives: “one has always
known”, or “one was always aware of”, a difference in how one understood their gender from
birth, or “learning, over time, what these differences mean.” These narratives invite a kind of
static temporalization. The nonbinary subject either knows or not from the start or else they learn
what they already knew. It is a consciousness that bars continuity because the framework of selfdetermination is already determined.
Coming Out
Regardless of the self-discovery narratives, experiences of coming out vary. Many
members of LGBTQ+ communities see coming out as both a figurative and literal process of
revealing one’s “secret” identity. Coming out is a diminutive of “coming out of the closet,”
where “the closet” is a personal and cultural space of shame. For some it is a rite of passage. For
others like queer literary theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2008 [1990]) the closet has marked
the “long crisis of modern sexual definition” and shaped, in so many ways, the epistemological
commitments of academics and everyday members of the public alike with regard to gender, sex,
and sexuality. To that end, sociologist Lori Girshick has rightly pointed out that coming out as
trans (in all its complex iterations) must be treated differently from an analytical. Girshick argues
that “a different sexual orientation does not challenge people in the same ways as gender
variance [sic]. Some individuals who are trans-identified will probably continue to look the same
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and may take on the same gender role as a gay man or a lesbian, but a traanssexual will
dramatically change his or her appearance, body, and gender role. A genderqueer may vigorously
confront others’ ideas of what a man or a woman looks like or acts like” (2008, 99). In a number
of ways, nonbinary people will often face similar sorts of epistemic, emotional, and physical
violence while coming out.
This violence manifests itself within, perhaps firstly, the space of the family. But violence
also takes place from peers within educational institutions to everyday life at work. Juliet
Jacques’ memoir, Trans, captures the isolation of coming to terms with a dissonant gender
identity. Jacques writes: “I’d never dared talk to anyone about my gender identity, or my
sexuality. At school, I got told that I sat ‘like a queer’ just for crossing my legs, so I felt that
being open about who I was would end badly. There was nothing to help me in Horley Library
either, so everything I learned about the subjects came from films and TV programmes—the
ones I’d chosen to see by myself” (2015, 31). This is characteristic of a kind of epistemic erasure
particular to nonbinary people: a realization that one’s own feelings (regarding gender, sexuality,
or everyday embodiment) are not exactly “right.” In Beemyn and Rankin’s (2011) survey, over a
quarter of respondents suggested that they had experienced some form of harassment within a
year of the study, and nearly a quarter of all respondents identified verbal harassment as the
major component (94-95). In all cases, whether harassment was reported, respondents indicated a
shift in their everyday bodily gestures and gender comportment. Jacques provides a narrative
detail of this as she ruminates that her discomfort was based in no small part on the policing of
her body (crossing her legs “like a queer”) by other students. She kept her gender identity to
herself out of concerns for her own safety if not for the ongoingness of friendship. Where else
would it be welcomed? Discussing the complexities of a nonnormative identity would otherwise

76

“end badly.” She learned how to manage her identity and composure to avoid, no doubt, any
physical violence that still haunts queer and gender nonnormative communities.
Transition and Passing
Transition describes a variety of processes. These include social and physical changes, or
a combination of the two. Some of these procedures are hormone therapy, vaginoplasty,
phalloplasty, mastectomies, full hysterectomies, cheek/chin/forehead shaving and other facial
alterations, chest binding, shirt and pants “stuffing,” standing-to-pee devices, complete wardrobe
change, makeup, or a new wardrobe that extends a person’s gender expression into the public. As
Simmons and White phrase it, “to physically alter our behaviors to align our gender identity with
our gender presentation. Some of us take hormones or have surgeries. Some of us wish we could
afford surgeries. Others of us do not want to take hormones or have surgeries, but we dress and
act in ways that affirm our gender identity” (2014, 7). In this sense, surgical transition is very
much a class-based issue. For Virginia Prince, among other transgenderists of the mid-20th
century, to realize the self in all its gendered complexity involved a split between two distinct
lives: the life of the “femme self” and the life of the “masc self.” The transition between the two
could be seamless or full of peril. Her contemporary, Ariadne Kane (1974), also a professed
transgenderist pioneer, considered the “genderal” or social boundary called gender as crossed
through apparel, comportment, and conventional style.
For many others surgery is not part of the equation. This means a panoply of sociallyrelated (and sometimes legal) changes including name changes, shifts in pronouns, and the selfmanagement that comes with these gender affirmations. Name change can take place in private
settings, legal documentation, or both. Some nonbinary people change their names to reflect
gender neutrality, shortening birth names to first letters or altering them completely. Nonbinary
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identities include new pronouns that may be gender neutral they/them/their, but also consist of
ze/zie (pronounced “zee”) or hir (pronounced “here”), or a combination of them. Although these
changes in pronouns seem simple enough, Beemyn and Rankin found that misgendering through
inaccurate pronoun use (malicious or not) was one of the most pervasive forms of harassment in
their study. Some found their peers unwilling to change; others consisted of their families (2011,
151-154).
Passing, whether in the context of SRS, is the recognition of one’s gender as they
consciously present it to a public. Simmons and White have described this publicness as having
one’s “gender presentation correctly read by others around us, choosing to live stealth. This
means that few, if any, of those around us know that we are transgender” (8). In a sense, it can be
thought of as the practices of self-management since passing, or the need for passing is also an
awareness of one’s surroundings. For example, shopping for clothes can become a situation that
invites ordinary violence where a “man in woman’s clothing” is be policed for violating the
unspoken norm of apparel. Jacques has also illustrated these moments vividly, attempting to find
the means “to pass” all the while being treated as a potential threat. “I tried the charity shops.
Ignoring the woman at the counter who told me that ‘the men’s clothes are over there’” (2015,
23). This scene reveals what normativity can do: nullify someone’s feeling of safety through
misrecognition.
Thus, the failure to pass can often lead to more than unwelcome guidance from store
clerks. It can also lead to physical harm. As captured in the anthology, Nobody Passes, gender
nonnormative people realize that “the majority of transgendered [sic] people travel incognito.
When traveling, dressing for the occasion means downplaying our gender-bending by dressing to
match our documented genders” (Thaemlitz 2006, 173). And, as will be explained in the
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following subsection, passing is a function of class and race, intersecting features of human
identity that enable or disable making a nonnormative life safe. In activist Toi Scott’s experience,
who identifies as transmasculine, there is a continued presence of intra-community policing:
“skating the ice between the two genders is a struggle. Trans men want to know why I still have
breasts and why I don’t take hormones. Feminists want to know why I pack and bind, why I
consider myself transmasculine” (2014, 33). Being in public consists of a complex set of
decisions for a gender nonnormative person. But so too is the decision to identify with and
participate in a community, who can also serve as a complex policing mechanism.
Race and Class
The notion that gender is a singular identity among many has, so far, been complicated.
Intersectional theories of identity, especially those articulated by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989),
have argued that each identity category is relational, impacting the lived experience of any other
one. Trans activist Alok Menon-Vaid (2016) shares this narrative construction of the embodied
gendered self. “I struggle with how society is obsessed with the idea of having one self/identity. I
struggle with how the only way we talk about gender as an identity. I think gender just like our
‘selves’ [sic] is relational. I think we have been and will become many selves for many different
people.” Many indigenous, especially Native American, cultures reflect this conception of
plurality or multiplicity for self-hood. Many are re-realizing that trans identities occupy spiritual
truths. Cassidy Anne Medicine Horse asserts the importance of Two-Spirit being, that “[a]
gender-crossing individual serves as a critical link in the balance of nature” (2014, 70). European
colonialism had a prevalent hand in destroying this epistemic linkage to the spiritual trans-self.
“The concept of gender,” Toi Scott writes, “is entrenched in the black community, if not the
pillar of it. As I’ve come out as genderqueer, I have found it difficult to imagine disassociating
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myself from black womanhood” (33). In some instances, communities have now altered their
plural and singular ethnic terms—such as Latinx, Latin@, Chicanx, Chican@—to represent the
spectrum of embodied diversity present.
Of these intersectional effects are the constructions of race and class, where racial
identity in many Western cultures determines the economic success and actuarial rates, where
people of color (POC) are disproportionately poorer and whose life chances are cut short. This
extends to the realms of health and personal care. Lauren Berlant reports that “[the] symptom[s]
of unhealth [sic] does characterize, disproportionately, the bodily propensities people of color
now suffer the wearing diseases of old age. High blood pressure and diabetes are especially
catastrophic, as these portend early heart disease, liver and pancreatic failure, strokes and
aneurysms, as well as blindness and circulation problems” (113). These conditions lead to what
Berlant has called “slow death,” a condition that thrives on an historically underprivileged
group’s inability to alter the conditions that attach it to the complexities of its own demise. This
stems from a number of socially reinforcing stereotypes—such as POC being “too lazy” to find
adequate work, “welfare queens” who continue to have kids to stay on public welfare—that
reproduce racism in the workplace and in public spaces.
Indeed, in each of Beemyn and Rankin’s (2011) studies of harassment, coming out,
abuse, employment discrimination, and other realms of everyday life, POC were almost a twothirds more like to experience a negative encounter than their white counterparts (96-97; 99; 105106). Race is a built-in part of (especially Western) human lives. Statistics, of course, can only
reveal so much. Experiences of racism, especially ones intersected by gender, are often ones of
“demonization, scapegoating, police brutality, housing segregation, and lack of access to certain
jobs and employment” (Ziegler and Rasul 2014). There have been multiple studies in the 20th
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century documenting the various ways that institutionalized racism impacts everyday life for
POC. Michelle Alexander (2012) writes in The New Jim Crow, for example, of the mass
incarceration of black men (that gender assignment in particular). The widespread effects of this
racially biased carceral state impacts gender nonnormative POC in other ways than merely being
locked up. Such issues include, but are not limited to, higher risks of sexual abuse by inmates
and prison guards alike, being placed in the wrong gender population (thus increasing the
likelihood of violence), and administrative segregation or confinement to a single cell (Broadus
and Minter 2014). Finally, C. Riley Snorton and Jin Haritaworn (2013) have argued that trans
POC are only understood in their discriminatory settings as affective tools. That is, their deaths
are used as a means of making a larger ideological cause (such as hate crimes legislation, etc.)
more pressing.
Sexuality and Intimate Violence
Sexuality has been as much a part of the feminist and queer debates of the latter 20th
century as have gender and sex. Nonnormative gender identities are often lost in the ongoing
discourses that have emerged out of the evaluations of sexual practices. Often perceived to be
either gay or lesbian, or more commonly for members of the LGBTQ+ community queer, people
with nonnormative genders involve the complex relationship between that person’s gendered self
and those to whom they are attracted. For many, this may involve defaulting to queer because
there is a limited vocabulary to discuss sexuality without recourse to binary sex/gender. From the
lived, or phenomenological standpoint, gender nonnormativity does not reflect the complex
psychic, physical, social, and cultural phenomena that sexuality invokes. Someone who is
transmasculine may not consider themselves gay for similar reasons as someone who is
transfeminine may not consider themselves to be lesbian. Although “queer” is a useful term to
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describe many nonnormative sexualities, its gloss-like cover may tend to erase more than it
illuminates.
Many gender nonnormative people feel a particular kind of scrutiny on their sexual
practices through a form of social, but also relational, policing. In short, their bodies are subject
to a heightened expectation because, as normative conventions of sex(uality) go, a person’s
gender expression ought to match their sex (or genitalia). For nonbinary people, gendered
appearances can (and often does) fluctuate. One’s everyday aesthetic is not tied to a perpetual
attachment to the norms of femininity or masculinity. In one crucial sense, gendered appearance
becomes a means of bargaining for normative acceptance for the nonbinary or gender
nonnormative people. This concept may be difficult to grasp. Most do not have to consider how
one’s own gendered appearance simply matches a normative standard. That is the privilege of
“looking” and “being” normal—that one’s bodily appearance under their clothes is the same as
the one on the surface.
Summarizing the Phenomenality of the Body
Critic and writer Andrea Long Chu (2017) has argued that the trans body is neither
behind nor ahead of things. The body is directly in possession of the person about whom
activism or academia is narrating. That argument alone requires a more holistic analysis of
everyday trans politics and life. Indeed, if gender dysphoria were the only sensation of otherwise
numerous oppressive structures that gender nonnormative communities feel, then cis privilege is
not only reified within trans subjectivity. It’s a done deal, so to speak. Attention to other forms of
racial and economic marginalizations fall away as the (now de-pathologized) trans body
circulates in the zone of cultural mediation. The (cis-) public, such a politics would accede, has
finally recognized the real person behind all the discursively defined sex/gender barriers.
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Theorizing Self-Management in the Trans Ordinary
Throughout this chapter I have been developing the view that norms and normativity
need to be recast in the modes of what living is doing with the norm rather than the other way
around. Thus normative accounts of the good life (manifested through heteronormativity
[marriage], cisnormativity [passing], and bionormativity [transition-related surgeries]) do not
interpellate trans subjects as such. These views of what is otherwise a brand of Althusserian
ideology tend to “read normativity too narrowly as an authoritarian desire” (Berlant 2011, 186).
In this section, norms are more like genres within which subjects work and make life happen.
Each of the following testimonies will indicate that affects of belonging and self-sovereignty (all
relationally “happy”) might have to be put on hold, suspended as it were, in response to
perceived norms. Yet in each story, these suspensions illustrate a kind of “readying” for (not the
hollowing out of) agency, agential intensity that living in crisis conditions induce.
On Rage
Susan Stryker (1994) has written some of the most influential critical on cisnormativity
and biological determinism in trans studies. Her style is often disarming, revealing, and resonant
with an everyday awareness of lived pain often lost in critical (queer) theory. Her influential “My
Words to Victor Frankenstein” captures the powerful affective stakes of the everyday (from
transition, to heterosexism, to medical science, to the normative family). The joyous scene of her
partner’s giving birth is fraught with all kinds of affective tensions. It didn’t begin at the hospital.
It began at home where the decision was made that the birth was to take place at the hospital.
The declaration that “it’s a girl,” a trigger in that moment, was also unlocking a series of affects
already circulating in Stryker’s experience of the event. “Why, just then, did a jumble of dark,
unsolicited feelings emerge wordlessly from some quiet back corner of my mind? This moment
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of miracles was not the time to deal with them. I pushed them back, knowing they were too
strong to avoid for long” (249). She was already exhausted and disappointed from not having had
the chance to have the birth at home. She didn’t want to have the birth at the hospital. This birth
was not a part of the normative “script” that she and her tribe (her close friends) wanted. The
hospital was a site of ambiguous consent to gendered norms and an ominous waiting seemed to
haunt the air. Stryker confesses that, “my body left me hanging” (250). Between her lover’s body
and her own there grew a space, an emergent gap that seemed unbridgeable. Her feelings
suspended the moment but she was not completely undone. She simply had to catch up to
herself.
The sensation of “catching up” is an example of what Berlant (2011) attributes to the
peculiar temporal effects of life in cultural crisis, or what Massumi (2003) has called a “pastness
opening directly onto a future” (30). Any number of things that are perceived as traumatic or felt
as violent do not manifest themselves every day. For example, a homophobic or racist norm,
ones that possess the essential effect of dehumanizing nonnormative forms of life, can be felt as
tremors in the fields of perception. They are virtual. The become actualized in form and content
by a joke, or sexing a newborn child, or being mistaken for somebody else when you are Black
in a culture of whiteness. Anthropologist Veena Das (2007) calls the effects of these happenings
“the soft knife of everyday oppressions” (218). In this way, crisis is lived as a nonevent, an
affective maw spanning across lived time, connecting feelings of presence and precarity in ways
that are phantasmatic but materially abrupt. I would describe the sensation as anticipation,
worrying affects that ready the subject for the actualization of something “in the air.” This bodily
state is anxiety inducing, for sure, because it suspends feelings of control in favor of the potential
something to happen. It is a kind of knowledge, an epistemology all too familiar for
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nonnormative forms of self-management. Whereas Sianne Ngai (2005, 1) describes anxiety as so
many “ugly feelings [that act as] affective gaps and illegibilities, dysphoric feelings, and other
sites of emotional negativity [producing] suspended agency,” I argue that, on the contrary, such
suspensions are sites where affective attachments turn into new experimental practices that
question the limits of ordinary knowledge and test boundaries.
I say this is a nonnormative epistemology because it runs the full gamut of intersectional
precarity. Claudia Rankine (2014) argues that the affects of racialized anger form “[another] kind
of anger [that] can prevent, rather than sponsor, the production of anything except loneliness”
(24). One wonders what is known. “You begin to think, maybe erroneously, that this other kind
of anger is really a type of knowledge: the type that both clarifies and disappoints. It responds to
insult and attempted erasure simply by asserting presence, and the energy required to present, to
react, to assert is accompanied by visceral disappointment” (ibid.). The known becomes the
realization of having lived in the very impasse being presently faced. Experiences over the long
course of making a life accumulates and saddles body with the potential of activity. Minorities of
all kinds carry a life’s worth of experiences in everyday life that may never registers at conscious
levels. This is especially true of bias and of the expense of energy. The soft knife of everyday
oppressions is “soft” precisely because it hews slowly and delicately into the ordinary over the
course of time. Unaware of its temporal effects, minoritized subjects feel a continuous sagging
by the nonevent of (racial, economic, gendered, or sexed) crisis, a sensation that anticipates a
happening before it actually takes place. It’s the difference in what happens and the attunements
of the people that count.
This seems to be the case in Stryker’s hospital scene. She must make new attachments in
order to make sense of the impossible (her own body’s inability to bear children), to recuperate
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from her own feelings of shame at being emotionally distant, and her exhaustion of feeling so
overwhelmed by norms that she already knew were there. She writes “I floated home from the
hospital, filled with a vital energy that wouldn’t discharge. I puttered about until I was alone.
Finally, in the solitude of my home, I burst apart like a wet paper bag…” (ibid.). Her impasse
leads her to an attachment of rage, the epistemic continuity she needs to fix what she can fix in
the everyday. Her tears of anger at the limitations of her own body are akin to her feelings of
pride at having been witness to the birth of a child. This transgender rage, of a particular kind of
relation between the trans subject and normativity, de-privileges the linguistic and advances the
affective: “No sound/ exists/ in this place without language/ my rage is a silent raving” (ibid.,
252). Her rage is a means through which hegemonic gender practices and the limitations of
biology get mapped back into her ordinary. She is free to associate with other feelings, ones both
cathartic yet emotionally tentative, but given over to potential energy. Rage surely cannot sustain
someone forever. But it can situate in their body as virtual affect, waiting to catch up with them
again with its situatedness, its promise of knowledge.
On Isolation
The following are taken from the Transgender Archives at the University of Victoria,
British Columbia. I understand that archives are often products of privileged donors, situated in
private universities or libraries, exemplifying how certain voices are recorded and remembered
and others discarded to history. The materials themselves felt lost—keepsakes, forgotten lives
attached in various, sometimes non-intuitive ways in folders and paper clips (much like affective
attachments). This place, where the physical archive and the cultural/affective archive buried into
each other, prompted a host of personal affective connections of my own. At this burial site, I
was left with an unenviable task of “finding” stories, narratives, or “critical objects” to signify
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trans life. These stories illustrate that the “I am” is often a linguistic mask for an attachment to “I
want to be.” This attachment, often routed through the future-temporality of transition, leads to a
number of affective impasses each person deals with in different ways.
Among the number of people whose testimonies I read, Dorothy D. (1979) stood out to
me. She, along with many other trans people in the mid-20th century, found op-ed pieces and
letters to the editor as means for sharing lived experience. This style of composing a life’s
narrative and past was almost anonymizing. Dorothy, living most of her life by another name,
writes of the kinds of exhaustions identified earlier in Stryker’s letter. Her identity, she argues,
“would be classified by shrinks as an unoperated transsexual. [She hasn’t] gone to the girl
factory to get a sex change a la Christine Jorgensen” (1979, 9). Dorothy would, however, “prefer
to live as a woman full time. I feel more together that way. I am more comfortable, relaxed, more
me. I’ve spent better than 50 years trying to be Phil, and all I’ve got to show for that is a lot of
pain and agony, so I think I’ve given my male self a good try” (ibid., my emphasis). Fifty years
of waiting, practicing, and being-another to what effect? By the time Dorothy (as Phil) reached
middle age, she had joined the advertising business, had served in the military, and experienced
economic success. These were all under the pretense of a name she felt alienated from. In one
important passage, she asks “where am I, Dorothy, at?” (ibid., emphasis in text). Dorothy
discloses herself as herself, her I, as less a part of a constructed “trans-script” and more of an
ongoing encounter with the nakedness of her experiences with the world. Her ordinary was
trying to make Phil work; and it didn’t work in the emotional longhaul.
Her frustration and exhaustion while living as Phil only tracks into the life of Dorothy.
She must consider how “passing” works, how to overcome the former duality of Dorothy/Phil
and merge into a unified self. She has to make do with the body she has, and explains how
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important passing (its practices, its constitutive features) like this: “[a]ppearance can also
overcome a low-pitched voice if you know how to act the woman’s role—carriage, sitting,
gestures. This takes practice” (ibid.). Dorothy’s practice is one that revels in the adjustments to
the norm—of a norm as guide rather than interpellative construct. She is not performing them so
much as living in day-to-day mediations of them. These practices are bound up with pain and
joy, economic success and emotional failure, for sure. But she sutures these events together to
make a life, however unexceptional she defines it. In one sense, it is the boring-ness of trans life
that stands out in Dorothy’s story.
For Dorothy, learning and practicing gender cues does not exhaust her as such. She finds
them to be a part of the bodily package. It’s the wait, of “getting people to believe how I feel—
that when I’m Dorothy, I feel together, secure, at peace with myself and full of self-confidence”
(1971, 10; my emphasis). The feeling of her own togetherness seems to be in a constant state of
risk. Dorothy’s ordinary consists of the sagging sensation of never getting it quite right. One
wonder why she should try at all, keeping at it despite the fact that friends and family continue to
let her down. Why keep those connections, after all, if they are not conducive to self-making?
There is an ambiguity of what constitutes actual social reciprocity (rather than recognition) here.
You take what you can get and make it work so that one day you might rest in the space of some
kind of tenable affective balance.
Dorothy deserves to be understood as she is and deserves access to the medical care her
body and identity require. But I want to complicate the reading of these stories by detaching the
scenes of trans bodily experience from their automatic emplotment in a genre of transition (thus
avoiding what amounts to an identity-based teleology). To that extent, I resituate Dorothy’s
desire for SRS as both a desire to feel at home in her body and access to affects of social
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belonging as well as to the conflicting promises that SRS and transition offer. SRS, at best, offers
the contradictory guarantee that this form of transition (and there are many forms) will allow her
to thrive, but specifically where her family and friends are concerned. But SRS does not fix nor
guarantees that forms of social reciprocity will be there. The need to make a (working class) life
will continue, regardless of undergoing the procedure. How she makes that life workable
becomes the more critical question.
Nancy Ledins (c. 1960), like Dorothy, uses writing as her own kind of vehicle to clarify
her vexed identity with womanhood. It was a letter written for a future self. It was meant to be
cathartic. But it expressed a tentative connection to her future self-realization, a feeling of
belonging in a bracketed yet-to-come. Or as Veena Das (2007) puts it, “writing the self points to
a promise—the creation of a future community” (214). In a letter addressed only to “Dear,”
Nancy tells her reader that “Bill Griglak is Nancy Ledins—the name I have chosen to be known
by in this preoperative stage and, within due time, postoperatively. [But] surgery is not the final
answer—not the end-all—not the magical answer” (1-3, my emphasis). What is the promise of
the future here, then? In saying, “I am me,” that “Bill Griglak is Nancy Ledins, she places her
identity in the tenuous bracket of “becoming.” This “I” comes at a personal cost (no doubt
expressed in her grief of capping, repressing, and suppressing her feelings in the ordinary).
Rankine (2014) maintains that this pronoun provides a false sense of present and future security.
“Sometimes ‘I’ is supposed to hold what is not there until it is. Then what is comes apart the
closer you art to it./ This makes the first person a symbol for something./ The pronoun barely
holding the person together” (71, emphasis in text). There is no guarantee that the “I” will ever
come through on its promise of togetherness, completeness, or happiness.
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Perhaps affects of happiness are always in the mode of catching up, realizing themselves
in different scenes of the present from their relations to a past and intended future, but never fully
manifesting the way we ever want or expect. Dorothy speculated that SRS would provide the
means of dissociating from her old life by making her new life livable. But before, during, and
after SRS, Dorothy would still persist in an unjust ordinary of misrecognition, a false reciprocity
of that recognition among family and friends. Nancy knows how that sagging feeling of
incompleteness in life might in fact carry over into bodily life after SRS—a body that, from a
phenomenological point of view, was already there. Dorothy felt the ongoing pressure to
convince others that her “I” existed. Nancy had to confess to an ongoing construction, a tentative
“I” always in process of becoming—as if she needed to prove to herself that it was possible to
exist. These forms of convincing, of holding out hope, are indexes of affective attachments
keeping their present livable when cisnorms prevail.
The point I am trying to make is not that SRS or transition-related activities constitute a
kind of false consciousness of trans selfhood. That would be contradictory and, well, completely
off the mark. What I am saying is that attachment to the promissory narrative of transition, a kind
of self-extension into the future trans-self-to-be, may lead to (Rankine’s vision of)
disappointment and of potential self-dissipation. Dorothy and Nancy’s affects of wellbeing swell
around such self-extensions as they are lived and performed in their present. They are not duped
by the idea of total self-completion through SRS. They have to deal with their body as it is, to the
best of the abilities, and persist however wrong or unjust it is that they must persist in a
transphobic milieu. As I will argue in the next and final section, this kind of knowledge can also
result in attachments where the normative fantasy invites the creation of a sensorium of injurious
acts.
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Self-Interrupting and Injurious Acts
Theorizing the genre of “life in the crisis ordinary” is also theorizing how everyday
violence is woven into the scene of the ordinary. Self-harm (various forms of purposefully
injuring the body) is an example of this. When someone’s ordinary is impinged by an injurious
world, a subject might find injurious acts enabling continuity and solidity in an attempt to
reproduce the normative feelings that “healthy” forms self-care are supposed to produce. These
include belonging, grounding, control, and relief. This discussion opens a place for self-injury in
the conversation because it “provides an alternative way of talking about phrases like ‘selfmedication,’ which we use to imagine what someone is doing when they are becoming
dissipated, and not acting in life-building ways—the way that liberal subjects and happy people
are supposed to” (Berlant 2011, 100). This alternative thinking attempts to separate the
phenomenological act of cutting from the so-called medicalized subjectivity and its implicit need
for institutional forms of help.
In spite of itself, this discussion remains adjacent to (if not captured by) psychiatric and
psychological discourses. It also must contend with a popular imaginary that reads self-injury as
indicative of a poorly managed emotional life. These practices are linked to suicidal ideation
(which is often not the case). These perspectives narrate the cutter within diagnosis and
melodrama the present analysis is distancing itself from. That is to say that cutters are either a
psychiatric subject and are out of control and not able to recognize the healthy decision; or they
are liberal self-sovereign agents and in total control, freely choosing to irresponsibly injure
themselves as a call for help. Injurious behaviors can pose serious health risks (Adler and Adler
2011; Carmel, et al. 2014, 314; Girshick 2008, 166). But it is consistently the case that
psychological (read normative) expertise on the matter of self-injury regularly intervenes in ways
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that can trigger a popular response to shame people who self-injure, or deny their ability to think
for themselves. In other words, cutters need to view it as their “problem” that they need to
change. Neither incriminate the cultural context of crisis, precarity, and inadequate attention to
mental health as possible culprits. Self-injurers who are gender nonnormative, already emplotted
in a medical narrative, live in multiple, intersecting impasses that deepen that medicalization.
I want to buck this trend and frame these injurious acts as a means of getting by during
scenes of perceived irregularities and (possibly) trauma) in life. Often, normative life for gender
nonnormative communities seems miles away. It is the fantasy of normativity that becomes selfsustaining. “Moments like this, the fantasy of an unconflicted, normative lifeworld can provide
the affective pre-experience of a potential site of rest, even if one has known it only as at best a
mirage of solidity and stability” (Berlant 2011, 185). I get the sense that cutting acts as a form of
catching up to oneself, that each person is attempting to escape the sagging feeling dragging the
self they know to be there. In other words, self-injury qualifies as a means of feeling at home in a
given body, temporalizing a sense of self either reeling out of control or discomfited by the
contemporary conditions of economic life (see “Reading the Signs”). In fact, there is something
that is often left out of this analysis of self-injury. In seeking objects that provide a sense of
security and protection, subjects risk “the cost of massive misrecognition” where she denies the
object’s instrumentality in causing her ongoing pain (Berlant 2012, 37). This is to say that selfinjury is an object or state that can provide that protracted sense of self-stability or interruption,
management or mismanagement, that responds to much larger issues than a diagnosis.
Lori Girshick’s (2008) study, Transgender Voices, is a rare but useful archive in this
respect. There is not a lot of research about trans communities and their relation to self-injury. I
read some of the testimonies in Girshick’s study as demonstrative of how self-injury becomes
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attached to life’s maintenance, how affects of rest and stability are tracked through the
experience of cutting, and how self-hatred is still read as moments of dealing through violence. I
also read how trans youth discuss their bodies in terms of temporal and episodic achievement.
For instance, A.J., self-identified as female-to-male transsexual, said “I did have a self-mutilation
problem which was like a drug to me. I hurt myself any way I could just as long as I was in pain
because I hated my body” (166). This “drug,” was an affective rush, a bundle of feelings that can
become addictive for anyone (eating too much bad food, driving too fast—anything can be a
drug). For Tim, another female-to-male transsexual, the act was a means of re-grounding
everyday experience. “I used to dissociate and that was a way of bringing me back” but stopped
doing so once he was able to achieve what he perceives to be his male embodiment. If not
personal release, many argued cutting engendered feelings of belonging in an otherwise
impersonal world. In some instances, this became a virtual gesture toward being in the world
(Adler and Adler 2011, 94-128). For example, the growing discourse on self-injury meant that,
alongside rising access to online communities, cutting was being lived as a new form reciprocal
exchange, particularly that of recognition that was absent in their everyday offline worlds. Their
affective attachments adjusted to make these new virtual fields in order to vitiate the stigma of
cutting. In effect, cutters produces an alternative sensorium of well-being.
Gender, race, and class were all significant factors in Adler and Adler’s (2011) canonical
study of the phenomenon. Roughly 85 percent of respondents in their study were (I’m assuming
cis) women (35). The socialized gender identity of the person also had corresponding impacts on
type of injury, location on the body, timing, and location of the act itself. Instances of cutting
were overrepresented in white (middle and upper middle class) communities, reports of selfinjury have increased in non-white communities as well. In particular were the cases of black
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men, whose injuries ranged from scratching with fingernails to the use of shattered plastic. It has
become “rampant among the incarcerated, in jails and prisons as well as in juvenile detention
centers, where people of lower socioeconomic status and minority ethnicity are
disproportionately prevalent, as well as in the military, where stress is high, personal control is
low, and racial/ethnic mixing is common” (37). Self-injury is a contingent site where the fragility
of being-in-crisis can be ameliorated, temporalizing the body through acts that feel like selfsovereign control. Feeling-like is often everything for feeling itself.
I am tempted to read these accounts of injury together as potentially performative acts of
(racialized) masculinity and femininity. This leads to a new, but understudied, notion of gender
identity and its attendant affects, emotions, and subjectivities. How might cutting become a
performative mode of gendered (and racialized) being? In other words, taking for granted that
cutting is more often associated with cisfeminine embodiments, could the act enable a
transwoman, aware of this social “fact,” to feel feminine? If so, then the question of healthy and
normative practices are inflected if trans women engaging in cutting view these acts as
expressions of feeling gender, what Ian Hacking (1999) has dubbed the “looping effect” of social
knowns. The same could be said about iterations of cismasculinity, where transmen might
reproduce the more severe forms of self-mutilation as a performative part of transition. Or,
contrariwise, they avoid cutting altogether as signs of a femininity that does not define their
bodily experience as men. Thus, self-injury implies a worrying kind of agency because it enables
certain modes of gendered continuity in life. So, when Chu (2017) argues that so-called wrong
attachments are necessary, “even if it is the wrong kind of wrong to hold onto,” she’s doing so
because nonnormative communities within conditions of contemporary crisis feel the affective
pressures to be normal more intensely. The improvisational nature of (being) trans invites
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theorists to understand that such improvisations defy normative visions of health and happiness.
It is not that happiness is an illusion. When viewed as an affect, happiness is more complex when
it is embroiled in making a life.
Summary
This chapter has dealt with a large archive of feelings and testimony already. But I would
like to end with two images captured during a fraught moment among women to illustrate a
crucial point intimated in “Reading the Signs.” These structures of feeling, or sensoria, that often
circumscribe the trans ordinary do not just disappear. Even emerging sensoria have residues from
those of the past. For example, more than forty years after Sylvia Rivera challenged the crowd at
Washington Square Park, trans activists and celebrities Laverne Cox and Carmen Carrera
appeared as guests on Katie Couric’s daytime television show, “Katie.” The theme was
“Transgender Trailblazers” and aired on January 6th, 2014. When Couric began the segment
with Carmen Carrera, Couric introduced Carrera as having been “born a man” and repeatedly
framed her in this way throughout the interview. There was an obvious assumption on Couric’s
part that all trans people must experience “that moment” of identity formation. Couric eventually
asked the question(s): “Was the whole process [of surgical transition] painful, physically, for
you? [Pause] Your private parts are different now aren’t they?” Carrera hushed Couric during
part of the inquiry. Carrera said it’s not something she’s comfortable talking about. And if her
gestures capture the spirit of the moment, Carrera showed a sense of shame at even having to
express herself in this way.
So before she could begin giving an account of herself on her own terms (that she was
always a woman and did not “become” a woman) the plot of her story, in effect, had already
been delimited. She had been shuttled between a tradition of sexed bodies “matching” their
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reproductive organs and the modernizing discourses of surgery and prosthetics that authenticate
such a match. Carrera’s follow up, that she “still had a life to live” after transition, was still
caught between these forces. She had to defend her concrete experiences as a woman and, by
extension, her rightful place within those cultural fields that authenticate gender/sex identity.

Image 2.0: Carmen Carrera. Digital Screenshot of digitized video. Public Domain.

Image 2.1: Laverne Cox responds to Couric. Digital Screenshot of digitized video. Public
Domain.
Couric then turned to Laverne Cox. “[Carmen said] people who are not educated about this or
familiar with transgenders [sic] are preoccupied with the genitalia question, and I’m wondering if
you think that’s true and if you have the same feelings about that as Carmen does.” Laverne, in a
short monologue, argues that “I do feel like there’s a preoccupation with [genitalia] and I think
that the preoccupation with transition and surgery objectifies trans people and then we don’t get
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to really deal with the real, lived experiences.” She then identifies the (very real)
disproportionate conditions of poverty, bias-motivated homicide, and transphobic abuse that
trans people (and particularly transwomen of color) experience. She discusses Islan Nettles, a
young trans woman of color beaten to death by a would-be lover. Cox emphasizes at the end of
her interview that “by focusing on bodies we don’t focus on [these] lived realities of [trans]
oppression and [trans] discrimination.” It’s easy to take for granted that Cox has this opportunity
to respond, making these important problems in current discourses on trans communities known
to a larger audience by virtue of the invitation to a national television show. But what’s
interesting is that the Carrera/Cox interview exceeded the clinical space of feeling. Cox’s
reaction was a pushback, a a justified activism constituting an expression of feeling. She put
words to the affective experience (anger) that the objectifying discourses of medicine has for so
long discouraged.
Taking the political aesthetics of this chapter, my aim has been to challenge
presuppositions concerning how affects, like happiness, rage, or isolation, are lived in gender
nonnormative communities by theorizing its politics. Whose politics and on what register (local,
national, affective, tonal, gestural)? Theories of the social have an obligation to look at how
contemporary living is often one of getting by as best one can. If our culture expects its subjects
to to simply bear with whatever it is they encounter in the world by maintaining a self in
solitude, then nonnormative life of all forms bears the brunt of attrition (self-dissipation, forms of
“unhealthy” self-management) much more intensely. It might seem to be more evident that the
trans ordinary is a space where affects of wellbeing come in the form of simple attachments,
from the simple elation of an unspectacular public encounter, the boring continuity of having a
stable feeling of home (whatever that home is and wherever it is experienced), or even the
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production of a bodily scar that temporalizes pain and makes getting on with life better because it
is “less bad.”
This has amounted to other concerns, especially how trans narratives are getting spun for
political agendas (National Geographic 2017; Steinmetz 2017; Fogg Davis 2018). Circling back
to this chapter’s political stakes, trans people are often caught between the belated promises of
political recognition and the undertow of fitting into the world of mainstream LGBTQ+ rights.
And yet, if not for inclusivity, these same communities are expected to fill in the normative gaps
that anti-normative critics claim that trans bodies represent. Their lives are sensationalized
through accounts of surgical transformation (one need only recall Katie Couric’s interview with
Carmen Carrera in 2014); appropriated for the amplification of a more (homo)normative “we”;
or they hardly make headlines because other members of this LGBTQ+ “community” are dying
(Snorton and Haritaworn 2013). Which trans voices get to fill those gaps? In such a political
climate, I wonder which ordinaries, which everyday pursuits of a happy or stable sense of self in
nonnormative life, will in Audre Lorde’s (1982) words “survive all these liberations” (50).
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Second Interlude: Jokes in the Ordinary

Image 2.2: The Joke’s on Whom?
This interlude is a means of addressing what is common to nearly every ordinary in every
culture: the joke. I take the joke as occupying a particular epistemic role in social life, however,
that taps into the affects discussed in the previous chapters. A joke is often a means of
communicating otherwise complicated social and cultural symbols, alleviating stress, or creating
an atmosphere of camaraderie. And yet they also transmit information. Jokes are by and large
means of solidifying certain kinds of ordinary relations. Claudia Rankine argues that jokes,
especially ones that place a group, an ethnicity, a gender on the line, are isolating. She describes
the following scene and the interpellative effects of the joke.

Someone in the audience asks the man promoting his new book on humor what makes
something funny. His answer is what you expect—context. After a pause he adds that if
someone said something, like about someone, and you were with your friends you would
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probably laugh, but if they said it out in public where black people could hear what was
said, you might not, probably would not. Only then do you realize you are among ‘the
others out in public’ and not among ‘friends’ (2014, 48).
This is a form of epistemic violence, where the majority (or overrepresented in a
community/nation) makes jokes at the expense of the marginalized. Whether one knows it or not
tends not to matter as much as when one knows the harm. That for a time they, as subjects of the
commentary, have been unconsciously aware (paranoid even) of their own otherness. But the
joke confirms it, compounding the effects self-dissipation by generating an excess of anxious
affects. The joke also serves as a warning to others, both normal and non-normal, in order to
confirm a hierarchy that is only ever really “a joke,” regardless of how harmful that joke can be.
Trans people have been the brunt of many jokes, caught between heteronormative
masculinity and its demands that sex/gender cohere. In the comic above, two boys stare intently
at an ordinary but well-dressed girl, carrying books, walking down what is presumably a school’s
hallway. The shorter boy delivers to his taller teammate the punchline of the joke. The she is a
he. Both boys have a grin. The taller seems either fascinated or infatuated by his female
teammate—perhaps sexually aroused by her now feminine appearance, sleek dress, and womanly
carriage. She, on the other hand, is drawn in a space not only highlighting the divide between her
and the boys. She’s cramped. Her lips, unlike those of the boys’, are pursed tightly—as if to
imply anxiety or fear. Whereas the two boys are standing listlessly in the hallway, perhaps in
between classes, she seems hurried—her right leg about to pass her left in an effort to move
quickly away from these two. But who’s the joke supposed to be on? The boys, for having
played football with her? For having had her in their locker room, changing clothes in between
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games? Or is the joke on her, since she is the one being objectified—the one who is no longer
who she “once” was? Her expression implies that the joke, and I would agree, isn’t funny.
These “jokes” are more and more becoming known as microaggressions: ordinary almost
unconscious remarks that communicate derogatory, demeaning, or dehumanizing views toward
another person’s being. Whether they are intentional or unintentional, these forms of psychically
debilitating comments have traumatic consequences. Those who experience the psychic brunt of
such microaggressions are at once victims and ordinary listeners (Cole 2006). In a number of
instances, microaggressions could be taken as foundations for not just future dehumanizing
jokes. If the person who stands up against the joke that everyone seems to find funny, a looming
fear of retribution exists. Microaggressions have the effect of becoming aggressions, pushbacks,
and hostile interrogation. “The verbal taunts, bullying behaviors, and harassments are preludes to
the more severe physical violence” (Girshick 2008, 141). A joke about a he-she, a she-male, a
tranny—a passing reference to what the trans communities have called “dead names,” could be
taken as social cues for such acts of violence. These cues produce affects, and such affects
produce fear, embarrassment, and an internalized justification for self-silence. Juliet Jacques
illustrates this point in her recollection of “Home Movies.” The big reveal in Jim Carrey’s Ace
Ventura: Pet Detective was that a fellow police lieutenant is actually a transsexual woman who
committed a murder. Ace (Jim Carrey) removes the lieutenant's skirt to show that she had been
tucking her male genitalia between her legs and was the assailant who killed the man who found
her out. “Every man [on screen] pukes in unison: clearly, I was mean to puke with them, or at
least laugh. I couldn't’, but I still felt sick” (2015, 33-40). Jacques astutely observes that the bulk
of movies that portray trans women represent them as leading lives as tricksters and deceivers in
a culture that expects transparency from all. This is, of course, cisnormativity, or the expectation
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that all bodies (sexually, anatomically from birth onward) will cohere with its gender
expressivity.
In terms of cultural representation, finally, consider how the image and description of a
trans woman police officer’s suspension is depicted in the image below. Her picture, no doubt
deliberately, is one where she’s next to a “Ladies” restroom sign. The headline describes her as a
“sex-changer”—conjuring the image of an inhuman creature who can change embodiments at
will. Even the subhead that describes her “bar brawl” situates her in a masculinized way. (Point
of fact, a brawl never ensued.) The newspaper publishes her portrait before her transition in the
story (not shown here).

Image 2.3: The Juxtaposition of Symbols. Scanned image from Rikki Swin Archive (Box 3).
This headline delivers an affect that seems eerily similar to the kind elicited in Ace Ventura. A
transsexual woman alleged to have committed a crime. Her femininity is merely refurbished—
situated next to a restroom sign for emphasis (or crude joke). This kind of subterranean “locker
room” humor seems altogether gross, out of place, unacceptable to media. Yet it not only fits all
too well in the contemporary political climate where a man whose organization once banned
“non-biological” women from competing in the Miss Universe pageant, a man who thinks
gender expression and identity is a joke, a man who chalked up saying he’d grab any beautiful
woman “by the pussy” to locker room banter, is President of the United States. Jokes serve as
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indexes of normative cultural values. The next chapter is an examination of how ordinary affect
might help overcome some of these epistemic violences by paying attention to what selfknowledge becomes when it is lived.
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Chapter Three: The Politics of Epistemology: An Affective Contribution
Thus far I have argued that the trans ordinary is a site of affective, historical, and
phenomenal relations that construct life’s meaning-making processes. It is not, however, a place
where normativity roams freely to reproduce itself, as if the ordinary were only a garbage dump
of culture and social forces. Rather, it is a site where the subject “folds” the norm, the daily
grind, the everyday violence, into a means of getting by—whether affects of joy, satisfaction, or
pain are present or not. Affective attachments don’t always lead to perceptibly satisfactory
living. This chapter will discuss the relationship of affective states to states of being.
Phenomenology might enable a new way of thinking about self-knowledge through its emphasis
on situated mood and feelings. I argue that knowledge coming from the trans ordinary to be
saturation with getting by under conditions of neoliberalism. I will call these epistemic states of
being “affective intelligences.” These epistemic states condition the embodied subject
“teachable,” that is to say she learns what it means to make decisions based on intuition and,
following Mariana Ortega, streetwise theorizing. Studying affects in this contexts provides an
added dimension of meaning to the conversation of epistemic justice. Knowledge is inextricably
linked to our affective attachments over the course of history and scenes of our life. At least, that
is the demonstrative goal of this chapter.
Broadly, this chapter will bridge multiple conceptions of mood, affect, feeling, and
selfhood to epistemology by showing how feeling can be understood as certain kinds of
knowledge. Given the fact of affect’s rather slippery and frustrating nature (Ahmed 2010),
grounding a study of affect’s empirical interpretation consists of tracking its expression in texts
and historical documents as well as mass-mediated cultural representations. My aim is to focus
on the living experience, or phenomenological components, of affective realities that inform
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epistemic practices. In other words, affects that are coextensive in the production of knowledge,
in how such knowledge is conveyed, and how knowledge is lived. This chapter draws from
Silvan Tomkins’ (1968) work on positive affects, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003; 2007) and her
writings on reparative reading, and Lauren Berlant (2008; 2011; 2012) with her theories of
genres of desire, attachment, and affective structure. Each thinker has argued that affect is
embodied but not reducible to the body. Affect is part of daily life in singularly lived and
culturally mediated ways. They enable certain feelings or emotions to be disclosed or others
remain concealed.
I am not theorizing affect in terms of functionality. My argument is that the folds of the
ordinary contain improvisations of life that can index certain affective realities. In this respect, I
will draw on Martin Heidegger’s theories of mood and attunement from Being and Time (2010).
Heidegger believes that moods produce states of being. Anxiety, in particular, is a mood that
allows for the subject’s self-reflexivity, a distancing from the moment of things. I am also
drawing from the rich tradition in Black and Latina feminist thought and philosophy, primarily
from the works of Patricia Hill Collins in Black Feminist Thought (2000) and Mariana Ortega’s
(2016) Latina phenomenology In-Between. I am particularly impacted by Ortega’s conception of
“hometactic” as pedagogic strategy for establishing one’s being-at-ease. My archive for most of
this chapter relies on auto-ethnographic examples from Claudia Rankine’s (2014) poetic work,
Citizen, and from Juliet Jacques’ (2015) memoir, Trans. These will ground my reading of affect
and knowledge production under the conditions of the ordinary in various lives across time.
Affective Intelligence as Epistemic Practices
I would like to preface this section with a brief meditation on the writing method of a
feminist philosopher I have only recently discovered, Mariana Ortega. I do so because I believe
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that her personal narratives that accompany her investigations into selfhood are themselves an
archive of queer feelings, affects, and nonnormative orientations. When Ortega writes she does
so with an expressive and unapologetic self-awareness that is rare in philosophy or social
thought. Although the purpose of her book, In-Between, is to offer a philosophical intervention
into phenomenology, she ends up describing more than the experience of “selves.” Indeed, we
are multiplicitous and inhabit plural worlds. We are made to feel a sense of belonging that
depends upon many intersecting cultural and social (as well as singularly mediated) norms. But
she never displaces herself from the writing itself. She argues that this method, drawing from
Gloria Anzaldúa, is meant to provide a strong existential background to her analysis. She is
writing from multiple standpoints (as a Latina, a lesbian, a philosopher). This personal
investment is not absorbed or lost in the style with which she is writing. It is preserved in spite of
the fact that she is writing from within philosophy, a field she and others (such as philosopher
Stanley Cavell) have already noted is hostile to autobiography and the ordinary voice. I make
these observations because I believe that her words offer a means of entering into the epistemic
state I am calling the affective intelligence.
Three Modes of Affective Intelligence: Hometactics, Repair, and Repetition
“To start,” Ortega writes, “I have a confession to make: this writing is an exercise in selfmapping, an attempt to deal with a certain nostalgia, a painful fixation on loss and a desire to
return to a place called home….” (2016, 193). Being or feeling “other” generally entails what
Ortega describes as a being-between-worlds that often feels alienating, uncanny, not-at-home.
Her method for overcoming these feelings consists of hometactics, practices that life lived at the
margins might engage so as to produce a sense of belonging (194). She provides a poetics of
space, a methodical way of engaging the worlds we travel, so as to bring a sense of continuity (or
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not, it depends) to the multiplicitous selves that crisscross human being-in-worlds. As my current
chapter title implies, there is a politics to (epistemic) location. Some belong to a given location
and others do not, even if they were born in that place. Location matters, but not only. “Do I
belong with US Latinos, Chicanos, Latin American exiles, or women of color?” (196). In other
words, spatial locations and social locations produce affects that orient the subject to her
environment. But it is not always safe feelings, of being-at-ease. In fact, these moments of
intimate terrorism, of being alienated from what one believes is one’s own (world, people,
community) by those objects can have all sorts of effects. How does the subject make do in such
circumstances? Ortega argues that hometactics, a spin on streetwise theorizing that puts the
subject in a relation of practice to her surroundings that cannot be reduced to pure forms of
resistance or selling out. They are improvisational responses to circumstances; they are not
predictable and cannot be easily repeated; but they are used to interrupt the sensation of feeling
unfamiliar, dislodged, deflated.
I believe that Ortega’s phenomenological description of hometactics describes a certain
kind of affective intelligence that subjects experience by virtue of living in between worlds:
moods and attunements. These moods are constitutive affective scenes of making do.
“Multiplicitous selves,” she argues, “‘make do’ in their everydayness [and] how they engage in
hometactics is an important issue that we need to consider if we are to understand the
phenomenology of multiplicitous selfhood” (206). These consist of “microtechniques” of lived
experience that render mood more or less explicit. In Chapter Two, I argued that these moods are
not only historically rooted, but track certain political affects into the ordinary. For Ortega, these
moods consist of sensations (she calls them sentiments) of belonging, familiarity, and voice. And
they are political, in that they can potentially be replicated for others’ uplift. But they are not
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understood in any explicit epistemic sense or refracted into even more sometimes forgettable
forms of ordinary activity (see the discussion on Berlant below). In other words, the subject does
not express a claim to knowing a world in this or that way, but rather merely claims to feel a
way. This does not suggest that Ortega is incorrect. I just disagree with some of the epistemic
limitations she places on hometactics. My sense is that such practices are epistemically
capacious, in that they produce varying degrees of intensely felt sensations of knowing. These
sensations, likewise, get reproduced through the subject’s improvisational acts in ordinary life.
When Ortega describes hanging out as resistance, or making food from her native country to feel
at ease, or revivifying her concept of family be engaging with neighbors, she is describing a set
of performances that produce something. That “something” is not a literal home and cannot
begin to change the external world to fit her more personal conceptions of it. They consist of
putting her body in moments and scenes of learning what works, what produces and what does
not.
Both Ortega and I share the belief that anxiety is a critical mood for certain forms of self
and world reflection. Thus, the subject of Ortega’s speculation is what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
would call the depressive subject of practice, a position that “is an anxiety-mitigating
achievement…[and] a uniquely spacious rubric” (2007, 636). In the sense Sedgwick describes it,
using psychoanalyst Melanie Klein’s theories of affect as inspiration, the depressive position
provides a uniquely reflective moment for repair. It is important to note that the depressive
position is not the same as “being depressed” in a purely pathological sense. Rather, it is a
reflective space, where the subject might feel most alienated or most depleted, that she learns
what resources she possesses can mitigate the conditions for that emotional drain. Here, the
subject is teachable, learns what may or may not produce the sensations she requires, or what
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repairs can or cannot be made in the world. In short, it is an epistemic state, one that I am calling
affective intelligence. But it is important to trace the relationship between these potentially
incommensurable theoretical implements (phenomenology and affect).
Lauren Berlant’s Cruel Optimism is a sustained examination of the neoliberal impasse, a
feeling of existential stagnation that accompanies modern relations of production. Her archive is
literary and visual, but representative of numerous cultural scenes of ordinary life (2011, 11). In
a chapter called “Two Girls, Fat and Thin,” she examines how depressive subjects make do in
times of intensified impersonal forces such as economies of sex, body comfort, eating, and selfdissipation. The constant drag of the effects, hypervigilance, as I argued in Chapter Two, has
shapes how subjects know their worlds so they can be in those worlds. In this sense, the most
banal of practices are now raised to a level of affective (and epistemic) importance. The
ordinariness of eating a cookie might be self-care if it opens a psychic space of optimism,
change, and security. She argues that everyday life is now shot through with practices that
personalize the impersonal for subjects, “bodily practices [that] condition them for taking on the
risk of knowing everything they can, without being anchored to a particular story that reduces
subjectivity to the sum of biography. Embodied impersonality,” Berlant continues, “provides
for...the time and space to judge freely, angrily, and bemusedly: to seek the experience of big
feeling and the protection from exposure. Impersonalizing bodies facilitate escape from the very
monitoring intelligence that [subjects] also cherish” (2011, 143). Like Ortega’s experience of
finding a sense of belonging in the economies of Anglo sentiment, or Sedgwick’s depressive
subject whose reflections find the means of repair, Berlant understands subjects in their
respective worlds as improvising within impersonal spaces by embodying them. Thus, a subject
enters the economies of sex or ordinary composure in ways that make a world. In other words,
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history hurts but affective intelligence allows subjects to attune themselves to circuits of repair,
practices of being-at-ease, even if these are perceived as persisting in a space of self-dissipation.
The most banal activities that do not seem to make much difference of anything might be worth
something, anything, if it happens to follow on the heels of an event like sex, or a violent
encounter, or an awkward public gesture. What these forms of affective intelligence do is serve
as a “space of detaching from the normative world while cultivating a parallel sensorium from it”
(Berlant 2011, 148). They act as a means for subjects to find spaces where they can reflect on the
uncanniness of the external worlds they travel as well as seek reparative ways of engaging those
worlds. The construction of a parallel sensorium is a means of reproducing feelings of normalcy,
bargaining with their constitutive liminality so they might carry on in precarious scenes of life.
Applying these forms of intelligence to gender nonnormative forms of life requires some
further clarification. The first is study how already established theories of experience (what I am
calling strong theory) have utilized feeling as a central part of its epistemology. I end this section
with a brief illustration describing how trans narratives can reflect these intelligences In Juliet
Jacques’ memoir, Trans.
Strong Theory: Affective Intelligence in Black Feminist Knowledge
Affective intelligence has been a part of a long tradition in Black feminist writing.
Resisting the exoticizing of Black women’s knowledge as either mystical or folksy, Patricia Hill
Collins (2000) emphasizes the role of lived experience and everyday self-making in the
production of Black women’s knowledge. To that end, she illustrates how the history of Black
women’s struggle for recognition (even as a form of life within the category of woman) is often
based on invoking stories that attempt to allegorize new meanings. Appeals to the emotional and
affective dimensions of these accounts is critical for how Black Feminist Thought situates
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narrative. One cannot excise the emotional content of knowing—such as the feeling of sisterhood
that Collins discusses as critical to the singularities of Black women’s experience (278). It is here
that she provides a re-telling of the ethic of care, one I find more compelling than most feminist
interventions on the subject.
Collins places three interrelated components as central to the of a Black feminine ethos:
uniqueness as a form of life (or the singularity of a life); a circumspection about emotion within
dialogue (a form of knowledge assessment); and, in some ways akin to Virginia Held’s vision of
care, the capacity for empathy (Collins 2000, 282-283). The long history and heritage of Black
women in American contexts, of interrelated care-giving and support under conditions of both
domination and non-domination, grounds Collins’ emphasis on emotional expressiveness as
central to knowing. As oppressive structures that obscure or foreclose lived experiences tend to
overlap, Collins and a host of other theorists of color suggest re-thinking marginalized
epistemologies as a means of locating multiplicity of selfhoods that rise in spite, not because, of
oppression. Collins is a crucial theorist who provides these compelling and genre-creating claims
to revivify feminist thought (others include bell hooks, Kimberlé Crenshaw, and Angela Davis).
But her caveat (like many others) is that such marginalized ways of knowing have more often
than not taken the context of emotion as a means of knowledge assessment.
This tradition provides a rich sense of how to read narratives of making do in the face of
structural oppressions. When one reads Claudia Rankine’s (2014) work, one is immediately
struck by the ordinary affectivity of her writing and its underlying reliance on non-events.
Citizen describes the cumulative effects of memory and embodied reactions to explicit and
implicit racism. Rankine runs the gamut of emotional and affective affinities from feelings of
suffocation, erasure, and coping to brief respites of joy and belonging. Rankine’s work is a
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poetics, a phenomenology that situates what carrying on looks like in an American culture of
hierarchy. These attunements and related reactions form a kind of everyday knowledge that I
argue is hypervigilance—an attunement and mood shared by most non-normative forms of life.
Because of space, I will reserve my commentary to her opening pages of this written form of
self-poetics.
Rankine wrote Citizen as a performance piece but it is a rich archive of racial knowledge
in its own right. In this way, Rankine is showing how a parallel sensorium becomes real in the
ordinary. She is describing how her life as a Black woman is marked as so many sites of
affective intelligences and orientations. If we are intelligent enough to be aware of what
sensations reproduce feelings of goodness, then we orient ourselves to routes that best get us to
those points. But Rankine also illustrates the lived and felt sense of pain, anger, or lingering
exhaustion in the flow of ordinary life for non-white communities. “When you are alone and too
tired to even turn on any of your devices,” she invites us to consider, “you let yourself linger in a
past stacked among your pillows. Usually you are nestled under blankets and the house is empty.
Sometimes the moon is missing and beyond the windows the low, gray ceiling seems
approachable. Its dark light dims in degrees depending on the density of the clouds and you fall
back into that which gets reconstructed as metaphor” (5). The reader realizes this might be the
entree into her past, her presence taking leave for a moment. She remembers events that make a
metaphor out of the force of knowing: “The route is often associative. You smell good” (ibid.).
This is the parallel sensorium, a detachment from the normative without losing feeling and a
sense of the present.
Rankine begins an affective journey through racialized experience at the most formative
and seemingly innocuous moments. That’s where the hurt is. “You are twelve attending Sts.
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Philip and James School on White Plains Road and the girl sitting in the seat behind asks you to
lean to the right during exams so she can copy what you have written. You never really speak
except for the time she makes her request and later when she tells you you smell good and have
features more like a white person. You assume she thinks she is thanking you for letting her
cheat and feels better cheating from an almost white person” (ibid.). She allows the white girl
access, the privilege of not having the responsibility to study. And she’s told she has white
features—as if black features were problematic. As if blackness sullied cheating. So the
metaphor draws itself into figures of authority. “Sister Evelyn never figures out your
arrangement perhaps because you never turn around to copy [the girl’s] answers. Sister Evelyn
must think these two girls think a lot alike or she cares less about cheating and more about
humiliation or she never actually saw you sitting there” (6). The metaphor is the erasure of her
blackness. Did she even see you sitting there?
Rankine is anything if not attentive to feeling. One imagines that lying back in the
comfort of pillows would be soothing, if not for the remembering of times when, as a child,
one’s very being was both erased and devalued. Then in a disorienting turn, Rankine remembers
another aspect of everyday life. “Certain moments send adrenaline to the heart, dry out the
tongue, and clog the lungs. Like thunder they drown you in sound, no, like lightning they strike
you across the larynx. Cough. After it happened I was at a loss for words. Haven’t you said this
yourself? Haven’t you said this to a close friend who early in your friendship, when distracted,
would call you by the name of her black housekeeper?” (7). The very subtle, almost minute slip
of a name can harm because “you assumed you two were the only black people in her life.
Eventually she stopped doing this, though she never acknowledged her slippage. And you never
called her on it (why not?) and yet, you don’t forget” (ibid.). Why, if anything, must Rankine

113

take the onus of feeling not just wronged, but compounded injury by not having acted? Does she
lose credibility in the face of inaction? Is her own self-knowledge and confidence violated? She
argues that “if this were a domestic tragedy, and it might well be, this would be your fatal flaw—
your memory, vessel of your feelings” (ibid.). This unfolding poses the memory, the thing
ruminating on the metaphor of erasure, the flaw that serves as the vessel of hurt feelings and a
reminder of self-doubt. “Do you feel hurt because it’s the ‘all black people look the same’
moment, or because you are being confused with another after being so close to this other?”
(ibid.). What seems so powerful in her self-interrogation is that Rankine, alone, must deal with
this knowledge of what is perceived as a non-event by her friend—but is altogether painful.
Which is it, the brunt of an already caricatured trope (of racial stereotypes) or the feeling of
being betrayed?
Moments of loss. Feelings and memory. Hurt and confused. Feeling so close. These
ordinary affects brought on by the banality of racism, in cumulative form, start to serve as a kind
of knowledge for Rankine. From an epistemic vantage, these affects produce what she will later
call an anger as a (tentative) “type of knowledge: the type that both clarifies and disappoints (24,
my emphasis). What could this knowledge do, exactly? I would argue that this reflection feels
like a form of reflective wisdom that calls one to think about how all the wrongs and painful
slights one accrues, some forms of anger simply eviscerate. Although being angry, feeling the
weight of cumulative microaggressions, might not resolve immediacy it may take more of a toll
on one’s own energy reserves to carry on in an ordinary one knows contains these kind of
affective assaults.
The psychologist Silvan Tompkins realized that the emotional reserves necessary for
these kinds of survival tactics could run out. They are not infinite, though we like to think so.
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“The activation of positive affect or negative affect is a necessary condition for the mobilization
of the energy reserves which support the behavior calculated to achieve...goals” (1968, 304).
Tomkins is describing a general state of embodied feeling (like the “low-ebb” of feelings during
a cocktail party after a long day of work), that underscores the ordinary of affective endurance.
The paradox is that, as phenomenologists from Heidegger to Ortega have shown, feelings of
anxiety create the very conditions of reflection necessary for energy to be directed towards goals.
Heidegger would describe anxiety a structural condition of a subject’s “thrownness,” of
discovering her random placement in the context of the world. Ortega, however, would describe
anxiety for the marginalized, those existing between worlds, as a feeling of unease. This
sensation allows for a critical distancing, a bracketing of everyday conventions, to make sense of
things. For some, such anxieties respond to emotional depletions folded into the ordinary. For
example, when pain becomes expectation for the day the subject learns affective tactics of
coping. But is this coping a form of irrationally avoiding or dealing with the impersonal? Is this
selling out, to an extent, by allowing some form of pain in so that enjoyment can be extracted in
others? Tomkins also wonders “what is the gain, then, in substituting a more severe for a less
severe pain? It is that the lesser pain is accompanied by the distress and fear of helplessness and
passivity whereas the more severe [self-inflicted] pain is attenuated by the more tolerable affects
of excitement and, for some, even delight, in overcoming the distress and fear and the status of
helplessness in the face of pain and assault” (59). As I have been arguing, these kinds of
substitutions, of extending one bodily orientation for another in order to carry on, is less an
internalized knowledge of defeat and more an affective-cum-epistemic response called selfadjustment.
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Rankine tells us, like Tomkins, that our bodies are always receptors, whether we are
passive or active about the incoming stimuli. “You take in things you don’t want all the time,”
she argues. “The second you hear or see some ordinary moment, all its intended targets, all the
meanings behind the retreating seconds, as far as you are able to see, come into focus” (2014,
55). This focus, this snapping into place of a meaning, doesn’t happen in the extraordinary.
Much like her encounter with a friend who slips the wrong name but never takes accountability
for it, Rankine wonders, “hold up, did you just hear, did you just say, did you just see, did you
just do that?” (55). This is self-interrogation in the absurd. The absurdity is the shift of blame and
burden of responsibility that being black attends—from which being white is absolved. Of
having to wonder what the fuck? And have that question linger as a response to one’s erasure.
But this cannot be sustainable, if only to make do in shitty circumstances. Even Rankine argues
that “the voice in your head silently tells you to take your foot off your throat because just
getting along shouldn't be an ambition” (ibid.).
In so many ways, the ordinary complicates ways we might consider how subjects make
do in the production of local forms of knowledge-production. I began this section by asserting
the importance distinguishing affective forms of intelligence. I suggested these can be found in
phenomenological theories of hometactics or the affective theories of repair and repetition.
Exploring the writings of Collins and Rankine, my hope was to address how the lineage Black
feminist thought has reflected upon this affective intelligence. Tomkins himself associates affects
with modes of learning. The subject begins to understand how the affect-body relationship
operates in the ordinary so as to reproduce livability. Subjects participate in, following Berlant’s
lead here, new aesthetic economies in all kinds of ways. For example, subjects alter facial
expressions and other bodily gestures. Their bodies (unconsciously) make do as much as their
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(conscious) attention to the everyday banalities of social violence. Moments of conscious
decision-making, of weighing and understanding the consequences of pushing back, of the
realization that shit is happening again, directly imprint upon the ongoing production of ordinary
knowledge. Affective intelligence is an attunement to the nebulous but lived incarnations of
racism and sexism. Although such kinds of intelligence might not be easily duplicated (as they
live in contexts and differing structures) they can be felt as shared, a form of comparative
attunement. In Collins’ terms, is an inherited wisdom that seems always present in the life of
knowledge. For Rankine, it is a sudden realization that, given time, these feelings become “coded
on a cellular level” (2014, 10-11). This code circulates, can be read by others, and can impact the
ways certain forms of being-in-worlds get experienced.
Stories of a Trans Woman
Traveling to a new city in her home country, England, Jacques is struck by the more
progressive campus at the University of Sussex, particularly their queer studies curriculum. The
city itself had a number of rebranded LGBT clubs. “The inclusion of the ‘transgender’ made me
feel I could go to these places as Juliet” (2015, 73). In making her home, Jacques’ tactics were
nevertheless self-conscious, anxious. Although she was accepted, almost to a fault she implies
(shops falling over themselves to show her how they accepted her) she was also economically
pressed. She couldn’t afford the bus and had to walk to these scenes of social acceptance. On her
long walk to such places, Jacques confessed “I worried that people would ridicule me, threaten
me, or worse. I preferred the walks in winter. Light and heat made me feel exposed, my makeup
running as both fabrics and fear made me sweat. In the dark and cold, nobody looked at me
much” (74). She avoided certain streets along the way, navigating around larger groups of men
who she defined as being more openly hostile than most. “Over time, I realized that however
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vulnerable I felt, the only way to stop them was to hold myself up and try to look fearless. And
after the difficulties of getting to my destination, meeting my friends always made these
hazardous journeys worthwhile. I’d feel liberated...” (74). Through detaching herself from the
world that normalized catcalling by men and fear among women and nonnormative genders,
Jacques was also attaching herself to the safety of her networks, of places that she knew
reproduced a sense of being-at-ease.
And yet her friends still made a sense of ease unstable. In one instance, Jacques was
questioned as to whether she wanted to “go all the way” regarding sexual reassignment surgery
(SRS). But in responding with ambivalence, her friend Phil suggested that the procedures
“damage” the body, and hardly resolved the social inequalities Jacques would have to deal with
afterward (76). Her networks provided an ongoing, if sometimes tentative, sense of ordinary
continuity. “In public, i was playing with my style, telling friends that the notion of ‘male’ and
‘female’ clothes was absurd. I didn’t challenge anyone who called me ‘madam’, just smiling if
they apologised. At work, though, I had to be unambiguous, inauthentic in polo shirts and
trousers, trying as hard as I could to convince people that they really needed that television” (74).
Her hometactics, as is the general case in the neoliberal impasse, is one that must confront the
necessities of reproducing the conditions for everyday life: work. Considering that Jacques had
wanted to be a writer, she thought back to how poverty would not be so bad if she did what she
loved. “I’m poor now [she thought back]—how bad can it be? I was finding out, trying to
balance my job, studies and social life with writing a play….It wasn’t going well” (77). The
mixed feelings about her play, as it turned out, would reflect the insecurity she felt in her
ordinary life. She tried making up for those lacks through dating a man named Carl.
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I am not suggesting that this is an emancipatory narrative that finding friends will make
things better. I am also not arguing that getting by as a thing to be nurtured. I am arguing that
these scenes describe a set of practices that enable the gender nonnormative subject to move, and
be-in, between worlds of work, friends, school, and professional ambitions. For instance,
Jacques’ tactics involved identifying, down to the climate and weather, when was best for her to
take her walks. Her attachments to a given fantasy, ones that put her in direct conflict with an
aesthetics of who she was, were nevertheless powerful enough to get her through. She kept
writing because she loved it, in spite of the poverty. She detached from that normative world by
living the fantasy of heteronormative love with Carl. Commenting on her first kiss, “I forgot
every street heckle and intrusive questions, every newspaper cartoon and TV comedy sketch, and
relaxed, letting him love me, letting him fuck me” (79). The relationship was a parallel
sensorium, a means of overcoming the stress and doubt the external world induced. She literally
could not be herself at work, in an “inauthentic” wardrobe and all. With Carl she could. She
developed, within that sensorium, epistemic states of knowing who she was and what she
wanted. Affective intelligence is knowing what makes you feel good amidst feeling bad. It
means risking optimism in the face of failure and misrecognition. That is, repair in the face of
constitutive brokenness. This kind of affective awareness, I will argue in the next section, is
glaringly absent from the literature on epistemic justice.
Trans Epistemology: An Update on Affect
Trans epistemology, like all intersectional epistemologies, is based upon a relational
understanding of social reality As Mariana Ortega has made clear, we are fundamentally beings
in shared worlds, or beings-in-worlds. But Ortega makes an additional distinction. Marginalized
lives experience a phenomenological sense of being-between-world. By this Ortega means that
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intersectional selves travel across and within multiple worlds that mark their identities (2016, 7071). These worlds are in a constant state of re-arrangement and subject to improvisational
practices. Associations and affective investments in shared meanings suggest that local
knowledge cannot be extracted from ordinary source. Context matters. That is to say, the very
things to which subjects are attached come to define them; or, in the very least, those objects can
be understood as tracking the constitutive desires that comprise the epistemic life of the subject.
In this sense, trans epistemology seeks to combine feelings, emotions, and ordinary affects to
capture the force of local knowledge in self-making. Additionally, because we are always
beings-in-worlds or beings-between-worlds, the culturally mediated norms by which we live are
just as indispensable. The caveat would be to avoid universalizing claims to trans forms of life
while attempting to preserve the commonalities of shared histories and experiences.
For this section I use the groundbreaking works of philosopher Rachel McKinnon to
determine the epistemic dimensions of trans knowledge. Hers is, to my estimation, the most
robustly worked-out theory of epistemic practices in trans communities. But, unlike McKinnon, I
will argue that emotional and affective practices in the trans ordinary need a more generous
reading. I will seek to update this theory with my own conception of trans knowledge production
through recourse to what I have been calling affective intelligence. I also find important affective
investments in McKinnon’s theories of stereotype threat, ones that can shed further light on the
everyday experience of epistemic violence for trans people.
On Epistemic Terms Only
Rachel McKinnon’s work covers, like so many standpoint epistemologies, lived
experience and personal knowledge. As a transwoman and philosopher, her social position is of
particular importance not just to the credibility of the work. I contributes to the narrative of
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nonnormative gender that is a necessary supplement to epistemology in particular, and
philosophy more generally. Although McKinnon does not ascribe the belief that transition
narratives to any trans imaginary (the culturally intelligible self-projects lived in the trans
ordinary), she has argued that “when we consider trans people’s decisions to transition” there is
an accompanying epistemological need to understand a shift in social location and situatedness
(2015, 420). The bulk of her article, “Trans*formative Experiences,” (henceforth “Experiences”)
attempts to understand the radical (her word) social, and by extension epistemic, changes that
occur to someone who undergoes sexual reassignment surgery (SRS). For McKinnon an
“experience is personally transformative when ‘it may change your personal phenomenology in
deep and far-reaching ways’” (421). As I will argue later, this definition misses the crucial
underpinnings that undergird the meaning-making process. Thus, when someone transitions from
“a relatively stereotypical masculine male identity to a relatively stereotypical feminine female
identity, nearly everything about her experiences will change” (422). She qualifies this
statement, namely that not every epistemic change is necessary. Importantly, epistemic change
does not happen for everyone. I assume, of course, that this stereotypical identity is white and
that the everydayness in McKinnon’s form is akin to Husserl’s “average man on the street.” In
this sense, the average subject is a privileged subject (male, white, and heterosexual) who may be
unwilling to consider that he is in a position to change anything bad. “Men are typically afforded
more space than women; women are more likely to be ignored in conversation...the way one
relates with social and legal institutions is changed, particularly if the person has to navigate the
often complicated systems of changing their sex/gender marker on identification such as driver’s
license” (422). In other works, McKinnon (2014) expands the discussion of how stereotyping the
other reinforces this privileged ideal. But at its core, or rather in order for this this epistemic
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theory to make sense, coming to terms with trans forms of life means something unique, nonreplicable, and opaque. The epistemic theory would also need a more worked out theory of
desire and affective attachments.
On these bases, primarily on the basis of affect, my objections I have may be outside the
immediate project of McKinnon’s piece. But I believe there is an issue, at least in defining
experiences in her article, “Experiences,” where McKinnon errs by creating decision
dichotomies (a commonplace for analytic philosophers) about happiness and transition. She then
uses these outcomes as a foundation for assessing knowledge and as an assessment of happiness.
As I argued in Chapter Two, affects such as happiness are complex relations that obtain among
many objects. There is a troubling rationality in using these decision tree. As I see it, there is a
smuggled “universal knower” in her analysis transparent to herself yet divorced of affective
sense, or feeling. I’ll diagram them for visual ease (below). It might be easy for theorists to find
this diagram dissatisfying at best or misrepresenting at worst. In McKinnon’s defense, this is to
simplify the ways that (I assume) she can reach cis (non-trans) academics dealing in with
epistemologies of experience.

Transition

Not Transition

Happy

Transition Happy

Not Transition Happy

Unhappy

Transition Unhappy

Not Transition Unhappy

Table 3.0: The Happy Transsexual
I think this kind of thinking can suggest that transition does not work for everyone.
Someone cannot be aware of whether their embodiments will enable affective changes. At issue
here is what, precisely, defines the affectivity of transsexual life and why SRS (as the form of
transition) is the foundational qualifying heuristic of transsexual emotional life. She refers both
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the high suicide rates among trans communities and their lower socioeconomic status than many
of their cis peers. Noting the critical importance of her language here (where trans means
transsexual whose entire emotional life rests on transition), she suggests that “for many trans
people, the available options are either transition or commit suicide” (423). This is an
overstatement. What occurs in ordinary life is as much about the messes of work as the tragedies
of self-foreclosure. Thus, in terms of likelihood, those in the category of “not transition happy”
would be statistically negligible. Even in a footnote, McKinnon argues that “transition for the
trans people I’ve described often shares the structure of a freeroll: not transitioning essentially
guarantees deep unhappiness, so the worst that could happen post-transition is to be just as
unhappy as one would be without transitioning” (425, fn. 13). But how can such utilities be
applied to the exceedingly personal and emotional complexities of any given transition? Why is
it that suicide becomes the only alternative when SRS is not a viable option? These are extremes
of affective life where forms of self-adjustment (such as those explored in Chapter Two) mediate
what comes in-between.
I cannot argue with her statistics. For many trans people, not being able to transition as a
result of insuperable social, political, and economic barriers push many to commit acts of selfinjury. But I think this preoccupation with transition narratives much of this might stem from
McKinnon’s own personal and affective investments attending what she calls “trans awakening,”
a conventionality in the trans genre discussed in historical contexts Chapter One and ordinary
contexts in Chapter Two. Her interpretive angle, as I’ve described it here, haunts most of her
reading of trans life.
Until I came to know myself as trans, one might say that I considered myself cis (well, I
didn’t know about the concept of cisgender, so I merely didn’t consider myself trans).
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The truth is that I was long aware that trans people existed. And while I experienced a
distinct and persistent discomfort with my gendered self starting around age 12, I didn’t
once consider being trans as even a possible explanation. However, I can distinctly
remember the moment (even exact date) where I first opened up being trans as a live
option (426).
I deeply appreciate McKinnon’s story. In a footnote appending this personal revelation,
McKinnon writes “I think it’s important to flag that I don’t share the ‘traditional’ trans narrative:
knowing from approximately age 3, not engaging in behaviors expected for one’s birth-assigned
gender, having a post-transition heterosexual orientation, the feeling of being ‘trapped in the
wrong body,’ and so on” (fn. 18, 426). What I want to say is that my sense of things is that selfmaking is a constant, critical, and sometimes stultifying act. It rarely happens as events. Rather,
these moments of self-clarity are often already there, affectively speaking. We just haven’t
caught up to them. It’s a “feeling” one has, but not only.
I want to complicate “that feeling” (whether dysphoric or not), the one that seems to
saturate a myriad of differing trans testimonies but discussed in McKinnon’s work. She frames
this feeling as a product of, not co-producing or equiprimordial with, certain epistemic shifts. I
want to ask, more precisely, what does it mean to feel as well as to know one’s many selves as
trans? I argue that these forms of knowing (that I have clarified with Collins and Rankine in the
previous section) are based upon a certain kind of affective intelligence, what Collins called
wisdom. Consider McKinnon’s claim that “the moment [transition as a live option] is opened up
as an option, the phenomenology of the transition to knowing is abrupt and almost
instantaneous” (427). The problem here is that such an instantaneous eruption of knowledge is
often underscored by a rupture in feeling. What does it mean to feel that something once far
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away in terms of possibility might actually become an event? What affective orientations does
such a realization make? I do not think this is an issue for McKinnon. And I think this is a
problem.
I understand that her project is an attempt to fit such newfound knowledge within an
epistemic category she is calling “trans*formational experience.” And I would agree that coming
into possession of such knowledge is, indeed, profound. But it is profound (and I would stress
here that this, too, is a feeling) because of the histories, narratives, affective attachments, and
emotional connections that the subject is undergoing in the scene of that experience. I suspect
that part of the reason for leaving out something like affect, emotion, or feeling would be their
difficulty in tracking across epistemic states (or their perceived lack of empirical grounding). As
I will argue in following section, she has given some attention to affect and the sensation of
threat in earlier work about experiences of stereotype threat that can offer much to the general
epistemic-affective discussion (McKinnon 2014). In one her most-affect saturated observations,
McKinnon writes “even in cases of invisible identities, where the group isn’t aware of her trans
status, stereotype threat can operate. For example, she may have internalized the negative
stereotypes (or is constantly, acutely aware of them) such that the effects of stereotype threat are
present” (2014, 862, emphasis in text). These internalizations are affectively coded. They might
also be understood as effects of attuning one’s body to the spatialization that threat induces, just
as Jacques did in her countless scenes of self-adjustment throughout her memoir.
It is important to note that McKinnon’s article “Experiences,” and most of McKinnon’s
work generally, is a sustained engagement with feminist standpoint epistemologies (FSEs).Thus
I do not want to encourage a project that was not hers to begin with. And yet her engagement
with FSEs actually helps to illuminate precisely why affect and emotion should not be reduced or
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abjured altogether from the epistemologist’s toolbox. Subjects are intersectional beings-inworlds where social interaction and meaning-making are coded with feeling. Phenomenologies,
and thus moods and affective registers (their sensorium), of these beings will change based on
their situatedness. “What matters for the situated knowledge thesis [of FSEs] is that one’s social
location as, say, a cisgender heterosexual woman, as a member of an oppressed class, may allow
her to ‘recognize that many of the concepts and procedures adopted by [a] discipline are
problematic when her colleagues do not’” (McKinnon 2015, 428). This much is uncontroversial.
For example, José Medina has called this kind of epistemic awareness “meta-lucidity,” a kind of
epistemic virtue (similar to W.E.B. DuBois’ “double consciousness” thesis) that makes a
reflexive moment to generate the kind of friction for necessary social change to occur (2013,
206-225). It is the epistemological equivalent of the phenomenological primacy of anxiety.
Following Miranda Fricker’s (2007) work on epistemic injustice, McKinnon proceeds to argue
(again rightfully) that epistemic injustices often occur for trans communities because of ongoing
patterns of privileging that remove knowers from ever experiencing these anxieties. These
patterns often reduce the subject’s access to terminology necessary for trans life, in her
arguments, to experience happiness.
A word about Miranda Fricker’s work and its influence on McKinnon. Fricker’s (2007)
monograph explores the ethics of individual and community knowledge production. Knowledge
is not simply a given. It is a productive effect of sociality, a good that is circulated amongst
society, the conditions for which need sustained interrogation. Who gets to participate in the
production of that good? How, in the utterance of knowledge, are people dispossessed of their
voice—their attachment to that knowledge? In what ways are people discredited from “really
knowing” a thing? These are more than philosophical questions. They run at the very heart of
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how power relations operate. If a person, for example, is prevented from knowing where their
non-normative community spends its nightlife (like a gay, queer, or trans-inclusive bar), then
they experience epistemically disabling effect on their identity. This epistemic foreclosure stunts
the growth of their non-normative potentiality. As Heidegger might say, such obstacles conceal
rather than enable and disclose the possibility of being. This arbitrarily truncated knowledge
(however trivial it seems from a non-queer or non-trans moralism) systematically reproduces
concealment: queer/trans existence as “less than,” as deviant and otherwise offensive to the norm
of (a certain conception of) community forms of life. This structural wrong is considered an
epistemic injustice of the “hermeneutical” or interpretive sort that Fricker has sought to amply
critique. Dismissing claims to experiences of structural injustices as merely subjective (as
“always being about race or sex,” or emanating from a place that “won’t let history go”) is not
just epistemically unjust. It denies political agency and also reinforces the material harm. It
makes invisible the varied ways that subjugation works by keeping “subjugated knowledges”
from rising to the level of accepted and living experience. Developing a trans epistemology has a
common itinerary with feminist epistemologies. They both mark the ordinary as a fundamental
site of experience and work to construct a just politics of knowledge and self-empowerment. But
I add that without the attention to affective attachments and emotion, epistemic injustice
literatures will continue to illuminate only parts of very complex social relations.
But this is where she and other forms of FSEs might obscure, rather than clarify, trans
standpoints in terms of their feelings. They lack an attention to affective intelligence in ordinary
scenes of life. For example, McKinnon poses a hypothetical trans subject who alters their social
location, being upwardly mobile. The radical shifts in perceived social identity, and its impact on
certain kinds of access to knowledge, might attend new takes on SRS. But must SRS be taken
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constitutively? My concern would be that some of her assumptions appeal to her previous work
on stereotype threat in counter-productive ways. Knowing and feeling continue to be separated in
the discussion, where feeling is often relegated to a kind of particularized subjectivism. But as I
have argued in Chapter One, we can track these affects and affective intelligences across
historical sensorium. Moreover, knowing one’s identity as trans must also take into account the
feeling one’s embodiment not as a yet-to-happen, but as a here and now. Perhaps my issue is that
McKinnon pays too high a price for attending to the kinds of (future-oriented) epistemic states.
She often does not take as theoretically central how the multiplicitous self is tethered to a relation
to historical and present worlds. Future projects abound. But thoughts about the future emanate
out of, not spontaneously erupt, from the historical subject. This includes, obviously, how
structural oppressions operate on one’s sense of possibility. But, crucially, there must be
attention to the subject’s affective connections under these structures. “Changing my social
identity and location to being a woman changed my situatedness and it changed how I struggle
against subtle forms of misogyny and sexism. The social change led to epistemic changes”
(McKinnon 2015, 436). Yes and no. Changes in social location might trigger epistemic shifts.
But these epistemic shifts are more likely to occur under the to the complex ways subjects have
learned to orient themselves in economically and socially precarious environments.
As forms life within the scope of the ordinary, trans people engage in a special kind of
affective intelligence and orientations toward the world that need special forms of inquiry. The
previous discussion in this chapter fleshes out such intelligence. Trans can be defined in ways
that weave together the complexities of family life, cultural heritage and race, class, and
sex/gender. So, trans narratives and situated knowledges involve survival, or at minimum
concern for self-definition and a sense of security, that form affective habits (Currah 2013). I will
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explore these affects of security next and see how they might help to avoid some of the costs that
I have suggested McKinnon has paid in order to maintain an epistemic theory of trans
experience.
The Epistemology of Threat: Re-examining Affect and Vigilance
I dealt with some stereotypes of trans people, mostly women, in my Second Interlude in
which I routed them the concepts of jokes and humor. I argued that jokes are indexes of cultural
attitudes and values. They also consist of perpetuating a felt sense of threat. Here, I want
elaborate the important affective dimensions of work of McKinnon’s on trans “stereotype threat”
(2014). The central point of her article is to illustrate the various ways that trans women
experience what she defines as “a dual layer” of such a threat. McKinnon’s own analysis speaks
directly to trans women experiences in order to gain valuable insight into the nature of this kind
of epistemic harm/oppression. This section reformulates McKinnon’s contribution to the
literature on stereotype threat by articulating its epistemic terms through the language of affect
that I have been deploying throughout this chapter.
McKinnon argues that there are at least “three dominant tropes used to stereotype trans
women: the ‘deceptive’ and ‘pathetic’ archetypes, and what we can call the ‘artificial’
stereotype” (2014, 858). Her central argument is that these three stereotypes combine to create a
sustained threat to the epistemic wellbeing of trans women. The deceptive stereotype suggests
that trans women are merely attempting to lure heterosexual (cis) men for sexual liaisons. Such a
misrepresentation suggests that trans women are only about the “reveal,” coming out to their
sexual partners only after they have effectively lured him in. These claims, particularly that trans
women are sexual predators, very much thrive in climates of hostility in which even the
bathroom has become a major moral and political issue. Whereas “deceivers” can pass for a
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“real” woman, the pathetic trans woman is portrayed “as weak, meek, and ignorant: ignorant
about how to be a woman. Or, at least, they’re bad at ‘playing’ at being a woman” (ibid.). Thus,
the pathetic trope situates such trans women in a tragic narrative, never passing and never
sexually attractive. This leads to the final trope of artificiality. Trans women aren’t “real,” and
are thus merely constructed women. These, by now, should be familiar strategies of narrative
emplotment that distort the histories I discussed in Chapter One.
Given these tropes, McKinnon defines “stereotype threat [that] occurs whenever an agent
is acting in a context where a stereotype may apply” (860). This means, for example, when
subjects engage in activities “meant for the other gender,” or “are less apt at performing.”
Multiple registers of epistemic harm occur here. First, if such stereotypes are internalized, the
subject may actually engage in the very thing that has stereotyped them (much like Ian
Hacking’s looping effects discussed in Chapter Two). When taking trans identities into account,
McKinnon notes that such groups have “heightened awareness” or what I can Rankine and others
call hypervigilance. “A trans woman knowing that she’s the only trans person in a group” will
activate such an awareness. “If people know she’s trans, she’ll be aware of this, and this may
create anxiety and make trans female stereotypes more salient to her” (862). This kind of
speculation reminds me of Claudia Rankine’s assertion that erasure wasn’t the thrust of epithets
and hate speech. Rather, she writes, “you begin to understand yourself as rendered hypervisible
in the face of such language acts. Language that feels hurtful is intended to exploit all the ways
that you are present. Your alertness, your openness, and your desire to engage actually demand
your presence, your looking up, your talking back, and, as insane as it is, saying please” (2014,
49). Much like the narrator of Rankine’s self-poetics, the trans woman is rendered hyper-present,
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alert and ready for the potentiality of hateful language, harmful attitudes, and otherwise negative
affects.
The important conclusion to be drawn here is that the trans ordinary, as a site that blends
the emotional and the affective at the register of the epistemic, produces a rich source of critical
material that provide needed supplements to social epistemology. People become aware of
potential threats as a part of their varying affective intelligences. They mark out their day
according to what they perceive, that is what they know, as safe. These form attachments that
might often compartmentalize life into zones of livability. “Apparently benign situations,”
McKinnon avers, “become potentially harrowing, and a source of anxiety and situational
avoidance” (2014, 868). This is McKinnon’s greatest affective insight. Unfortunately, focusing
entirely upon the stereotype and not the forms and extent of self-management in the face of these
situations provide only a partial picture. Avoidance strategies become a part of a complex
aesthetic weave of life in ordinary modes of being. The create economies of feeling and gesture
that might remove (spatially, temporally) the subject from those moments. I am arguing that
there must be, on the part of theory, a more attuned view toward how subjects feel their way
through the ordinary since so many still persist in zones of threat! This kind of descent into
ordinary zones of making do provides a more robust vision of how knowledge and feeling coproduce one another.
Summary
What I have hoped to do in this chapter is describe the various ways affective intelligence
can transform theories of knowledge. That is to say, affects are co-productive of self-knowledge
and claims about the world. In what other ways can we trace such intelligences? I want to end
with a brief but speculative account of how threat gets deployed in ordinary moments of self-
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adjustment where the subject seems to be fraying, buckling under the weight of normativity. My
archive here is consists of a trans youth survey conducted in 2001. I will return to a few
testimonials previously discussed in other chapters in order to re-examine the affects of vigilance
and their effects on ordinary knowing in epistemic terms.
One youth in this survey responds that their perceived body, what seeming appeared at
first hand to render feeling disjointed from reality. It revealed not only a harried necessity to
conform. Such a conformism is borne out of a persistent vigilance induced by being-betweenworlds, that sense of unease that requires hometactics, a sense of self repair, and repetitions of
behavior that orient the self toward safety. “Having to wear all this makeup just to hide the
burning stinging redness from the obsessive shaving on my face. Also the fact that I do not have
‘normal’ sized breasts. The other body hair that I have to shave irks me to no end. The worst
thing is the hair” (Trans Youth Survey 2001, 15-16). This stress of passing is real and creates a
common affective thread of exhaustion. But they are underscored by economic worries (as I
discussed in Chapter Two). It is as much about finding access to forms of transition as it is about
transition itself. Here, knowing transition is there, but worrying about which forms are
accessible, are folded into the fact of living with stereotype threat. “The stress of worrying about
passing and being clocked, dealing with people who don’t accept me as who I am and the cost of
hormones and transitioning (13).
Bathrooms are a source of anxiety, as one respondent put it, it was the worst part of
coming out trans and expressing their body in nonnormative ways (14). Even when sociality is
extended, and dialogue among peers is possible, the very basis of dialogue requires a heightened
emotional cost. “I have to teach everyone I meet what a transsexual is, and I have to fight their
misconceptions. […] Another very difficult thing is that in order to convince people that you are
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male, when your body is female, you have to be hypermasculine (which I am not)” (16).
Appearing in public is always an act saturated with affect. As one trans teen argued: “I know
perfectly well that the majority of people out there at best view me with something in between
revulsion and fascination. Like a circus freak on display. I’m terrified of most of the world” (15).
The perception of safety varies for the experience of gender nonconformity. Finding affective
comforts might also appear as reproducing the harmful norms that prolong self-dissipation. Even
attachments to the names under the trans the umbrella feel frayed. As one youth intimated, “I
came into being genderqueer in the last year I think, but I still identify as trans too because of the
umbrella term thing. Trans is the umbrella and genderqueer is the specific piece of it I identify
with” (9).
This survey is as much an archive of feeling as much as it is a cartography of how selfmaking is enabled or discouraged. They reflect a certain sense of when the secret of their trans
self is worth sharing not because they are internalizing and reproducing defeat. In these
revelations of “knowing” difference, notice how respondents already reflect upon a feeling, a
knowledge of culture or attunement to the structures of their worlds to which they must adjust.
“When I was six, I remember thinking that when I grew up, I wanted to be a boy. Then I found
out that wouldn’t happen and I couldn’t wait to die and go to heaven ‘cause I could be a boy
then. Before then I was masculine, but gender wasn’t that structured” (5). Others knew, or felt
their way through, their futures dismally. “I remember standing in front of a mirror and reciting
‘God made you a woman, you’ll die a woman’ over and over as punishment for sinfull [sic]
thoughts. :-\ I was a fucked up little kid (7). In a mass-mediated culture, more people have access
to the vocabularies that invite McKinnon’s sense of trans*formative experiences. “At about age 7
a friend and I discussed ‘sex-change operations’ after seeing a talk show on TV” (6).
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These testimonials speak to a kind of feeling, but not a kind of knowing, in McKinnon’s
framework. Yet I surmise that a complete split of knowledge and feeling would be leave
discussions of situated experiences inadequate to the task. Feelings are based upon close social
interactions, emotional gaps and bridges, affective bonds that form while “growing up” and
learning our how we fit in the world. In short, we develop emotional attachments to being and
appearing in the worlds we inhabit. Our moods direct us toward various parts of the world and
constitute what we find important while we navigate the ordinary. The next chapter will discuss
the extent to which these forms of life in the trans ordinary are represented at all in our judicial
institutions, especially ones that, from a certain sense of American heritage, are supposed to
protect marginalized life in terms of their individual right.
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Chapter Four: The Trans Ordinary as a Critique of Legal Institutions
In the last chapter, I outlined the various ways that developing an epistemology of trans
experience often meant overlooking affective practices. My hope was to illustrate how affective
intelligence possesses epistemic value. Such intelligence orients bodies toward new capacities
for learning and uptake; it renders bodies teachable. In this chapter, I want to explore what this
means in an institutional context, particularly an institution that is praised as being the bastion of
minority rights. Set up as a so-called apolitical institution that alone adjudicates what constitutes
rights, and one that abjures the whims of popular sentimentality ( here I use that term in it its
most derisive sense), the American judiciary faces the problem of squaring rights with the
ordinary life of marginalized people. Particularly, this chapter examines how trans people
experience epistemic violence within the execution of rights. I argues that since knowledge is
“generated from histories, social relations, and practices of communities,” the epistemological
consequences of translating trans affects and knowledges into legal discourse require serious
investigation (Nelson 1993, 126). I will draw on notions of epistemic injustice that was discussed
in Chapter Three. Miranda Fricker (2007) defines epistemic injustice in terms of temporal affect,
that is happening when knowers are discredited for their claims to knowledge and/or when
knowers who, needing to make sense of their experiences, lack the interpretative resources to do
so. In one sense, subjects lack a grammar or vocabulary by which to make their experience
intelligible for others. Fricker urged her readers to consider not only what she calls good
epistemic conduct but to overcome these epistemic injustices, but also “to lay the foundation of
correlative institutional virtues—virtues possessed, for instance, by the judiciary.…” (176). This
chapter is a gesture in that direction.
Trans experiences are often translated through an unacknowledged epistemic
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commitment to a cisgender sex/gender paradigm. Although many theorists agree that gender,
following Susan Stryker’s definition, “is thought to be cultural” whereas sex “is thought to be
biological” (2008, 11), they are both, however, linked by cultural and social norms. Much like
Rubin’s heteronormative sex/gender system, when a culture naturalizes cisgender formulations
and experiences of sex/gender, or normalizes them, it constitutes a cisgender sex/gender
paradigm. This chapter argues that particular forms of rationality and legal objectivity that are
peculiar to judicial procedure help reproduce this cisgender paradigm. The process undermines
the epistemic capacities of transgender people as knowers in their own right. Since gendered
knowledges are already pre-fashioned constructions—legal precedent—transgender people enter
into the field of liberal legal discourse at a disadvantage. Are there risks of colonizing
transgender experiences with a cisnormative, or cisgender-privileged, standard of being? As Finn
Enke (2013) notes, “the concept of cisgender privilege provides a necessary critique of structural
hierarchies built around binary sex/gender….When cis is taken up as an admission of privileged
identity, it is cis-privilege itself that reifies trans as most oppressed—so oppressed, in fact, that it
cannot speak out of character” (2013, 240). Accordingly, the courts construct out of the
cisgender body the caricature of the transgender body, and thus discipline transgender narratives
within legal discourse to meet corresponding cisgender narratives of discrimination.
Even law-enforcement agencies suffer from a limited understanding of the everyday
complexities of trans life. For example, well-intentioned FBI report written in 2015 by a
respectable list of professors in criminal justice is riddled with the problematics that plague many
who speak but who are not familiar with, or a part of, the community (Burke, et al.). Shooting
itself in the foot, the report begins with a biography of Brandon Teena’s birth name. This only
problematizes the report's assertion that law enforcement officials would benefit from exposure
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to Brandon’s story. In many ways this reflects the poor circulation of representative and less
harmful forms of information about trans people. Ordinary exposure to these sources might have
an optimistic outcome, they “will shift people’s life trajectories in some small way, change them
by literally changing their course for a minute or a day” (Stewart 2006, 12). The FBI’s
descriptions of sex/gender and the body are even more problematic. “People who identify as
transgender or transsexual usually are born with typical male or female anatomies, but feel as
though they have been born into the wrong body.” As I’ve argued in Chapter One, these
narratives cannot be the sole basis for reading or interpreting trans narratives. Vast numbers who
do not identify with their birth-assigned sex do not think along these lines. The inaccuracies
continue, from the use of the outdated “transgendered” to a problematic description of intersex
persons as living with a pathological ambiguity of genitalia, the report reflects the ongoing
epistemological and phenomenological lacuna that haunt mainstream discourses on trans and
Intersex communities in Anne Fausto-Sterling’s work (2000).
Rather than painting a disappointing picture of legal change, I do believe that the law in
perhaps non-liberal institutional forms, has powerful potential. Even as Kylar Broadus observes,
the law has a “tremendous power to reflect and shape larger societal messages of acceptance or
rejection” (2006, 99). But this kind of larger cultural uptake happens incrementally, a political
problem for the anti-normative thrust of some trans politics. But importantly, courts are not only
symbolic. They are both repositories and agents of knowledge. They transcribe the process of
how human subjects become legal subjects, how ordinary claims to experience are understood as
legal claims to that experience. They trace how social categories (race, sex, gender, age, ability,
etc.) are to be understood within a given constellation of rights and statutes. Fricker’s (2007)
analysis is a method for not only examining the shortcomings of legal institutions. It invites
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alternatives to how they might be reimagined to include the possibility for epistemic justice in
law. This chapter addresses how trans experiences of the ordinary might escape from the
narrative capture of certain kinds of institutional and cisnormative discourse. In one sense, this
chapter is a performative example of creating the conditions for such escape.
Not Out the Trans Ordinary: Workplace Discrimination and Sex Stereotyping
Sex discrimination cases refer, inevitably, to the precedent set in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins (1989). In Price, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that private employers could be held
liable for “sex stereotyping” when they engage in open practices of discrimination based on
certain preconceived notions of gender. At issue was a cisgender female employee of Price
Waterhouse, Anne Hopkins, who was denied partnership at the firm. In filing her claim against
the firm, Anne Hopkins asked the Court to consider the disparaging remarks male partners had
made during the process of considering her partner. She was held to lack the necessary
aggression, the “macho” qualities that being a “woman” naturally foreclosed. Price Waterhouse
argued that such statements were not in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
because they were not made in direct consideration of sex, per se. In disposing the case, the
majority discussion held much of sex/gender as one and the same thing. Sex, for this court,
became the site on which gender is mapped. A masculine woman or a feminine man cannot be,
in this sense, discriminated against as such discrimination constituted an “impermissibly cabined
view of the proper behavior of women [or men]…” (Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 1989, at 237,
emphasis added). The majority goes on to reason that
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that,
if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we
received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or
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employee was a woman. In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be,
has acted on the basis of sex stereotyping (Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 1989, at 237).
In terms of precedent, the Price decision set the following foundation: The body is either male or
female, man or woman, masculine or feminine, and judgments are anchored by these cisgender
conceptions of sex, gender identity, and general bodily expression.
The courts rely on analogical reasoning to conclude that a given litigant has experienced
discrimination. This sort of cognition suggests that a person’s experiences of discrimination can
be mapped onto another case containing “similarities”. This reasoning situates transgender
discrimination squarely alongside cisgender forms of sex stereotyping. In Smith v. City of Salem
(2004), the circuit court ruled “(a)s such, discrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual—
and therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no different from the
discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical
terms, did not act like a woman” (at 574-75). The question remains: According to which standard
of woman did she fail to act, and on whose terms? Although the court seemed to suggest a more
expansive view of “sex stereotyping” was on the horizon, the court places the “behaviors” and
“appearances” of a transgender woman alongside the characteristics of other cisgender plaintiffs.
In Schroer v. Billington (2007), the court suggested that an analogy be drawn between an
employer’s decision to discriminate against a person’s decision to transition genders and a
person’s decision to convert religions. The majority concludes that “(n)o court would take
seriously the notion that ‘converts’ are not converted by [Title VII]. Discrimination because of
religion easily encompasses discrimination because of a change of religions. But in cases where
the plaintiff has changed her sex, and faces discrimination because of the decision to stop
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presenting as a man and to start appearing as a woman, courts have traditionally carved such
persons out of the statute.…” (Ibid. 31). The court would rule in favor of the transgender litigant.
Yet, the analogy whereby religions stand in for gender would seem to suggest that transgender
people are to be taken as “converts,” in the process of moving between one legible form of being
to another.
The equivalence of “convert” to “transgender” is problematic in itself, as much as the
proclamation that a transgender person experiences “the same” kind of discrimination under
employment law as cisgender people would. It suggests a kind of liminality regardless of
whether the trans claimant wants it or not, an in-between space for the trans litigant that takes for
granted Ortega’s being-in-between-worlds. That is, such existential truths are thrust upon them
from the outside. Without the aid of an accepted gender duality, trans people are not, in one
fundamental legal sense, a categorically distinct identity possessed of separate kinds experiences.
In other words, “transgender” is merely the means through which a court might seek to
understand the much more legible experiences of (cisgender) “man” or “woman.” The cognitive
movement between two gender poles constructs an isomorphic transgender subject out of prefashioned pieces. Caught between these categories that are based on cisgender experiences of
gender, transgender narratives as transgender are radically altered or hidden from view. Indeed,
the Schroer court would explicitly rule that “transsexuality,” in itself, has yet to be categorically
protected.
These sorts of judicial epistemic commitments are typical of cisgenderism, which
describes the “cultural and systemic ideology that denies, denigrates, or pathologizes selfidentified gender identities that do not align with assigned gender at birth as well as resulting
behavior, expression, and community. This ideology endorses and perpetuates the belief that

140

cisgender identities and expression are to be valued more than transgender identities and
expression and creates an inherent system of associated power and privilege” (Lennon and
Mistler 2014, 63). Through their institutional power, as (knowing or unknowing) arbiters of
cisgenderism, courts create the conditions for hermeneutical injustice. This view is illustrated by
jurisprudence finding that gender and sex stereotypes themselves constitute discrimination
because they unjustly establish what it means to be a man or woman. However, from this point
of view, what standard of man or woman is being enacted, and whose bodies are being posited as
reflective of these standards? This legal cognition does not seek to arrive at any meaningful
transgender experience of womanhood or manhood. It takes for granted that cisgender
experiences of womanhood and manhood (in other words, gendered selfhood) constitute sex
stereotypes. This form of reasoning is itself epistemically problematic because it denies the
legibility of transgender experiences of gender and sex as such. It also forecloses the entrance of
such knowledges into the range of experiences that populate the resources of knowledge that
constitute legal as well as social discourse. It is not enough, I argue, that a transgender person
has, by law and right, protections against discrimination or harassment.
One of the most well-known cases in transgender employment in recent years illustrates
the limits of such kind of legal discourse to take transgender experiences and difference
seriously. The case, Glenn v. Brumby (2011) does refer to Vandy Beth Glenn as a transgender
woman. It offers the impression that that category itself enters the discursive array of the court’s
reasoning. Yet, a closer look suggests that cisgenderism organizes the court’s legal cognition.
In October of 2007, Vandy Beth Glenn, a former naval officer and journalism alum of the
University of Georgia, announced to her employers that she intended to live her life as a
woman—confirming publicly a personal truth that had remained mostly private. She was
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transgender. Having been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), Glenn’s lawyers
would later explain that she struggled with her social status as ‘male’—the sex assigned to her at
birth. At the time, the DSM-IV described Gender Identity Disorder as a ‘serious condition’ or
pathology, in which a person whose gender identity did not conform to their birth-assigned sex
(this has changed, as the current edition of the DSM-V [American Psychiatric Association 2013]
now describes such a “condition” as Gender Dysphoria, not “disorder”). Her public decision
came as a relief. Glenn loved her job. She had been working at the General Assembly’s Office of
Legislative Counsel of Georgia as an editor and proofreader for the previous two years.
Glenn informed her immediate supervisor, Beth Yinger, of her intention to transition.
Yinger passed along the information to the head of the Legislative Counsel, Sewell Brumby.
Sewell would later confront Glenn about her transition-related decision, telling her it was
“inappropriate,” firing her as a result. Glenn filed suit against Brumby in 2008. The claim was
legally straightforward: Glenn’s firing was a clear violation of the Equal Protections clause of the
14th Amendment of the US Constitution as it related to sex stereotyping. Sex for the Eleventh
Circuit court was still considered biological, or birth-assigned. Gender was a separate, socially
constituted identity. However, the Eleventh Circuit held that Glenn’s decision to transition was
not only considered sex-related. It also touched on areas of gender. Glenn’s assigned sex at birth
notwithstanding, her decision to move forward with both physiological and dress-related
transitions fell under the court’s wider interpretation of Price. In 2011, after three years of
judicial procedure and hearings, Glenn finally won her job back.
In order to determine whether Glenn suffered a violation of sex discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit had to come to terms with
the definition of transgender as a legal category. The court moved toward a definition of
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transgender as that of action and perception. “A person is defined as transgender precisely
because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses gender stereotypes” (Glenn v.
Brumby 2011, 1317). For this determination, the court used a law review’s determination that the
“very acts that define transgender people as transgender are those that contradict stereotypes of
gender appropriate appearance and behavior” (Turner 2007, 563). The court went on to conclude
that there is “a congruence between discriminating against transgender and transsexual
individuals and discrimination on the basis of gender-based behavioral norms” (ibid.).
Discrimination against transgender employees presumes discrimination on the basis of gender
norms. The transgender person “transgresses” or “violates” these norms or stereotypes. However,
these conclusions are reached through the lens of the very norms found stereotypical. In other
words, the experiences of transgender persons, in order to be understood as transgender, hinges
on the conclusion that transgender legibility is maintained between two legible cisgender
markers.
Much of the Glenn decision does not deal with transgender experiences. Rather,
“transgender” is perceived through the precedent that has already made sense of gender
stereotypes. The court held that “An individual cannot be punished because of his or her
perceived gender-nonconformity” (Glenn v. Brumby 2011, 1319). How is gender nonconformity
being perceived, however? Previous cases were primarily dealing with cisgender men wearing
jewelry, or cisgender women entering workplaces in pants, or other “typically” masculine attire,
or clothing associated with military service and thus being considered too “butch.” “Sex
stereotyping,” as a heuristic, smuggles the cisgender body and the gender norms that map onto it
as foundational. Transgender experiences of discrimination are made legible through this
foundation. In one sweeping statement, the court erases the particular difficulties that transgender
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employees face in their lived experiences as being transgender: “Because these protections are
afforded to everyone, they cannot be denied to a transgender individual. The nature of the
discrimination is the same; it may differ in degree but not in kind” (Glenn v. Brumby 2011,
1319). Such is the nature of equality guarantees. Because “everyone” is afforded protection—
indeed a cisgender “everyone”—transgender individuals cannot be denied that protection.
Symbolically powerful, but this does not offer epistemic credit to the particulars of transgender
discrimination. Indeed, the fact of being transgender—of not only looking and acting
“differently” but of actually inhabiting embodied difference—invites social violence and
discrimination in various forms that are not taken into account in the Glenn case decision.
These cisgender conceptions of sex/gender undergird even the most recent rulings.
Regarding a transgender employee’s termination, the court held: “[I]f the EEOC's complaint had
alleged that the Funeral Home fired Stephens based solely upon Stephens's status as a
transgender person, then this Court would agree with the Funeral Home that the EEOC's
complaint fails to state a claim under Title VII (EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc. 2015, 2, emphasis added).”
The status of being transgender is not in itself the site of discriminatory action. The court
holds to this reasoning because “the EEOC's complaint also asserts that the Funeral Home fired
Stephens ‘because Stephens did not conform to the [Funeral Home's] sex- or gender-based
preferences, expectations, or stereotypes’ [(Compl. at ¶ 15)]. And binding Sixth Circuit
precedent establishes that any person without regard to labels such as transgender can assert a
sex-stereotyping and gender-discrimination claim under Title VII, under a [Price Waterhouse]
theory, if that person's failure to conform to sex stereotypes was the driving force behind the
termination” (ibid., emphasis added). Under this brand of reasoning, the legal heuristic of “sex
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stereotyping” does not have to depend upon the claimant’s social identity. In this sense, it is not
the transgender person who holds the discursive and epistemic keys to unlocking why their
discrimination is patently unjust. It is, rather, sex stereotyping from the perspective of cisgender
sex stereotypes that constitutes the wrong, which can be described as a hermeneutic injustice.
This lack of a conceptual vocabulary allowing transgender experiences to become legible as
transgender creates the demand for a shift in hermeneutical resources for courts of law.
Thus the transgender legal subject undergoes a radical mediation. Glenn’s status as
transgender is liminal: her experiences are seen in terms of either cisgender male or female forms
of stereotypes, not transgender experiences of these identities. The social qualities of this
transgender experience(s) are erased because “everyone” deserves the right to equal protection.
Moreover, this invites the question of what type of transgender person is taken for granted.
Where, in such a schema, do non-binary people, or those who reject the binary altogether, or
“gender bend”—by subverting gender expressions one day but not the next—or who are intersex,
belong? Where does race belong in these intersecting phenomena? Recalling my discussion in
Chapter One, Rachel Walker’s (2011) examination of New York City’s Christopher Street Pier
kids, an ethnographic account of the lives of mostly homeless transgender and queer youth living
new the Greenwich Village neighborhood in New York City, illustrates the tragic paucity of
knowledge about the conditions in which most transgender and queer people of color experience
violence. Walker’s survey of the various transgender and queer identities that thrive on the
Christopher Street Piers also highlights the harsh realities of economic marginalization, social
violence, and brutal policing of nonnormative bodies of color. Dramatically, transgender
experiences are at risk of altogether disappearing in the face of such reasoning in legal discourse.

145

A Phenomenological Critique of Trans Life in Legal Discourse
For epistemic justice to exist at all, there can be no primarily “authentic” voice, no
idealized individual subject. Rather, the composite of voices and experiences that make up an
identity should be taken into account. Consider the following stories from trans life.In her story,
“Died and Gone to Heaven,” Jane Nance writes about the possibilities and non-possibilities of
living life as a woman “full time.” Going to lunches, shopping, appearing and acting—these are
“fantasies,” the idealizations that she cannot hope to attain. She goes on vacation with her wife as
a full-time woman, “two gals” out on the road. She wants her “mind and body” to feel in
“congruity as one!” (Nance, Undated, Died and Gone to Heaven, p 2 23). She revels in the
experiences she shares with her wife as a woman. She speaks often of a body conditioned by the
social realities of being male, but of possessing a female mind—of a split. Nance longs for
recognition as a woman, of being a woman as well as being recognized in her identity as a
transsexual (2).
In 1969, Virginia Prince (1969), a pioneer of the “transgenderist” movement, argued
“(m)ost women have little to say about the fact of their woman-hood…I was born a male and
raised as a boy and grew to be a man. Today I live as a woman by choice” (1). But she “hastens”
to add that she is not a transsexual, that she is “still a perfectly normal male and [she] plan[s] to
stay that way” (ibid.). (Cisgender) women have never had to question their bodies as such, in
Prince’s view. However, transgender people’s identities are nevertheless irrevocably grounded in
embodied norms. Speaking about cultural norms and their pervasiveness in this regard, she adds
that “a man is limited severely, however, in the degree to which he can move away from the
accepted patterns and requirements of masculinity and toward the more permissive world of
femininity…I am a woman by choice” (ibid.). Most of Prince’s publications (including The
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Transvestite and His Wife and the magazine Transvestia)—focused on defining, however
narrowly, differences among and within transgenderist communities—are meant to spread
information and thus create a language, a subcultural grammar and vocabulary of transgender
being, a grammar that is often missed in contemporary legal discourse.
In a letter known only as “The Quest,” the writer remarks that she always knew and
continues to understand her “body” as male, but that she identifies as female (The Quest,
Undated). Under the pressures of ensuring, she stayed employed and she wore men’s attire.
When eventually discovered wearing women’s attire, she was labeled a cross-dresser. She herself
identifies as a transsexual. In her letter, she describes how she is taking hormones, recounts her
desire to undergo sex reassignment surgery, and speaks of the strong urge to have a body that
looks like the image she has inscribed in her mind. The author narrates having the fear of being
“found out,” of reading what happens when others like her are discovered—of the violence
visited on their bodies.
Skye, the author of an undated letter entitled “Paths to Understanding,” suggests only that
her appearance will change after transition? She writes for recognition that her “self” be defined
by personality—that perception be based on more than just her desired transition (from male to
female). But her fear, just like the unknown author of “The Quest,” is that of being discovered—
of effeminacy that is mapped onto her “wrong” male body and thus the “wrong” attire she might
be discovered wearing:
So, with all this knowledge, how do I feel? I still become depressed. I still am in a recluse
phase. I continue with my sporadic ingestion of estrogen. I still long to be rid of my
maleness and want to be in my femaleness….Then I think about my deep voice, my
veiny hands, my high forehead, and I am caught in the middle of conflict. I stop taking
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the estrogen. Nothing is possible. Then I start again (Skye, Paths to Understanding).
Transgender experiences are those of self-creation in a cultural milieu inimical to the idea of
gender fluidity; these experiences push boundaries and norms while simultaneously adopting
some. Yet for all this gendered and sexed diversity, US-American culture and particularly its
legal discourses are fastidiously attached to cisgender narratives of a sex/gender binary that fixes
male and female expressions of selfhood.
The movement toward epistemic justice has been illustrated in recent years by numerous
agency decries. The EEOC for the US government has insisted in a number of cases that
transgender people are protected under federal statutes (particularly Title VII of the U.S. Civil
Rights Act of 1964) and other precedents. Indeed, the protections against “sex discrimination”
act as the bulwark against discrimination of transgender employees. Indeed, from the universal
legal point of view, gender and sex collapse on this front. The EEOC’s definition of gender
identity as one’s “inward sense” of gender that does not match their “birth assigned sex” is not
itself problematic. It suggests that a person’s identity of “transgender” strives at creating a
“match” between their cognitive gender and their bodily morphologies. It is important to note
that public employees are protected under these new rules. Private employees are not. Local and
state initiatives to protect transgender people vary. The EEOC and others have come to terms
with transgender claimants and the fact of their discrimination in the workplace, albeit a
governmental workplace. Case law brought this American executive agency and legal system to
a point of understanding “transgender.” Notwithstanding, the epistemic implications put recent
“progressive” views on gender and sex to the test.
Some legal venues have adopted alternative approaches that expand beyond the univocal
transgender narrative, creating a kind of legal “epistemic friction” against the cisgenderism of
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precedent laws (Medina 2013, 48-55). For instance, in 2001, a New Jersey court moved beyond
sex stereotyping, holding that a “person who is discriminated against because he changes his
gender from male to female is being discriminated against because he or she is a member of a
very small minority whose condition remains incomprehensible to most individuals. The view of
sex discrimination reflected in [precedent case decisions] is too constricted” (Enriquez v. West
Jersey Health Systems 2001, at 372). The court explicitly regards the status of transgender as a
category of identity, holding that the statute in question determines that “[d]istinctions must be
made on the basis of merit, rather than skin color, age, sex or gender, or any other measure that
obscures a person's individual humanity and worth. This case represents another step toward
achieving what has thus far been an elusive goal” (ibid., emphasis added). The case further
suggests not only the court system’s own epistemic limits (through its denial that precedent law
has taken up the transgender identities adequately) but also that society has yet to comprehend
“transgender” in its fullness.
Furthermore, a district court in Maryland, more than a decade later, gestures toward this
kind of epistemic comprehension of transgender communities—of taking transgender, in itself,
seriously. In Finkle v. Howard County, Md. (2014), the court ruled that an employee with an
“obvious” status as transgender is protected under “sex stereotyping” claims. The Plaintiff,
Finkle, argued that her appearance as a broad-shouldered, masculine-looking woman constituted,
as appearances go, the reason for her discrimination. The victory itself cautions pause. A more
expansive view of “sex stereotyping” should include the identity of transgender. But a court’s
incorporating this identity can only have epistemic merit when it concedes that transgender
people have particular forms of discrimination such as Finkle’s, where it is situated in a world
outside legal discourse. “The obviousness” of Finkle’s discrimination is founded in the fact that
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in a reality composed of degrees of cisgenderism, transgender people become the site difference
and derision (ibid., at 13). For the court, acknowledging this site of difference is key to
developing good law engaging and dismantling the varieties of discrimination that transgender
people face.
Summary
This chapter has argued that “sex stereotyping,” as a legal heuristic, naturalizes cisgender
conceptions of sex/gender and fails to take feelings of trans embodiment seriously. How can
legal discourse take differences seriously—where the body is the site of the difference? In his
analysis of gender construction before the law, Paisley Currah (2006) finds that most winning
arguments follow the standard pursued in the Glenn court. Others have followed similar
arguments, both critical yet receptive to the power of the symbolic victories these cases carry
(Gordon 2009). Yet, the internal power of this judicial reasoning to construct a gendered subject
routinely relies on cisgenderism as it organizes the legal imaginary of sex/gender. The anchor is
always already a pre-fashioned cisgender body. What can the courts do to comprehend the
multiplicities of being transgender, or the experiences that it entails? There must be a sustained
epistemic commitment to have transgender discourses and narratives of gendered selfhood enter
into these various frames of reference in order for legal institutions to realize epistemic justice.
Dean Spade’s work engages in a sustained critique of this sort of cisgenderism in the law.
His perspective on rights, specifically those developed under discrimination law, is founded on
what he perceives as the “perpetrator/victim dyad, imagining that the fundamental scene [of
discrimination] is that of a perpetrator who irrationally hates people on the basis of their race and
fires or denies service to or beats and kills the victim based on that hatred” (2011, 84). The law,
for Spade, adopts an already ideological notion rooted in systemic oppression—and thus
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becomes a difficult site in which to tackle that oppression. Rather, it reproduces oppression
(ibid.). Transphobia and cisgenderism are linked. Once viewed as the foundational body and the
accepted norm of bodily appearance and expression, “cisgender” helps to enact social and
political violence on non-normative bodies—hence the phobia that increases violence against
trans people (Enke 2013). The movement toward legal equality, from Spade’s point of view,
misses that point altogether. In order to seek full protections for transgender people, the law must
reflect the full diversity of transgender life as it is lived—not as it is idealized within liberal
traditions that extol cisgender bodies as the starting point of sexed and gendered subjectivity.
As Bassichis, et al., argue, a radical strategy and critique “is...recognizing that alternative
approaches to the ‘official’ solutions are alive, are politically viable, and are being pursued by
activists and organizations around the United States and beyond” (2013, 654). Offering
“transformative approaches” to big problems that otherwise official, or mainstream, approaches
have already attempted, Bassichis, et al. (2013) advocate for community interrelations to
organize around and outside of legal strategies. The authors argue in favor of “build[ing]
community relationships and infrastructure to support the healing and transformation of people
who have been impacted by interpersonal and intergenerational violence” (655). In this sense,
creating discursive spaces that open up hermeneutical possibilities for courts to grasp are the
conditions for the possibility of creating a legal grammar attentive to transgender diversity. Levi
and Klein (2006) have argued that intersecting disability law with transgender discrimination
jurisprudence would “transform the colloquial understanding of disability” and expand
protections for transgender people while dismantling misconceptions of disability (83). Indeed,
“Disability antidiscrimination laws cover both those who experience some limitations because of
a health condition, as well as those who experience discrimination solely because of ignorance,
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stereotypes, and misperceptions about their health conditions” (75, emphasis added). Multiplying
out the number of intersecting legal protections is generative, for Levi and Klein (2006).
Disability and transgender should not be taken as synonymous, but productively useful ways of
thinking through allying otherwise disparate legal discourses. Most scholars agree on this point:
there is a plurality of unconventional and radical approaches, from community institution
building to intersectional legal claims, which should motivate interactions with legal institutions
for a “more humanistic movement” (Minter 2006, 159).
Through these inclusions, trans narratives would enter into the pool of shared knowledge
that forms the foundation of our legal vocabularies concerning marginalization. Indeed, it would
help engender a field of judicial grammar that is epistemically inclusive. It would involve the
active engagement of justices and judges to exercise a certain “reflexive awareness” of the
struggle that trans people face in making their lives legible. It would therefore expand beyond the
limited scope of a “protected category” or the use of heuristics such as “sex stereotyping.”
Rather, acute attention would be paid to the discursive and material practices that make up
transgender experiences of discrimination. In this way, the process of judicial reasoning must
intertwine with the process of life itself. A commitment to the everyday should assume that our
legal institutions reflect our collective life adequately, grasping at the roots of lived and situated
moments in order to understand the varied people that make up transgender experiences. As
gender and sex are integral parts of the lived experiences of humans, the institutions that we, at
least in theory, consent to govern us must unequivocally understand gender and sex as they are
lived in a world of bodily plurality.
That we are social creatures is a theoretical commonplace: “human nature only really
exists in an achieved community of minds” (Hegel 1977, 43). But achieving that community, or
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communities, requires new commitments to epistemic virtues in philosophy and political life.
Fricker agrees, arguing “The only way to fully understand the normative demands made on us in
epistemic life is by changing the philosophical gaze so that we see through the negative space
that is epistemic injustice” (2007, 177). It is a demand to realize the material force and social
location of knowledge in all its diversity and to reflect that knowledge back into our governing
institutions. To this end, my next chapter will deal with the holism of affect and epistemology,
experience and the redemption of the ordinary in social life.
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Third Interlude: The Ordinary and the Politics of Danger

Image 4.0: “They Don’t Have A Father Anymore.” Scanned image from Rikki Swinn Collection
(Box 3).
Everything that matters can be jeopardized in an instant. Everything is subject to danger.
The above image from a newspaper describes how a judge announces that a father’s sexual
reassignment surgery meant a subsequent death certificate for that father’s “previous” life. The
parent was, in the judge’s eyes, dead. Another temptation might be to avoid implicating law
enforcement officers in systemic violence because, as the recent counter-narrative goes, not all
cops are bad. But I want to pause and reflect upon how the law has plural manifestations
ordinary life. In this life, “police officers may be charged with implementing the rules and
regulations of the state, but they do not cease being members of local worlds with their own
customs and habits” (Das 2007, 170). In 1984, for example, a Fantasia Fair legal seminar
presented the following scenario: A trans woman is stopped by the police for any reason. The
seminar advised
DO ACKNOWLEDGE your male status if you are stopped and questioned by an officer
in a public place. DO ASK FOR IDENTIFICATION of the officer especially if he/she is
in plain clothes. DO GIVE your real name and address if you are asked to do so by an
officer. DO SHOW the officer your legal masculine identification when it is requested.
DO NOT OBTAIN driver’s licenses, Social Security cards, etc., in your femme name.
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YOU MAY SHOW OFFICER TRANSSEXUAL IDENTIFICATION but they are not
legal. AVOID PUBLIC PLACES where you presence might be misunderstood, e.g., busy
ladies rooms or street corners where hustling street queens ‘hang out’ also, ‘high risk’
bars, etc. (1-2, capitalization in text)
In the time that has transpired, U.S. states have updated their laws concerning official document
changes. Public and community education programs that have disseminated information about
the trans have increased. The HIV/AIDS activism of the 80s and 90s altered the course for a
flagging LGBTQ+ movement. Progress, so it would seem, must have shifted the socio-legal
terrain for trans people. But old habits die hard.
Tyra Hunter, a 24-year-old transwoman of color, lived and worked in Washington D.C.
as a hairstylist. On the morning of August 7 1995, Tyra was involved in traffic accident. First
responders removed a half-conscious Tyra from the debris. Her wounds, it was later revealed,
were treatable and her death preventable. But the first responders, upon cutting open Tyra’s pants
leg, discovered that she had a penis. The firefighter was said to have exclaimed, “This bitch ain't
no girl...It's a nigger, he got a dick." He proceeded to joke with other personnel while Tyra, still
conscious and audible, was forced to listen. The continued banter,—some calling Tyra the
pronoun “it”—was only interrupted when a supervisor arrived and continued Tyra’s treatment.
Upon her being taken to the hospital, the ER doctor refused to treat her. She died at 5:20 m.—a
result owing less to the trauma of the car accident than to the delayed and woefully inadequate
treatments by professionals who were sworn to serve, and, in the case of the ER doctor, “do no
harm.”
S. Diamond, a 37 year old resident of the Bronx at the time, came to terms with anti-trans
harassment from the police in 2014. An argument with her then husband resulted in officers
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entering the home. It was there she was strip searched. When the officer spread her legs, the team
began gawking. She had male genitalia. The violence of the process was compounded by the
humiliating names “tranny,” “he-she” and “it.” She was arrested and later placed in a holding
cell with men. “I felt totally voiceless,” she said after the ordeal. “Like I wasn’t even human.
Like my safety didn’t even matter” (Reminick 2015). Prison rights activist Miss Major can attest
to these feelings being less than human. “When I went to prison, it was the most frightening
thing that ever happened to me because I was a target of so much violence. They strip away your
privacy, humiliate you—anything to make sure you know you are worth nothing and while you
are there, you don’t exist” (2014, 207). The law is as incarnate within and produce
disproportionately more violent relations between trans people and the officials who carry out
the bureaucratic implementation of law—from fire-fighters (as first responders), to the police, to
prison guards, and other administrative officials—in the vast and interrelated institutions of the
American carceral system.
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Chapter Five: A Trans Critique of Knowledge
There is always something a little disappointing as one attempts to write a critique about
critique. There is a writing practice that seems suspicious of itself, a self-effacement that does
harm to the project. Consider that the entire aim of this dissertation, and this chapter in
particular, has been directed toward a reparative reading, a means of thinking something beside
paranoid critical theories. It was hoped that by engaging in something other than, or beside, this
“hermeneutics of suspicion,” that forms of life emerging from within recent shifts in
neoliberalism and ordinary life could be taken as they are. Not the piety of letting the subjects
“speak for themselves,” but the reflexivity to know when a voice is being obscured. This chapter
seeks to make some final connections between affect and phenomenology and their bearing on
investigations into the epistemic resources of the ordinary. It will end with a mediation on the
emerging genre I am calling the conventionality of gender ambivalence.
The Trouble with Critique
Although it can be read as a derisive expression, deploying the phrase “beside paranoid
reading” is alluding to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003) here. Speaking of this preposition use as a
pedagogical tool, “beside permits a spacious agnosticism about several of the linear logics that
enforce dualistic thinking: noncontradiction, or the law of the excluded middle, cause versus
effect, subject versus object” (8). With recent titles in trans studies such as Heath Fogg Davis’
Beyond Trans (2018), “beside” seems like a welcome preposition that captures the spirit of the
phenomenological concept. What are we moving beyond and why should we move beyond
gender? Phenomenology is agnostic from even its earliest iterations in Husserl, whose emphasis
on “bracketing” an object so as to apprehend how the thing, in itself, is given over to
consciousness, invites a break with traditional metaphysics. It is an approach both critically
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aware of what it is doing but simultaneously uncritical in its return to things and their placement
in the world. If it is true that critical analysis seems to have its epistemological commitments
founded in the very critical object it seems to want to expose, namely the repression/oppression
of power, then phenomenology should be a welcome, if somewhat orthogonal, way of
approaching meaning, desire, and all the complexities of embodied experience.
I want to be clear that I am not privileging repair in the sense that it is somehow better
than the hermeneutics of suspicion. As I have attempted to parse out throughout each chapter,
there is something missing from contemporary analyses of embodied experience, particularly
when trans experiences are involved. Ironically it is the embodied experience. Critical (queer)
theory has somehow remained singularly attached to constructionism, or speech-act theory, or
psychoanalysis, or Marxism. Not that these theories are in themselves incomplete or patently
wrong. But each renders the body-as-effect, of being something other than itself. The body’s
givenness is a mere fiction. Marx, for instance, argued that objects (even the human being) is
never anything other than their economic or historical thingliness. Constructionism holds that
everything (even down to the body) can be routed through some explanatory model of the social
(also linguistic) forces to understand its “where” and its “what” of existence. Bruno Latour
(2005; 2010) called these models, coyly, the “black boxes,” of social theory—they alter the thing
to the extent that the heuristic is the thing. Whether we historicize everything or understand the
body (as raced, gendered, sexed) as intelligible only through the performative, the body is nearly
always just over there but never quite here. It’s difficult to discuss the intricacies of everyday
trans life ethically when these “paranoid” theories seem to absolve the critic from ever
descending into the ordinary of those deemed oppressed.
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Furthermore, these critical theories unfortunately create new dualisms and ontological
pitfalls. For instance, a lopsided appeal to the social, economic, or unconscious drives, while
trying to expose the constraints they impose on human thought and subjectivity, construct the
very subject’s embodiments without ever asking consent. What can be the case otherwise, for
example, if a human being is not understood as always already a subject (Althusser 1999)? What
can be the case otherwise if a human being is not always already recruited into a biopolitical
regime (Butler 1993; Preciado 2010) or, always already subjected to the field of linguistic power
(Bourdieu 1993)? The body’s experience, somewhere “in the mix,” plays a decisively limited
role. I have already raised this point in Chapter Two, agreeing with phenomenologist Andrea
Long Chu (2017) that “the givenness of phenomenality [of the body] as such—how and why
what is experienced is experienced as experience—is no more elucidated by social construction
or historical materialism than it is by bio-chemistry or particle physics” (150). If they cannot
explain this givenness, which is to say the being here of the body, then they are not explaining
the experiencing-body at all. There is a felt absence of the human voice, one bearing witness to
what the human has experienced as embodied experience, in these expositions.
What I am getting at here is that the body, as a body, enters the critical conversation
already other than itself. There must be a renewed attention to things (and bodies) themselves
and their practices. What I hope to illustrate in this chapter is that phenomenology can serve as a
means to repair this inattentiveness and bring the body back in our theoretical dialogue about
selfhood and knowledge. One way, perhaps, to bridge the gap here is to ask what relationship
between a body, a person, has to something like structural antagonisms we know to exist (racism,
sexism, classism, etc.) I have suggested that phenomenology demands three interrelated
epistemic and methodological commitments in developing that relationship. First is a resistance
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toward narrativizing bodily and affective phenomena solely through totalizing constructionism
and expect the phenomenality bodily experience to “fit” neatly within them. Instead,
phenomenologists ask how it is possible that experiencing the body might be elucidated in terms
of what Heidegger would call the “ecstatic now” of being (Ortega 2016). This means, for one
thing, that the phenomenologist admits that the body is already being affected, not determined,
by social, historical, and material conditions. These conditions need to be deconstructed, yes—
but in such a way that does not privilege linguistic, social, and economic phenomena over what
those phenomena feel like in lived time. Second is to assume that as “thrown” beings-in-theworld, that is to say discovering we are not in control of our situatedness, ordinary human life
resists being made into a mere effect of structural power. Human agency, likewise, cannot be
reduced to accepting or rejecting dominant forms of discourse (as if only conscious of a certain
dichotomy of resistance/non-resistance based strategies to life). Third is the need to avoid the
eventful as a roadmap for human affectivity and everyday meaning-making. Rather, a return to
the everyday and the ordinary reveals is an acceptance of the potentially uncritical ways
subjectivity plays out in the contemporary mode of making do.
Have queer appropriations of phenomenology fared better? Sarah Ahmed (2006) argues
in her now classic Queer Phenomenology, for instance, that “the racial and historical dimensions
[of being] are beneath the surface of the body described by phenomenology, which becomes, by
virtue of its own orientation, a way of thinking the body that has surface appeal” (109). Is
phenomenology, as a practice, establishing a vision of reality so radically disengaged from the
processes of social life? She goes on to describe phenomenology as “[attending] to the tactile,
vestibular, kinesthetic, and visual character of embodied reality...” (110). It would seem here,
that phenomenology, on its own, fails to consider the world-historical and the racializing effects
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of power, such as colonialism, and its effects on embodying the body. Insofar as that’s the case,
Ahmed fails to see a problematic dualism she creates separating structure from givenness, depth
and surface respectively. Embodying the body, as I’m calling it, is another trope of powereffects—of molding persons as beings. Continuing to bypass whether one can consider one’s
body in its naturalness (much like Salamon), Ahmed further limits experience through “the ways
in which the world is available as a space for action, a space where things ‘have a certain place’
or are ‘in place’” (110). Her shudder quotes indicate a somewhat hidden reliance on ideology, of
the Althusserian sort (of “interpellating” persons as subjects). There is clearly “something” at
work that constitutes subjects/objects. Granting that racialization affects an embodied perception
of belonging, we are still left with how, in spite of being “orientated” or “pointed toward”
something, persons engage in the work of life in a web of constantly shifting normative
expectations. In what ways do nonnormative bodies feel at home, familiar, or belong while
engaged in improvisational life-work? Perhaps, more probingly, is the feeling of belonging the
product of improvisational work or the product of the structure or the dialectic between both?
Must queer or bodies, for that matter, also bear the signs of abjection and always be orientated by
heteronormativity and cisnormativity? If we argue that bodies are always orientated, directed,
pointed toward, or effected by normative power, would we also have to concede that we are
reifying these same norms temporally—that is to say a cis and hetero present?
I am not suggesting there is some internal inconsistency in Ahmed’s book, which is as
erudite as it is clear, or that phenomenology and queer/trans theories are incompatible form the
start. I am saying that it merits attention from theorists when critical theories begin to guide,
rather than inform, inquiries about forms of life. Theory can maintain one without scraping the
integrity of the other. As Sedgwick (2003) illuminates: “for someone to have an unmystified
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view of systemic oppressions does not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin that person to any
specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences. To be other than paranoid , to
practice other than paranoid forms of knowing does not, in itself, entail a denial of the reality or
gravity of enmity or oppression” (128). A trans phenomenology is, then, a work of reparative
theory and affective reading. It is a pedagogy for the theorist. It has to work out relations
between the body as simultaneously reflecting structure and as a singularity distant from it. We
might say that a reparative reading “shows” the body, affect, mood, and life as living rather than
“telling” that is exercised as ideological interpellation, biopolitical disciplining, or neoliberal
commodification.
Other than Paranoid Theory as Trans Critique
As “beside” or “other than,” phenomenology is a part of the alternative epistemologies
called reparative forms of reading (cf. Sedgwick 2003). It is a counterpart (counteragent?) to the
“hermeneutics of suspicion” that marks much of contemporary queer and trans theory. In this
way, phenomenology thinks itself in terms of “what is naive, sincere, uncomplicated, unironic,
uncritical, unstrategic, or just plain ordinary about everyday being in the world’” (Chu 2017,
150; my emphasis). Out of a number of definitions for the term “naive,” one comes closest to
phenomenology’s intention, so to speak: a state of not having been subjected to experimentation.
This particular definition allows a clearer entre into understanding what is meant by the
phenomenological givenness of bodies in the world. In other words, as bodies are present
themselves to consciousness. Humans, Heidegger might say, are the peculiar kind of being that
discovers, by and for themselves, already being-in-the-world with other beings—what he calls
“thrownness,” the facticity of existence. Mariana Ortega agrees, arguing that this thrownness,
however, is something experienced with more dizzying effect for the racially and sexually
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marginalized. For Lauren Berlant (2011) this boils down to a methodological question, namely
“to think about [ordinary] sensual matter that is elsewhere to sovereign consciousness but that
has historical significance in domains of subjectivity requires following the course from what’s
singular—the subject’s irreducible specificity—to the means by which the matter of the senses
becomes general within a collectively lived situation” (53). In other words, to access and grasp
what it means to experience this life, this body, and its encountered-ness in the worlds trans
people inhabit, if only speculatively.
This is why Sedgwick (2003) favors privileging, in many instances, the nonlinguistic and
theatricality of day-to-day life. These improvisations, or “forms of life,” are not static or easily
brought into objective presence by interrogative methods (such as ethnography). They interact,
change from moment to moment, and are experienced differently over, as well as through, time
and space. One can never know what this life consists of until one has descended into its
affective spaces. For instance, anthropologist Veena Das (2006) argues that “the precise range
and scale of the human form of life is not knowable in advance, any more than the precise range
of the meaning of a world is knowable in advance” (90). From a phenomenological vernacular,
human existence is “thrown” into the complex and interrelated environments that make up the
world. Experiencing this world is filled with textures (of the tactile senses) and affects (of
feelings and emotions) that place the phenomenality of the body in already (tactile and affective)
interactive modes with the world. To put it another way, affect incorporates the gestural as a
means of disclosing, of unconcealing, the living parts of making do. But also of disclosing their
history, their deeply embedded roots in community.
As mentioned in my Introduction, affective inquiries do not discount structural
antagonisms, only the determinism that might follow from theorizing their oppressiveness in the
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everyday. Thus, the creativity within ordinary life runs up against what cultural theorist Lauren
Berlant (2011) is a temporality where “things feel random when they are not, and things feel
systemic when accidents actually happen. What threatens might therefore be political where the
power stakes are palpable, or entirely fantasmatic—the difference does not make much
difference in the encounter with what might happen and what does happen” (73). Thus, as
paranoia’s epistemological other, phenomenology and affect return to us the site of givenness
that lets improvisation within cultural contexts not only emerge but unfold. Consider the lifealtering experiences of violence and trauma and their associated affects (adjustment, fear,
anxiety, dread) within everyday life. Phenomenality deals with the body’s being-able-to-live as
well as its already-being-there. I am intentionally hyphenating terms to stress how these words
hang together as different modes of being under trauma. So, Judith Butler (2004), as a strong
constructionist on the one hand, argues that “each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue
of the social vulnerability of our bodies—as a site of desire and physical vulnerability, as a site
of a publicity at once assertive and exposed. Loss and vulnerability seem to follow from our
being socially constituted bodies” (20; my emphasis). The social being in the constitution of loss
and trauma seems wrongheaded to me. From the standpoint of givenness, there is a void or
absence of the body, of that being, already there making do. Again, reciting Chu, because it bears
repeating: to admit of life’s unlivability, or zones of livability, is to admit that “[life] is about the
livability of the dead-end, the survivability of what’s wrong—whether that is the wrong body,
the wrong society, or the wrong genre—even as the wrongness of hat is given is equiprimordial,
as Heidegger would say, with givenness itself” (2017, 151). One cannot theorize the body as
mere social effect without also explaining how it is that a person’s body is given over to that
person’s experience. Thus, Das would argue that “violence seems to define the edges at which
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experimentation with a form of life as a human form of life occurs” (86). Whereas
constructionism might suggest that our vulnerability is experienced as part of our being socially
constituted, phenomenology (while admitting of social effects and affects) directs us toward the
experience of vulnerability as an experience of the body as it unfolds as a complex function of
finding the rhythm of the ordinary.
This kind of improvising in the ordinary refers to the middle ranges of agency, of the
necessity to conceive of human being somewhere between the extremes of buying into or
refusing systemic and/or oppressive structures. Consider the beginning of Leslie Feinberg’s
semi-autobiographical novel, Stone Butch Blues (1994). The story revolves around Jess, a Jewish
butch lesbian from a working class family, and her formative experiences of queer sexuality and
gender identity. We meet Jess, in letter form, as Jess the lover and Jess the everyday being in the
world. She makes a special reference to her interactions with the police. Set in the 50s, the novel
deals with a number of police raids throughout Jess’s formative years in the gay bar scene. But in
one such raid, Jess confesses that she had been forced to decide whether to perform a sexual act
on the arresting officer. Jess writes “I never told you this before, but something changed inside of
me at that moment. I learned the difference between what I can’t do and what I refuse to do. I
paid the price for that lesson. Do I have to tell you every detail of that moment? Of course not”
(5). Jess’s confession to Theresa reveals the complexity of more than just her feelings about love.
Love is a notoriously difficult affect for Jess. Jess doesn’t have to tell Theresa every detail about
the experience because she knows that Theresa gets it. The butch-femme relationship is famously
illustrated throughout Feinberg’s prose. This affective structuration of love establishes a rhythm,
a middle agency for how to act in uncertain and catastrophic temporalities. She knows that her
body’s violation is her own violation.
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In another instance, Jess writes that “I remember when we got outside to the parking lot
you stopped and put your hands lightly on my shoulders and avoided my eyes. You gently
rubbed the bloody places on my shirt and said, “I’ll never get these stains out. I knew exactly
what you meant. It was such an oddly sweet way of saying, or not saying, what you were
feeling” (5). That Theresa speaks of the blood stains, and the impossibility of removing them,
instead of the pressing urgency of the violence Jess faced is not a disavowal or an acquiesces. It
is a strategy, experiencing and expressing what is conceivable within the boundaries of that
moment. Theresa is making a world in spite of the sagging undertow of desolation, feeling as
though she and Jess are suspended for a moment within a time marked by violence against sexual
minorities. She and Jess feel and know it to be true and is expressed through the touching
gestures in which they both engage outside the police station. This feeling is what Lauren Berlant
(2011) describes this “being in history [as a] densely corporeal, experientially felt thing whose
demands on survival skills map not the whole world in one moment but a way to think about the
history of sensualized epistemologies in the atmosphere of a particular moment now
(aesthetically) suspended in time” (64). Here and throughout the novel, Feinberg describes how
the (butch, trans, nonnormative) body, though always seemingly subject to violence, is always
part a subjective process of procuring a rhythm that promises a continuity to life in the ordinary.
The Emergent Trans Genre and its Non-Event
Much of my own affective learning occurred through a sustained engagement with
Lauren Berlant. As I have mentioned before, her argument is that the affective mode of
contemporary life is governed, so to speak, by a shared conception that life being lived in crisis.
Forms of life in this register are shaped by a temporality of anticipation, of not knowing. This
affective state that readies the body something-to-come is, in Berlant’s view, the presence of a
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happening awaiting its event, a becoming event. Her answer to this sense of something
impending is the impasse. This impasse is felt as a kind of crisis, or trauma, a non-event that may
or may not have taken place but is nevertheless known and felt as the body is often the conduit
through which such traumas are registered. We might also say that this is a way of thinking “life”
as “genre” or of how life is shaped by the kinds of affective limitations human beings perceive as
being there. In this way, we can visualize the everyday as being colored by affects corresponding
to crisis/trauma (dread, fear, resignation) as well as those pushing against crisis (optimism, hope,
or just plain boredom). This kind of thinking spatializes time. Being-in-crisis is a matter of
understanding one’s time as being limited to feeling intensely, as somehow bounded by the
future potential within this impasse, of an inability to move beyond a given set circumstances,
understood and called into presence by a very real past. Life, in such an impasse, is lived with
intensity because of the individuation that crisis invokes (this is my crisis, my time, my future).
By this, “thinking about life during lived time, everyone is figuring out the terms and genres for
valuing living preserving the potentiality for casual life is important in a crisis” (59-60). I find
Berlant’s epistemic commitments here to be particularly useful to understanding how affect in
the present can shape ordinary life that is both intelligible from a theoretical angle but also
phenomenologically irreducible. In bringing culture into conversation with givenness, of crisis
with presence, perhaps the perceived movement of much of the trans genre (of affects relating to
“beyond” questions of gender entirely) is that we, in fact, feel stuck. We are indeed stuck in the
“wrong wrong body.”
The proof that genres of normative life are fraying is something traced but not something
one holds in the form in a model. A genre of being looks something like the subject finding an
intelligible set of conventions that enable her self-description and self-creation. To an extent,

167

genres provide some of the very improvisational work that Ortega has described as hometactices
(one of three affective intelligences outlined in Chapter Three). But we have seen affective
orientations change and the genres thought to contain the narrative plots of trans life. Forms of
self-making become clearer or more opaque depending on where the subject stands in the social
hierarchy. Thus, an expression of dysphoria that one can read literally in a poem like “Agony” is
an expression of discontent with a cultural milieu in another, as expressed in the interview
between Carmen Carrera illustrated. Genres do not just disappear, much like practices do not
disappear. Contemporary genres on trans life have been engaging in movements toward feelings
of sovereign, autonomous safety. And both political forms discussed in Chapter Two (of
assimilation or anti-normativity) are expressions of that because they each point toward
attachment to a certain fantasy of feeling a sense of being-at-ease. But the trans ordinary is filled
with episodes where such fantasies fail. As theorists, we have to be up to the task of addressing
both the failure and the cause of the attachment. Where transition does not fulfill what it
promised, such as Rachel McKinnon’s analysis of the happy transsexual illustrated in Chapter
Three, invites needed critical revision. This fantasy is a poetics, a feeling “misrecognized as an
objective state: an aspirational position of personal and institutional self-legitimating
performativity and an affective sense of control” (Berlant 2011, 97). And yet this does not mean
that fantasmatic attachments do not do their part in constituting the baseline on which knowledge
about the trans ordinary is situated. On the contrary, most of our decisions (our epistemic
commitments one might say) are carried out in ordinary life based on fantasies about continuity,
of another tomorrow, the comforts of habit, and the like. What I have tracked through my various
phenomenological inquiries have been affective adjustments, self-management of a
multiplicitous self, and how the ordinary was the site of it all.
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Is the recent emphasis on this “beyond” that the so-called trans revolution inaugurated a
non-event trying to find its genre? Maybe. I am inclined to call this new epistemic and affective
non-event gender ambivalence. As Paisley Currah observes, “much was gained with this
movement away from the centrality of the sex/gender binary. But,” he goes on, “one crucial tool
was lost: the emphasis on asymmetry” (2016). These new conventionalities that away from the
binary have reframed certain affective orientations and attachments by shaking out of the
ordinary. Rather than revealing the violence, instability, or fragility that may have always been
and thus saturated everyday life, this ambivalence toward the beyond has posited a rather myopic
and reified view of identity politics. The neoliberal appropriation of inclusion, of misdirecting
politics away from the economy (and which narrative in this dissertation did not deal in some
sense with class) has absorbed feelings of normativity. Being healthy is a regime of expertise that
suffuses everyday life with normative habits. In this way, “health itself can be seen as a side
effect of successful normativity, and people’s desires and fantasies are solicited to line up with
the that pleasant condition” (106). This concept, of what is healthy as being a byproduct of the
normatively successful or the successfully normative, might also have some explanatory value
within debates on (gendered) passing. The problem is that this newer trans genre (if we can call it
that) does exactly what Currah is worried about. It masks how power relations obscure the lives
and conditions of the poor, a category that both trans and cis people share alike. Take passing,
for example. The problem with passing is compounded by the risks one takes at self-making; of
being misrecognized in certain spaces for the sake of economic wellbeing; of entering into the
world with the affective strain of always being present, always alert, always exhausted; of being
exhausted because it comes with the territory of having a job. Going beyond gender does not get
at the ordinary pressure that passing is exhausting to nonnormative bodies in more than one
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sense. And it is not always the state. Trans people must exhaust themselves in order to become
exhausted, in other words normal.
The radical answer to this new brand consumerism on the trans/queer Left has been to
mock “it gets better” as a means of normalizing otherwise anti-normative forms of political
action. The argument goes something like this. “It might get better for white cisgender gays, but
it won’t for non-white, non-cis nonnormative people.” The real problem, in this sense, resides in
how the state and corporations market gender and sex segregate. That much might be true. But I
supposed the question might go something like this: is it any crueler an optimism to cling to the
notion of a better good life because of fate, or because gender revolutionaries are hitting the state
where it hurts?
I think these are both liberal conceptions needing to be called out for their equally utopic
sense of the future as both do not generally deal with the facts finding work, a home, some kind
of health, within a culture that prizes economic productivity. Just “getting by” is, in fact, the
norm! It means that the only exhaustion they can every really “complain” about is not from a
singular force of bias (sexism, racism, transphobia, homophobia), but from the status of work
itself. One might think that success in the courts regarding anti-discrimination law for trans
people appeals to this notion. But it just reinforces the primacy of work as a central part of
contemporary cultural identity. So by “getting better,” this concept of life induces in youth an
affective drive to feel better about themselves not for its own sake. Getting better is orienting the
will toward finding a place in neoliberal markets through whatever means possible. Getting
better is a placeholder that could just as easily mean “get used to it” because that is precisely the
attachment expected out of nonnormative youth. An attachment to world order that promises
them a place only insofar as they are willing to exploit and plumb their own psychic resources
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and physical health in the pursuit of work. If not “get used to it” then “getting better” means the
engineering of affects for nonnormative communities in order to make self-management
(through therapy, sex/gender confirming transitions, etc.) a part of an already privatized
apparatus of medical professionals and experts. Thus getting better is also “getting ready,” if
only because you need the help in order to find the work that will, in the end, exhaust you.
When Currah suggests we bring the binary back, he is also illustrating the fraying edges
of older normativities even though our socio-economic inequalities (those asymmetries) are
getting more and more obscure. Anti-normative critiques of social constructs such as the gender
binary elide the fact that the binary is still very real, and sometimes a very safe, embodied set of
conventions for people. So what is the (gender, class, racial) nonnormative subject to do? Is
being healthy through do it yourself (DIY) self-help bucking the trend? Or should they seek to
deconstruct their own gender daily through practices described in activist zines? The answer to
these question rely on the theme of the similarly situated epistemic subject. That is to say, all
gender nonnormative people can appeal to a singular conception of sociality, a knowledge that
people can change. I would argue that both cling to an image of knowledge that posits a kind of
“true feeling” (one through citizenship and the other through presupposed shared oppression)
without interrogating how those affects frame knowledge of what is ordinary, of what is good,
and of what can reduce harm.
In all of these meditations, the ordinary, as a site of knowledge, is situated within an
epistemic/affective model of self-management. That is to say, knowledge about the ordinary, and
the feelings that are present or emergent within it, turn affective relations of the impasse. That
right now, the now of the present life, we are caught somewhere between those history that
should be behind us as the past and the empty promises that the old genres of being made about
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the future (recognition, upward mobility, political voice). The epistemic/affective model of
management reframes trans life in terms that rupture the biopolitical and feminist narratives that
capture the voices of trans people. Questions of knowledge in forms of life must tend toward
how gender nonnormative life orients itself toward affective relations that reproduce a sense of
security in an enduring sensation that change is, if not too slow, not happening at all. Knowledge
as feeling, and feeling as knowing, is a method in temporality that reveals what is at stake when
the ordinary is understood as already containing those forces that have erupted into the cultural
events that “change everyone’s perspective” about gender or sex. Bathrooms were already
political, already sites of self-care and potential danger. Public spaces were already filled with
tremors of violence against nonnormative appearances. Racism had already constructed how
sexuality and gender identities were to be experienced in non-white bodies. In this way, the
affective intelligences a side of trans life that cannot be sensationalized. They are a means of
creating something, making work that makes worlds, Berlant might say. Of feeling a way
through these worlds so as to know them.
Coda: The Trans Ordinary as a Space Resistance
When epistemologist José Medina suggests that the presence of epistemic injustices
(which includes instances dismissing another’s testimony because of identity-bias, the
foreclosure of access to what he calls knowledge practices, and the erasure of an entire
community’s knowledge from social recognition) calls for “epistemic resistance” (2013, 3). This
resistance is mounted on multiple fronts, and includes demanding interaction on equal
recognition and the re-emergence of “democratic sensibilities” that place dialogic outcomes as
crucial to sustained human life. In one sense, Medina normalizes epistemic conflict—that is to
say, struggle for epistemic recognition and justice is a constant in human affairs. However, he
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doesn’t seek to normalize it through institutions and apparatuses of consensus. There must be a
shared commitment, or ethical bond, among those seeking to evaluate their shared realities.
Epistemic resistance is an outcome of this normalized conflict. It challenges assumptions about
the realities of identity, the discursive limitations built-into the names given to certain forms of
phenomena and activities (such as gender, race, sex work, drug use, criminality, poverty, etc.).
These forms of political and lived activities invite the reconsideration of old, and the introduction
of new, terms.
But Medina goes a step further. In his own epistemological terms, we are “blind” to
asking self-dissipating questions because we have already committed ourselves to a certain way
of thinking about the world that we take for granted is real, perpetual, and normatively strong. In
a sense, we live in our own moments of privilege. We fear self-estrangement—that is, placing
ourselves outside of our lived contexts to investigate whether our assumptions about the world
are faulty. We also rarely think of ourselves as the responsible agents in the epistemic
interaction. So, thinking requires alienating oneself enough to feel the present—disquieting,
upsetting, self-estranging, unsettling, all over which dissolves the predictability of a world of
beings that, at minimum, are always under construction, always unfolding their being
unpredictable ways, and relating to each other in countless ways. There is an urge explain but not
experience. And once that explanation has been rendered, to move beyond it. If gender is
performative, then one can move beyond its parodic functions. If it is socially constructed,
gender is meaningful insofar a group gives it meaning. “This concern with aim or results, with
differentiating and passing judgment on various thinkers is therefore an easier task than it might
seem. For instead of getting involved in the real issue, this kind of activity is always a way
beyond it” (Hegel 1977, 3). So goes the problem with continuously moving away from genres of
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the gendered human: the post-human, the nonhuman, the anti-human. Real knowing, as it were,
is shaped by degrees and kinds of relations that force theorists to retrace our steps back to a
moment where our thinking stopped, and our instinctual need to explain began. “Instead of
tarrying with it, and losing itself in it, this kind of knowing is forever grasping at something new;
it remains essentially preoccupied with itself instead of being preoccupied with the real issue and
surrendering to it” (Hegel 1977, 3, emphasis my own). The prelude to thinking gender is to
surrender to the ordinary but immense affect it has upon our living experiences; to come undone
by the sheer weight of our relational experiences that we have with ours and others’ bodies. We
must learn to be affected by gender again.
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Afterword: The Trans Complaint
In some sense, this dissertation has been a sustained examination of what would it look
like if gender nonnormativity were a site of attachment, as a genre in which performances range
and expand up the concept of the multiplicitous self. In this line of thinking, to identify as this or
that gender is less to suspend everyday activity into a single dimension or aesthetic like we
normally do. In a sense, defining “who I am” requires that I must first be willing to accept that
my performances will never fully satisfy anyone else. That I will fail in performing a certain
masculinity or femininity. That I will fail at looking or acting like a man. That I will fail around
loving peers and community members as much as my allies and supporters. And all
performances that come after any self-realizing or self-transformative moment are means
overcoming the lock and key of my genre, my gender. Being a gender, or not, consists of an
infinite array of “somewhere” to which someone might be escaping. And if that somewhere is
less a projected moment suspended in futurity, then at least it consists an ordinary of exceptional
or perhaps project-worthy human life-making and life-building. I want to speculate as to the
possibility of the trans complaint, following writing on a parallel and more sustained project
called the female complaint. And it is primarily speculative and hopefully provides a point of
departure for future research on mass-mediated trans culture.
To be recognized at all is to allow misrecognition into the fold of our being as an
equiprimordial factor of our entering public life. To pass as this or that (gender or race or
ethnicity) is to live inside a fantasy in the outside world where that fantasy is tested time and
again—whether by others or ourselves. And the escape that generic conventions of gender offers
us is a place of refuge as much as it might be a place of injustice or solitude. Perhaps the
personal is the political only because the impersonal is what we bargain with when we exist our
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homes (if we have one) and enter the space of other human beings. We bargain with the
impersonal to make do with a sense of self we feel (we know) to be under new pressures. And if
the conventions of normativity engenders a day of rest, or a self-care moment, then those
moments should not be cast out of our critical attention. It announces a need for a closer
inspection of these ordinary sites in order to measure the extent of the need for feeling normal
and knowing what normal is/looks like. Or to put it another way, gender normativity—whether
through the so-called imitative properties of passing, living within and accepting normative
aesthetics as natural and part of one’s own body, or pushing against these and exploding gender’s
fantasy—suggests that people get to feel the guarantee of personal and intimate exchange
through the impersonal and convention. The everyday promise of reciprocation (or recognition)
is one that is ratified only when someone mentally and bodily navigates their gender genre.
But if the mass-mediated trans culture considers the point of being trans to get rid of
gender, to consider gender as an inherently violent aspect of social identities, even undoing
gender altogether, does this constitute a kind of narrative complaint. This complaint goes
something like this: recognizing gender is necessary but also violent, so abolish it. This means
that culturally mediated affect, the way we feel and the way we come to feel normal, is more
important than ever for intimate trans publics. If someone’s sense of femininity is attached both
to the conventional standards of “the female complaint,” as Lauren Berlant (2008) called it, and
to the particular imaginaries that a singular life experiences, we have to imagine that trans and
gender nonnormative embodiments are not pushing against but rather living alongside something
like gender conventions. Living a gender nonnormative life is not always bound up with the
political decision to unmask gender’s illusion. Living that life is a making decisions about what
conventions feel most safe or which ones simply do not make sense to the ordinary experiences
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within that life. In other words, defaulting the context of a trans life to one combating cisgender
heterosexuals inadvertently privileges the power of cis and heteronormativity. This means that
discussions about “passing” trans identities must allow room for all sorts of disappointments that
are not going to be linked to the power of cisgenderism or Gayle Rubin’s classic account of
heteronormativity. If cisgender is part of, but not primordial to, the conventions of gender
normativity, then critics must accept that cisgender possesses a plurality of forms in itself. This is
so not because critics have been wrong about cisgender privilege, or that such a privilege needs
to take a backseat in critical discussions moving forward.
On the contrary, cisgender privilege, if defined as the ability not to consider one’s gender
“realness” in the context of everyday life, is a kind of attachment to which many forms of
nonnormative life might make. It is a promise, an unstated guarantee, that if one can obtain it one
will be free to move through space without the constant vigilance that attends marginal life. But
cisnormativity, like all normative forms that life-making, leads to a kind of cruel optimism. It
promises movement through space but never touches the issues of class, race, or ability. Passing
as, being one’s “authentic” self against, or just being cisgender does not compute the
irregularities that economics and race shuffle into a life that is attempting to make sense of itself.
The fact is that people are struggling to get it right. And this struggle is a kind of making do that
often requires a certain attachment to a certain feeling, a certain kind of failure—let us say
misrecognition—that breaks with the cruel optimism of gender normativity and the privilege of
its identity. And if one is suddenly misread, or misrecognized, that break in the script of
everyday life is rendered ordinary because trans people have had the necessity for a kind of
intuition, experiencing what it means to bargain their gender conformity for their everyday
safety, that have made their affective orientations to an aesthetics of the ordinary a complex
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affair—more complex than most. So complex that one might ask how does one find a kind of
emotional space and release so as not to explode in their own bodies. If gender as genre means
that in many instances that genre bleeds into another, pushes its own limits and requires revision,
the hypervigilance of everyday trans life is a kind of knowledge that such limits exist in the first
place—that normativity is both a safe space and a space whose edges are slowly expanding
through action.
The complaint is found somewhere between the fantasy of recognition and the lived
experiences of gender nonnormative life. That “somewhere between: is not nothing, not an
abstraction, but a felt sense of things out of joint. Although Berlant calls this somewhere critical
it is also sentimental—that clings to a fantasy and a certain kind of affective knowledge rather
than the “truths” critical inquiry. The media that carry this message convey the following
optimism in the complaint: that women can transform themselves in ways to overcome
heteronormative conventionality concerning love, or to find a degree of sovereignty within it
without changing much of the world around them. And that is the failure of such sentimentality.
It clings to the notion that the flaw is in human individuals, not culture; conventionalities of
gender and not the larger sensorium of markets, labor, and emphases on individualism. The flaw
can be exposed. And this exposure can somehow allow for that singular transformative moment
in other women to overcome. In a sense, such a culture allows women (ironically to be sure) to
persist under attachments of self-dissipation and disempowerment rather than actual political and
social change.
The question of whether there is a trans complaint itself would probably raise some
eyebrows in trans activism. What do you mean complaint? At the end of the day, isn’t the whole
point to undo the argument that trans and cis are locked in some kind of fundamentally
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constitutive dualism? Is this reifying a conception of trans? Aren’t trans women women? Thus,
would the trans woman’s complaint fall under the female complaint? To say there is a complaint
is to suggest there is a mediating characteristic to culture, something that trans people can share
in commonality, but something that nevertheless absorbs their social energies in generic form.
Indeed, to argue that there is a trans culture or subculture at all is to take the leap of faith that a
common sense of a gender nonnormative selfhood is experienced. It is to accept the possible loss
that is experienced when one argues there is “a culture,” where the word homogenizes the
otherwise complex lifeworlds of people across lines of economy, race, ethnicity, age, and ability.
What cultural precepts are there to suture the gaps that such identitarian categories engender?
Are they strong or weak? Or does that even matter if they exist at all?
I would argue that the “trans complaint” can parallel Berlant’s “female complaint” in a
number of ways. Trans culture, since the eras of Jorgenson and Prince, Rivera and Johnson,
Mock and Cox, have carried the same kind of message: that trans people are neither sick nor
abnormalities, but authentic and real in their sexed and gendered being. The public sphere’s
uptake of this simple claim has been mixed, at best. Its most recent iterations have been a
materialization of de-pathologizing transsexual and transgender identities (the noted change in
the DSM-V to gender dysphoria), offering new spaces of representation for trans characters on
streaming TV (Orange is the New Black, Supergirl, Transparent, Pose, to name just a few). The
political and legal strides made by trans communities have been quite large recently (with the
inclusion of gender identity as a protected status under Title VII and Title IX, the inclusion of
trans service members in the Armed Forces, and the multi-state actions that no longer require
medical approval for changing sex markers on official documents). It would appear, if one
follows this path of liberal progress, that the affective world where feelings matter does exist—
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and that coming out of the shadows, trans people are finally receiving the recognition they have
been demanding since their incorporation into public discourse.
But this intimate public of trans people, a public that thrives on the aesthetics that such
political change occurs outside everyday life and is therefore “juxtapolitical” (Berlant 2008, 3).
In this sense, the proximity of trans communities to the political is one marked by kind of
ambivalence. World circumstances should change, and they can, but such a political world is
often filled with corruption and scandal and difficult to manage. There is little control over the
narrative in such a sphere. If this is the case, then many trans communities attach to the ordinary
in order to “live small but to feel large; to live large but to want what is normal too; to be critical
without detaching from disappointing and dangerous worlds and objects of desire” (3). My
archive has already been discussed at length throughout the dissertation: Stryker, Feinberg,
Jacques. I believe each of these pieces reflect upon, either directly or indirectly, the kind of
politics at stake the trans complaint: sentimental attachment to but critical detachment from
(sex/gender) normativity; of a homonormative conventionality (perhaps bordering on, if not
creating, transnormativity) that constructs an imaginary that enables coherent communities out of
trans selves; this imaginary is its own aesthetic space that allows others within it to feel affective
connections with each other, share stories and narratives that make sense, and “get” one another;
and that these feelings not only matter but are necessary in order to change the everyday lives of
trans people who are commonly struggling in an atmosphere that is toxic to them.
The trans genre is tied up with all sorts of attachments to femininity and masculinity;
normative conceptions of gender, sex, and sexuality; to what the sexed and gendered body and
embodied aesthetic are; of what feelings are tied up with such embodiments; to what an
appropriate trans politics would be that reflects the needs of communities. In short, the trans
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genre establishes a certain (gendered?) convention of “true feelings” exclusively for trans people.
In her previous works, Lauren Berlant identified this cultural milieu of true feelings as a response
to the impersonal world of politics—that the result were new cultural forms that fostered what
real feelings, well, feel like when one is a citizen, or white, or black, etc. In making political
claims (if indeed that is what someone desires), a historicized imaginary would be antecedents
for such true feelings to exist. The irony is, of course, that the battle against what is taken for
granted as true (true sex, true gender, true biology, etc.) has been the cornerstone upholding the
trans movement since its inception. This is no coincidence. It is a necessary bargain that is
struck. The moment a marginalized group enters the liberal tableaux of rights, individualism, and
citizenship, they need to get their stories straight—their histories might buckle, but not
dismantle, the shared history their nation. The genre, the conventions constellated within it,
create both epistemic and aesthetic expectations. These expectations tether to those who perform
and identify within a genre’s limits as well as for those who bear witness to those performances.
Thus, generic limits help constitute certain phenomenological truths in everyday life, sorting out
what is ordinary from what is not, what can be from what cannot.
And yet the question of how such cultures (here trans culture and the trans complaint that
is concealed within it) persist in an era that has no clear trajectory for how trans people will be
accepted. For Berlant, women’s culture was something re-mediated over and over owing to
market forces. There is always a market for romance, for fantasy, for the better good life as a
woman. As a genre, femininity (and its dynamics with feminism) can play out in the various
media of popular culture. The spaces these media create allow for all kinds of feelings about
living realities to be purveyed all the while generating a singular response on the part of a female
participant. They trigger a realization of what is translatable from the day to day realities of
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certain kinds of oppression into the fantasies that love provide in a novel, a short story, a play, or
a movie. “The complexities and stresses of lives managed under all of the vectors of
subordination that we know about produces a vast market in such moments of felt simplicity. But
because those fantasies of translation are in relation to what is hard by surviving, there is nothing
simple about them or the astounding amount of creativity they absorb in the course of the
ordinary reproduction of life” (7). That is to say, there is nothing about these media that can be
reduced so as to sum up what women must be feeling upon watching, reading, or hearing them.
The responses that these media produce are means of both political release and optimistic
futurity, that even though the future is unknowable, “there’s always tomorrow” and the promise
of change.
Re-Examining Rage in the Trans Complaint
I want to revisit Susan Stryker. She is a pissed off transsexual woman. She split no hairs
about this affective space in her piece, “My Words to Victor Frankenstein above the Village of
Chamounix: Performing Transgender Rage” (2006, henceforth TR). “I decorated the set by
draping my black leather biker jacket over my chair at the panelists’ table. The jacket had
handcuffs on the left shoulder, rainbow freedom rings on the right side lacings, and Queer
Nation-style stickers reading BE CHANGE, DYKE, and FUCK YOUR TRANSPHOBIA
plastered on the back” (245). She identifies with Frankenstein’s monster, a technological
construction, the monster. Her voice is intelligent but belies a concealed politics. And why
shouldn’t she be pissed? The first part of this narrative piece is a reaction against those who
proclaim transsexuality as unnatural, an illness, or a disease of the will. When queer and feminist
communities seem to occult trans histories into something minor, inconsequential, how can the
trans subject narrate their own account and order of things? For Stryker, the monstrosity of

182

transsexuality is not nothing. As a character, the monster holds a critical position of refusal. “The
monster problematizes gender partly through its failure as a viable subject in the visual field...the
monster accomplishes [its] resistance by mastering language in order to claim a position as a
speaking subject and enact verbally the very subjectivity denied in the specular realm” (247).
The monster never passes. The monster, however, may learn to speak critical language—a
language that might inspire some to change their minds about what constitutes humanity.
This, I think, marks a limit point for the trans complaint: as an Other, constructed out of
the bits and pieces of social, cultural, and linguistic matrices, trans people can never fully occupy
that space they hold out for. It is a realist (albeit academic) take on an everyday problem,
recognition. Stryker’s use of spatialized language (“inability of language to represent...movement
over time between stably gendered positions”) invites readers to witness what appears to be a
common frustration for trans people. Phenomenologically, how can one comfortably situate
oneself in a culture if that culture’s language never captures the dynamics of self-projection for
trans people? But trans people can master the critical language of inquiry—like the monster. As
an academic, Stryker can speak and write at the register of the intellectual, in part to provide
access to a mode of understanding for the academic communities—in a sense, proving her own
humanity. As an activist, she is a body in public—a body, she argues, molds the trans psyche as
one built out of technological and psychiatric tableaux. Her body might always be called into
question. Her words, however well-spoken and saturated with academic credibility, are likewise
questioned for their authenticity. And this leads to rage.
Is there something so common about this rage that traverses communities of trans people,
allowing them a space for emotional awareness? Is there room in this piece for any kind of
reciprocation and recognition? Or is the trans subject forever attempting to occupy a place in
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culture that they can never fully occupy? Can this rage be transformative in the sense that when
one reads it, the feel moved by her words and willing to stand up against the very culture she
criticizes? And what about sexual reassignment surgery (SRS)? How does this potential moment
in the life of a trans person constitute both a moment of relieving change and the cruel optimism
that what was hoped for never comes true: acceptance, both self and social? I think these
questions underlie the trans complaint because they all touch the essence of liberal cultural
norms of self-transformation as the starting point for social change. Be that revolutionary! Own
that rage! Piss people off! This is what the trans genre offers: a way to feel political without
acting politically. A way toward self-understanding but always at the cost of an optimism that the
future self will be one’s authentic self. In a sense, this iteration of the trans genre mediates
personal tragedy with critical thinking in such a way that attaches the self to a normative
framework of political feeling and detaching from the pressures of real-world pressures in the
reproduction of ordinary life.
My sense is that what Stryker is doing here is crucial. It is not in vain and it is not
nothing. But it conceals an attachment to a vision of the world that could be if only people would
come to their senses. “Sometimes, though, I still mourn the passing of old, more familiar ways”
(250). The sentiment that the past is gone and all we have is now belies the fact that Stryker
desires a future where people see nature from her point of view. In a way, TR is a selfmanagement piece as much as it is autobiographical. Is that, perhaps, what the trans genre is, a
means of self-help and care; of self-management and self-projection? If so, then the worry might
be that such writings merely discuss how trans people manage but do so with the backdrop of a
bad kind of optimism. Take SRS, for instance. For many, SRS is seen as a means of finally
completing a journey of the body, of realizing in a material way what they had been feeling all
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along. But the oppressions of bias in the world do not change with the trans patient receiving
adequate care. They continue. (People still die of starvation; women are still brutalized by their
intimate partners; Black men are still rounded up in the prison industrial complex, a racism that
profits from cheap labor.) What I am trying to say here is that embodying the self, one’s feelings
of true mental self, does little to remove someone from the world into which they are thrown.
And, one can read, Stryker intimates ambivalence toward SRS, at best. So what is the trans
subject to do, if only to utilize that rage, own it, and seek change where change can happen?
What TR does not equip the reader with is exactly how to manage the affective pressures
that the trans subject will face in the world. As an academic, Stryker is more attuned to her
surroundings from an intellectual angle. She possesses an intuition that makes her aware of bias,
even alerts her to the potential of it. I am not criticizing Stryker for a project she never intended
to carry out. I am, however, concerned with what this seminal work in the trans genre is saying
about feeling normative and the “true feelings” associated with misrecognition. There is certainly
a great deal of good feelings, pleasure, when one is recognized for what they are, what they
project into the world as beings in the world. But there is also a certain kind of poetics to
misrecognition—of thinking that an object or future state will make us happy. In this sense, and
following Berlant’s take on it in Cruel Optimism, misrecognition is a part of the process by
which repetition, form, and release of energy constitute our affective attachments. Our affective
states make our bodies teachable (as I argued in Chapter Three concerning affective
intelligence). And if that is the case, our reactions to scenes, at least in part, reflect less of a
conscious willpower to govern these states than attempts to make the learning moments more
tolerable. When rage is overpowering, what is to be done? Do we confront a representation of the
problem (say, a white police officer, or a hospital worker) to construct a moment within a world
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in which we feel a little less “less than”? When we are stressed by the day to day practices we
require to reproduce ordinary life, do we exercise because, as we are told, that it is a natural
antidepressant? Or do we eat an entire foot long sandwich from and vomit it up later? When our
families no longer accept us for our identities, for our so-called lifestyles, do we “push through”
it, knowing that “it gets better”? Or do we turn to sex, drugs, alcohol, or other forms of selfinterruption? This rage goes somewhere, but my sense is that Stryker relies to heavily on the
power of genre to convey its direction.
I cannot speculate as to the answer Stryker might have. But it seems the normative routes,
as deemed healthy by experts, sound a hell of a lot better alternatives than the others. Berlant
argues, “Learning to interrupt the present may have something to do with learning to make a
political claim on the present” (2011, 159). Perhaps a political claim is being made when
someone, owning a certain historical narrative, refuses therapy because their problem is not
located in them but in an environment that continues to drain their creative energies. Perhaps the
political claim is having too much sex, perhaps drinking a bit too much, not because one is an
addict or has “a problem” but because the absence of feeling a real sense of reciprocity, real
recognition, is ameliorated through interrupting a present that seems endless. So what if language
cannot hold the temporal positionality of the trans subject when trans people are confronted with
the lattice work of racism and other oppressions that force an affective orientation that looks less
like revolution and more like making do. And if the trans complaint consists of finding
recognition and self-love (if only by and through a poetics of misrecognition), if it is about
finding a place in the normative world (if only to feel normal), then the critical shift ought to
pivot toward that desire to normativity and what affective practices such a desire gives rise to.
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So the question still haunting these meditations on the trans complaint (or even the trans
genre) could be framed around the desire to feel something like pity, or (re)sentiment about the
condition of trans communities. The politics of modern sentimentality is, as Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick would argue, is “vicariousness and misrepresentation, but also as sensation brought to
the quick with an insulting closeness” (2008, 150). If Stryker’s readers are moved by her words
or interpellated into revolutionary action, it is because they are invited to do so through the
temptation to witness the porous and generic pain through the author’s particular experience.
Considering that neither author invoked above offer explicit blueprints toward affective release
or a political program for a specific kind of cultural change, they stand as examples of the work
of sentimentality in the growing subcultural fantasies of norm/anti-norm positions the trans
genre. It’s the kind of writing that simultaneously—and importantly—making personal demons
public and offering a textual analysis/space of reflection for the reader to change their mind. That
is, the reader can (or ought to) change perspectives that accommodate the fluidity of gender, the
constructedness of the body, the cultural attachments to the nature/nurture divide (or to nature
most particularly), and to de-essentialize the notion of the self. In that sense, the trans complaint
aims to usher in what could be called a subjectivity that holds out hope that readers can change
because they finally “see the light” between the interaction of theory and personal reflection. But
for me, to read texts and think through theory that denudes the fantasies and stability of gender
norms, should also hold out for critiques of sentimentality, especially those of personal
reflections that absorb, rather than transmit, the vital energy of trans people in their ordinary
lives.
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